The Revolt of Kaunos and the Assassination of Zopyros

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For much of the fifth century BCE, the southwest Anatolian region of Caria was part of a dynamic frontier zone between the Athenian archē and the Achaemenid Persian empire. Athens extended its hegemony over Persia’s former Carian subjects in the 460s, but many of its inland polities disappeared from the Tribute Lists by the later 440s, and some may have resumed closer contacts with the Persian satrapal administration at Sardis. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War destabilized Athenian power along the Carian coast, facilitating revolts among tributary cities and offering opportunities for an increased Persian presence in the region. Unfortunately, the state of the evidence, chiefly consisting of ATL entries (sometimes reconstructed) and absences, augmented by a handful of brief references in Greek narrative sources, limits the possibilities for close examination of political interactions between Athenians, Persians, and Anatolian subjects. It remains especially difficult to reconstruct local Carian perspectives on interactions with, and resistance to, the imperial powers. The sources provide little guidance on why small towns might have chosen to repudiate Athenian authority, and whether they took such decisions with the deliberate intention of seeking Persian alliance. This is often assumed, notably in S. K. Eddy’s 1970s model of an Athenian-Persian “Cold War” in western Anatolia, in which uprisings resulted from explicit Persian efforts to foment defections and gradually reclaim its former Anatolian subjects. But the focus on Persian subterfuge


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overlooks the possible role of the Anatolian cities’ agency and local objectives in rebellions and shifts of allegiance.

The bilingual polis of Kaunos (Carian Ḳbid), the principal harbor town of southern Caria, provides a rare test case for the exploration of Anatolian resistance to Athens in greater detail. Kaunos’ revolt is attested by a fragment of Ctesias, which mentions it as the backdrop to the violent death of a Persian exile in Athenian service and the subsequent Persian execution of the killer. Despite its brevity and problems, the Ctesias passage provides several valuable details, and a number of previous studies have given it attention in the context of Athenian-Persian relations at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.² This paper attempts to expand on their conclusions and consider the passage’s implications for Kaunos itself as well as the imperial powers, focusing on a number of clues that problematize the assumption that anti-Athenian rebels automatically sought to align themselves with Persian patrons.

The Ctesias epitome on the Kaunian revolt: contexts and Questions

Photios’ epitome of Ctesias’ Persika reports the revolt of Kaunos in the context of a tragic tale about Zopyros the Persian, the son of a famed imperial general and maternal grandson of Xerxes (FGrHist 688 F 14.45):³


Ζώπυρος δὲ ὁ Μεγαβύζου καὶ Αμύτιος παῖς, ἔπει αὐτὸ ὅ τε πατήρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀπέστη βασιλέως καὶ εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀφίκετο κατὰ τὴν τής μητρὸς εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐνεργεσίαν. Εἰς Καῦνον δὲ ἀμα τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσέπλευσε, καὶ εἰς τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ αὐτῶ Ζώπυρος ἀποθνῄσκει. Αμήστρις δὲ ἡ μάμμη τὸν Καῦνιον ἀνεσταύρισεν.

Zopyros, the son of Megabyzos and Amytis, when his father and mother had died, rebelled against the King and came to Athens on account of his mother’s benefaction towards them. And he sailed out to Kaunos with his followers, and commanded them to surrender the city. The Kaunians said they would surrender the city to him, but not to the Athenians accompanying him. And as Zopyros was going inside the wall, Alkides the Kaunian threw a


6 A few earlier studies take εἰσιόντι δὲ Ζωπύρῳ εἰς τὸ τεῖχος as a statement that he attacked the Kaunian wall; see Albert T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948) 343 (“Zopyros refused their terms and began an assault; while climbing the wall, he was struck on the head”); Eddy, *CP* 68 (1973) 255 (“The latter attacked the city, but the assault failed and Zopyros was killed”). But the wording does not require combat and says nothing of his rejection of terms. A preferable translation simply indicates that he met his fate while going inside the city; see Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 436 (“When Zopyros entered the walls”); Lenfant, *Ctésias de Cnide* 134 (“Tandis que
rock, hitting him in the head, and thus Zopyros died. And Amestris his grandmother impaled the Kaunian.

Modern studies have accepted the story’s overall historicity in part because of its correlation with Herodotus (3.160), who mentions that Zopyros deserted the King and went to Athens but says nothing of his subsequent fate. Despite Ctesias’ notorious capacity for error on earlier periods of Achaemenid history, Babylonian documents from the Murāšu archive demonstrate his veracity on the prosopography of late-fifth-century Achaemenid elites, and recent studies argue for his preservation of genuine Persian oral traditions. The proximity of Ctesias’...
native Knidos to Kaunos is also relevant, as is the fact that Ctesias names the Kaunian culprit, in contrast to his references to anonymous Kaunians and Carians at the battle of Cunaxa.\textsuperscript{11}

Most scholarly commentary on Ctesias’ account of Kaunos’ revolt and Zopyros’ death has concentrated on their chronology, with the majority agreeing on a context in the early years of the Peloponnesian War.\textsuperscript{12} The next passage in the epitome records the demise of Artaxerxes I in 424, and two additional pieces of external evidence also point to the first half of the 420s. In the Tribute Lists, after regular payments of half a talent per year throughout the surviving lists of the 440s and 430s, Kaunian tribute leaps to ten talents in the reassessment of 425, a probable indication of punishment for disloyalty.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, studies of the Lycian inscriptions on the late fifth-century Xanthos stele (\textit{TAM I} 44) have associated a probable reference to a Persian governor (\textit{haxlaza}) at Kaunos in the context of anti-Athenian military activity with the defeat of the strategos Lysikles in Caria in the fall of 428 (Thuc. 3.19). As the Ctesias passage does not imply that the Persians were present at Kaunos until after Zopyros’ death, the event can probably be placed sometime

1985) 90–95. For Ctesias’ debt to Iranian oral traditions see Lenfant, \textit{Ctésias de Cnide} xxxv–xxxvi; Llewellyn-Jones and Robson, \textit{Ctesias’ History} 58–59, 63–65; Waters, \textit{Ctesias’ Persica}.


\textsuperscript{12} The alternative context would be Perikles’ voyage towards Kaunos to deter the approach of a Persian fleet during the siege of Samos in 440 (Thuc. 1.116.3); see Joseph Wells, “The Persian Friends of Herodotus,” \textit{JHS} 27 (1907) 43; Truesdell S. Brown, “Megabyzus Son of Zopyros,” \textit{Ancient World} 15 (1978) 73; Simon Hornblower, \textit{Mausolus} (Oxford 1982) 28 n.176; Christian Marek, \textit{Die Inschriften von Kaunos} (Munich 2006) 93. But Kaunos’ tribute payments at the time of the Samian revolt problematize this hypothesis, and it is unlikely that Perikles would have gone unmentioned as Zopyros’ companion in Ctesias or that Perikles’ critics would have failed to use the failed attempt on Kaunos against him.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{ATL} II p.42, A9.98.
between 431 and 428.\footnote{Badian, \textit{Plataea to Potidaea} 36, stresses that Ctesias does not directly place the Persians inside Kaunos, for which the Lycian evidence is crucial \textit{(TAM I} 44.a.51–55, c 46–48); see Diether Schürr, “Kaunos in lykischen Inschriften,” \textit{Kadmos} 37 (1998) 152–156; Thonemann, in \textit{Interpreting the Athenian Empire} 175–178; Diether Schürr, “Zum Agora-Pfeiler in Xanthos II: Selbstlof auf Perserart und Ordnung des Raumes,” \textit{Kadmos} 48 (2010) 168–170.}\footnote{Meiggs, \textit{Athenian Empire} 437; Eddy, \textit{CP} 68 (1973) 255–256; David M. Lewis, \textit{Sparta and Persia} (Leiden 1977) 61 n.77; H. D. Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” \textit{CQ} 29 (1979) 22; Raymond Descat, “Colophon et la Paix d’Epilycos,” in H. Malay (ed.), \textit{Erol Atalay Memorial. Arkeoloji Dergisi Özel Sayı I} (Izmir 1991) 39; Badian, \textit{Plataea to Potidaea} 35; Miller, \textit{Athens and Persia} 24, 90; Antony G. Keen, \textit{Dynastic Lycia: A Political History of the Lycians and their Relations with Foreign Powers} (Leiden 1998) 134; Schürr, \textit{Kadmos} 37 (1998) 152–154; Briant, \textit{From Cyrus to Alexander} 975; Thonemann, in \textit{Interpreting the Athenian Empire} 171; Schürr, \textit{Kadmos} 48 (2010) 169; Hyland, \textit{Persian Interventions} 39.} Persian forces were also involved in clashes with Athenians at the Ionian poleis of Kolophon and Notion in the early years of the war (Thuc. 3.34), and Kaunos’ revolt and Persian occupation are commonly explained as part of a Persian effort to exploit the growing instability within the Athenian arché.\footnote{Yet despite widespread agreement about the context, previous studies have not been able to offer satisfactory answers to the numerous questions raised by the Ctesias passage. This paper will discuss five of these in turn: 1. Why did Kaunos, previously an ally of exceptional loyalty, revolt against Athens? 2. Why did the Athenians entrust a Persian exile with such a prominent role in the mission to recover Kaunos? 3. What are the implications of Kaunos’ offer to surrender to Zopyros but not the Athenians (and the apparent willingness of the Athenians and Zopyros to consider these terms)? 4. Why did Alkides kill Zopyros, and what does the murder imply about the internal political situation at Kaunos? 5. Why did Amestris—or the representatives of Persian authority at Kaunos—impale Alkides rather than rewarding his elimination of a prominent rebel against the King?}

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1. Why did Kaunos, previously an ally of exceptional loyalty, revolt against Athens?
2. Why did the Athenians entrust a Persian exile with such a prominent role in the mission to recover Kaunos?
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The limited state of the evidence prevents certain answers to all of these questions, but there are enough contextual clues to broaden our understanding of the revolt beyond the conclusions of previous studies.

Causes of Kaunian revolt

Over the decades preceding the revolt, Kaunos stands out in the ATL documentation for the frequency of its payments, in contrast to the recalcitrance of other southwest Anatolian communities. Many of Athens’ Carian and Lycian tributaries, including nearby coastal sites such as Idyma and Telmessos, ceased payments over the course of the 440s, and the Athenians discarded their Carian tribute district in an administrative reorganization by 438. Yet Kaunos remains in the records for 453/2, 452/1, 451/0, 448/7, 443/2, 441/0, 440/39, 438/7, and 433/2, and its presence has also been restored for 447/6, 446/5, 444/3, and 442/1. Despite agricultural wealth, access to overseas trade through its two excellent harbors, and minting of local coinage by the middle of the fifth-century, it paid the minimal tribute rate of half a talent per year, lower than many cities of comparable size and resources. It is possible that the Kaunians made additional, unrecorded contributions in kind,

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but the post-revolt tribute surge indicates that the Athenians 
could have demanded much greater sums in the 430s, and 
perhaps did not because they wished to reward the Kaunians’ 
fidelity. The sources offer no hints as to Kaunos’ form of 
government or political ideology in this period, but the pro-
Athenian stance was probably rooted at least in part in the 
combination of economic advantage and isolation from anti-
Athenian neighbors. Mt. Imbros (Ülemez Dağ), the Kalbian lake 
(Köyceğiz Gölü), and the river Kalbis (Dalyan) imposed physical 
boundaries between Kaunian territory and the rest of Caria, and 
both Herodotus and Carian epigraphic evidence testify to 
Kaunian traditions of linguistic and ethnic distinction from other 
Carians.  

What changed in the early 420s to overturn Athens’ and 
Kaunos’ special relationship? S. K. Eddy hypothesized that 
Persian agents actively sought to provoke anti-Athenian revolts 
across western Anatolia, before and after the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War, but there is little evidence to support such 
a widespread pattern of subterfuge—the later arrival of Persian 
forces after the revolt’s initiation does not prove that they 
brought about its outbreak. Whether or not foreign influence 
played a role, it is clear that something must have happened to 
alter the Kaunians’ perception that cooperation with Athens was 
beneficial to their city. 

The events of 430–429 provide several plausible catalysts for 
revolt. The great plague of Athens which broke out in 430 must 
have sent shockwaves around the Aegean, and in the winter of 
430/29 Lycian dynasts inflicted a sensational defeat on the crews

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19 Hdt. 1.172 reports Kaunian claims of descent from Cretan immigrants 
in contrast to Carian autochthony, and their annual ritual expelling “foreign 
gods.” For the distinctions between the Kaunian dialect and standard Carian 
see Adiego, *The Carian Language* 214; Alexander Herda, “Greek (and our) 
Views on the Karians,” in Anne Mouton et al. (eds.), *Luwian Identities: Culture, 
Language and Religion between Anatolia and the Aegean* (Leiden 2013) 433–434. It is 
also noteworthy that Kaunian Greek-speakers employed Ionic while their 

20 Eddy, *CP* 68 (1973) 255. For critiques of Eddy’s approach see Lewis, 
of six Athenian triremes and their general Melesandros, who had been trying to collect war materiel along the Carian and Lycian coast (Thuc. 2.69). Kaunian trade may have suffered from the depredations of pirates whom Melesandros had been ordered to suppress. In addition to any negative economic consequences, it is clear from the Lycian Xanthos stele that the battle inflicted a major blow on the image of Athenian power in southwestern Anatolia. This military reversal is likely to have influenced Kaunos’ loss of confidence in Athens’ ability to protect them from enemies, or punish them for abandoning their former loyalties.21

What was Zopyros doing at Kaunos?

The next question is why the Athenians chose to involve Zopyros in the expedition to recapture Kaunos. It is unclear how long he had lived in Athens, but he is likely to have been a figure of considerable prominence during his residence;22 modern studies have hypothesized his personal contact with numerous members of the Athenian intellectual community.23 Some

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21 See Thonemann, in Interpreting the Athenian Empire, 171–72, 181. A decision to turn against Athens after learning of its military setback would echo the choice of the early-fifth-century Kaunians to join the Ionian Revolt upon news of the burning of Sardis (Hdt. 5.103.2).

22 It is unclear when to date Megabyzos’ death, the precursor to Zopyros’ flight from Persia. Diod. 12.4.5 reports Megabyzos’ role in the Peace of Kallias around 449. Ctesias adds a five-year exile and return to court towards the end of his life, and implies that Amytis outlived him by a substantial period (f 14.43–44), which may imply that Zopyros’ flight did not occur until the late 440s or 430s; see David Welsh, “The Chorus of Aristophanes’ Babylonians,” GRBS 24 (1983) 145–146; Miller, Athens and Persia 24; Wouter Henkelman, “Zopyros en Sokrates, een fysiognomische ontmoeting,” Lampas 32 (1999) 145–146; Kuhrt, The Persian Empire 329 n.2.

Athenians may have suspected his loyalty, as perhaps hinted by Herodotus’ reference in the context of his grandfather’s false defection at Babylon.\(^{24}\) Nevertheless, the Ctesias epitome suggests that the Athenian government trusted him enough to send him to Kaunos as an official representative, accompanied by Athenian “followers.” It is doubtful that this implies Zopyros’ sole command of Athenian ships, although one cannot rule out the possibility that mercenaries in his private employ took part alongside Athenian forces. The Athenian presence on the expedition, though, implies command by a state officer, perhaps one of the strategoi. A promising candidate is Lysikles, who cruised the southwest Anatolian coast in 428 with twelve triremes (Thuc. 3.19), and may have attempted to retake Kaunos before sailing north on his final mission to the Maeander valley; this could explain the Xanthos stele’s apparent report that a Persian official at Kaunos ordered another Persian to coordinate resistance to the Athenians in the Maeander region.\(^ {25}\) But regardless of the Athenian commander’s identity, Zopyros appears to have taken the lead in talks with the Kaunian rebels. This demands explanation—what advantage did the Athenians see in


employing a Persian exile as negotiator, and what does his role imply about the situation at Kaunos?

A number of studies suggest that Kaunos revolted from Athens because of Persian influence, and that Zopyros accompanied the Athenian ships to act as an intermediary with the Persians who now controlled the rebel city. Athens’ reliance on ‘Persia experts’ for assistance in diplomatic communication is attested a few years later in the decree honoring a prominent Ionian, Herakleides of Klazomenai, for his role in contacts with the King (IG I3 227). But despite Zopyros’ bona fides as a member of the extended Achaemenid family, it is doubtful that the Athenians expected him to engage in direct talks with Persian counterparts at Kaunos. Without a royal pardon, the exile could not have expected to exert much influence on imperial officials who retained Artaxerxes’ favor, and contact with Persian authorities would have exposed him to the danger of arrest and extradition to court. Furthermore, as pointed out by Ernst Badian, the Ctesias passage clearly indicates that Zopyros spoke with the Kaunians themselves, not Persians, which implies in turn that the Persians had not yet established control of Kaunos; if they had, they would hardly have allowed their subjects to conduct open surrender talks on their own account.

That said, the Athenians had good reason to fear that rebel allies in coastal Anatolia would attempt to strengthen their defenses by calling on Persian assistance, even if that aid had not yet materialized. Not only were the Spartans beginning to solicit Persian imperial aid, as indicated by the failed embassy of 430 (Thuc. 2.67), but Ionian rebels at Samos in 440 (Thuc. 1.115–116) and Kolophon and Notion in 430 (Thuc. 3.34) had obtained mercenary soldiers from Pissouthnes, the satrap of Sardis. In this context, Athenian forces attempting to recover rebel cities would need to reckon for such appeals and attempt to deter them from seeking Persian alliances. It is possible that Zopyros’ unique

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26 Meiggs, Athenian Empire 437; Hornblower, Mausolus 28; Miller, Athens and Persia 24; Henkelman, Lampas 32 (1999) 129.

27 Badian, Plataea to Potidæa 36.
status as a disaffected Achaemenid, intimately familiar with Persian imperial methods, made him an ideal spokesman to persuade the Kaunians and other rebel communities that Persian intervention would not be to their advantage, and that they were better off seeking reconciliation with Athens.

The Kaunian surrender offer

The Ctesias passage makes no reference to fighting between the Athenians and Kaunians, and although an unsuccessful assault may have preceded the talks and failed to make it into the epitome, it appears that Zopyros initiated surrender talks soon after the Athenians’ arrival. Why did both sides choose to negotiate instead of trusting in the outcome of a military encounter? The Athenian willingness to talk, as in their operations at Notion in 427 (Thuc. 3.34), probably resulted from the defenders’ possession of a wall, which Athens generally attempted to prohibit in the cities of the archē as a deterrent to rebellion. Either it had tolerated an existing fortification in light of Kaunos’ earlier loyalty, or the citizens built it in haste when they decided to revolt. Whether this was a simple stockade or more elaborate defensive system (stone fortifications at the site date to the fourth century), it enhanced Kaunos’ already formidable natural position. It should not have been difficult for the ships that brought Zopyros to enter one of the city’s two harbors, the larger Southern Harbor on the southeast side of the Small Acropolis or the round Inner Harbor (now the lagoon of Süülüklü Göl) below its western face, but the steep acropolis slopes would have favored the defenders against attack from either direction.

28 On the apparent absence of combat see Christopher Tuplin, “Ctesias as Military Historian,” in Ktesias’ Welt 453 n.7.

29 For unwalled cities in the Athenian archē see M. H. Hansen and T. H. Nielsen, Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis (Oxford 2004) 1374. In 411 Ctesias’ unwalled hometown Knidos repelled an initial Athenian attack and then built a stockade overnight to strengthen the defenses (Thuc. 8.35.3–4).

30 Personal observation in May 2017 strengthened the author’s impression of the site’s defensive potential. The Classical town occupied the Small Acropolis and its northern saddle, and stretched west around the Inner

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Even if the Athenians outnumbered the Kaunians, the nature of the terrain and Melesandros’ recent disaster in Lycia likely encouraged caution.  

On the Kaunian side, though, the willingness to consider surrender suggests a corresponding lack of confidence in the city’s defenses. There was every reason for the arrival of an Athenian expeditionary force to prompt anxiety in the rebel city, regardless of the strength of its walls and rocky hilltop position. Athens’ response may have been faster or more vigorous than expected in light of the setbacks that preceded Kaunos’ rebellion. Sieges in the world of the Classical Aegean frequently ended in the defenders’ betrayal by internal factions, as for example in Mytilene in 427 (Thuc. 3.27), and the length of Kaunos’ attachment to Athens would have increased the danger that Attic sympathizers might let the enemy in. If the city fell to assault, the inhabitants could expect a sack and the danger of andrapodismos or outright massacre, of which the Peloponnesian War period provides all too many examples; when Potidaea surrendered to Athens in the winter of 430/29, the Athenian demos disapproved of its generals’ leniency in granting conditions and merely expelling the entire surviving population (Thuc. 2.70.4). The fear of a worst-case scenario provides the most plausible context for the Kaunians’ decision to counter Zopyros’ initial surrender demand with a compromise offer instead of breaking off talks and attempting to repel the enemy by force.

Harbor to the area of the early Hellenistic stoa and agora. Surviving fortifications north of the site are Hekatomnid or Hellenistic, but the wall that confronted Zopyros probably defended the approaches from one or both harbors to the saddle and the Small Acropolis. See G. E. Bean, “Notes and Inscriptions from Caunus,” JHS 73 (1953) 12–15; Hornblower, Mausolus 315–316; Marie-Henriette Gates, “Archaeology in Turkey,” AJA 98 (1994) 266; Cengiz Işık, “Die Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen in Kaunos bis zur Entdeckung der Bilingue,” Kadmos 37 (1998) 187–188; P. Flensted-Jensen, in Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis 1120.

The Athenian general Paches resorted to treachery in order to seize Notion (Thuc. 3.34.3–4), and his force, which had already successfully besieged Mytilene, was much larger than Lysikles’ dozen ships or other forces available for operations in the southern Aegean.
The specifics of the counter-offer deserve further attention. What did it mean for the Kaunians to agree to hand over their city to Zopyros but not his Athenian associates? The phrasing (παραδίδοναι τὴν πόλιν) suggests a transfer of political control that went beyond a simple payment of tribute arrears and agreement to remain loyal in future. Zopyros was to enter Kaunos and take possession of the city. The sources give no details on Kaunos’ form of government at this period, but the proposal may have envisioned Zopyros’ installation in some supervisory role, perhaps similar to the archontes, episkopoi, or other Athenian administrators sometimes stationed in allied cities, if not as the city’s actual dynast. It is clear that his acceptance of Kaunos’ surrender would curtail its political autonomy to some degree, but the Kaunian negotiators might have proffered the compromise as an alternative to full occupation by Athenian troops and the sorts of reprisals often visited on defeated rebel cities. There was still the danger that Zopyros might bring in the Athenians once he entered the gates, but the Kaunians doubtless required oaths or other assurances of good faith before permitting his entry.

Zopyros’ entry suggests that both he and the Athenians willingly accepted the Kaunian proposal. The city’s conditional surrender may have seemed advantageous to the Athenian commander because of the avoidance of casualties or the depletion of his force through the necessity to leave behind a garrison. Although acceptance of compromise risked public anger such as that which surrounded the outcome of the Potidaea siege, it might have seemed justifiable in light of Kaunos’ rapid surrender, which reduced the threat of Persian interference and

32 The theory of Athens’ derivation of such imperial administrative positions from Achaemenid models would be particularly relevant in Zopyros’ case; see further Kurt Raaflaub, “Learning from the Enemy: Athenian and Persian ‘Instruments of Empire’,” in Interpreting the Athenian Empire 103–105.

33 In light of Kaunos’ tribute history, it is less likely that its citizens simply preferred to be ruled by a Persian rather than the Athenians, as proposed by Lenfant, Citéas de Cnide 270 n.581.

34 For the danger, see Paches’ actions at Notion (Thuc. 3.34.3).
allowed the Athenian ships to move on to other objectives (such as Lysikles’ targets in the Maeander valley). As for Zopyros, the acquisition of an administrative position at Kaunos provided both the opportunity to help his Athenian allies and perhaps some leverage in future negotiations for royal forgiveness, similar to the pardons that Artaxerxes had bestowed on his father Megabyzos (Ctes. F 14.42–43). If the King still wished him ill, Sardis was far away, and Mount Imbros and the lake limited potential avenues of Persian approach; should the Persians attack and Athens prove unable to provide direct support, Kaunos’ harbors offered an easy escape route. But in deciding to accept the Kaunian offer, Zopyros and the Athenians misjudged either its sincerity or the unanimity of the Kaunian citizens’ support for the terms.

**The death of Zopyros**

This brings us to the causes and consequences of Zopyros’ murder. The epitome’s ἔφασκον in the surrender discussion may carry an intentional connotation of pretense, implying that the Kaunian compromise offer was actually a ruse designed to lure Zopyros to his death. But the other possibility is that the negotiators treated in good faith and Alkides acted in opposition to a genuine surrender attempt, bringing their plans to ruin through Zopyros’ assassination. To assess the plausibility of these two options, it is necessary to consider the problem of motive.

What did the city of Kaunos and its negotiators stand to gain from Zopyros’ death? He was not in command of the Athenian forces, and his murder should not have demoralized the Athenian crews to the point of causing their withdrawal; rather than deterring an assault on the town, it was likely to provoke greater hostility and lessen the chances of mercy if the Athenians gained entry. It was equally implausible as a delaying technique, if the Kaunians hoped to buy time for Persian forces to come to their support—the killing would have cut short negotiations

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rather than drawing them out, and the Kaunians lost a potential bargaining chip that might have been gained by taking Zopyros hostage.\textsuperscript{36} It remains a possibility that they plotted the Persian renegade’s death as a means of purchasing Achaemenid assistance; but this required a gamble on the arrival of Persian troops before the Athenians could take the city, and would make the subsequent Persian treatment of the killer all the more inexplicable.

On the contrary, the killing has more obvious benefit for an individual or group that sought to prevent a compromise peace with Athens, perhaps in opposition to the conditions that the negotiators attempted to arrange to save the city. Its most obvious consequence would be to prevent any further negotiation and make it more difficult for remaining Athenian sympathizers in the city to find a path to reconciliation. Internal division over the wisdom of continuing resistance would be plausible in light of Kaunos’ long history of loyalty to Athens; the outbreak of factional conflict between moderates and proponents of all-out resistance is attested in the contemporary revolt of Mytilene, and provides an attractive model for understanding what may have transpired at Kaunos (Thuc. 3.27–28). Zopyros’ death implicated the entire city in the crime, thereby forcing even reluctant fellow citizens into a position of irreversible hostility to the Athenians in the harbor.

Without Ctesias’ full text, of course, the specifics of the murder cannot be fully explained, and the position of the killer Alkides in Kaunian society must remain a mystery. The epitome does not specify whether he acted alone or on behalf of a faction, or whether his deed was the culmination of a premeditated plan or carried out on the spur of the moment. Stone-throwing (as opposed to stabbing) seems an unusual method to employ in a deliberate assassination. But it is possible that Alkides took

\textsuperscript{36} One might contrast the decision of Samian rebels to seize their Athenian garrison and its officers as prisoners and turn them over to Pissouthnes at Sardis (Thuc. 1.115.5); for the potential diplomatic consequences see Hyland \textit{Persian Interventions} 35–36.
advantage of the elevation and opportunity for an ambush behind the concealment of wall structures or zigzagging paths on the rocky slopes of the Small Acropolis.\textsuperscript{37} Or should he be envisioned as throwing a piece of battlement or roof tile from a position such as a guard post atop the gates or an adjoining tower? Alternatively, did some of the Kaunians riot when the negotiators announced the terms to the citizens and Zopyros attempted to enter? Stoning might seem more appropriate to the actions of a mob in which Alkides played a prominent part and earned the credit for the deed.

Regardless of the exact details, internal division among the Kaunians remains the most plausible explanation for the assault on the Athenians’ Persian proxy. It seems less likely that Zopyros’ killing fulfilled the plans of Persian sympathizers at Kaunos, in light of what happened to Alkides after Persia took control of the city.

\textit{The Persian execution of Alkides}

The epitome skips over the immediate consequences of Zopyros’ death at Kaunos in order to highlight Alkides’ fate and the vengeance of Zopyros’ grandmother, Xerxes’ widow Amestris. The Athenian reaction, therefore, remains unknown—did the crews in the harbor make any attempt to avenge their fallen ally before they sailed away? We also remain in the dark on the circumstances that brought Persian forces into the city, and how soon after the Athenians’ departure this took place. In any case, Persia’s temporary occupation of Kaunos by the fall of 428 appears to be supported by the Xanthos stele’s references to an official there with the Lycian title \textit{haxlaza}. Diether Schürr and Peter Thonemann have interpreted this word as a variant of \textit{asaxlazu}, attested in the fourth-century Letoon Trilingual\textsuperscript{38} as a term for a city “governor” (\textit{epimeletes}) within the local satrapal system. \textit{TAM I} 44’s Lycian A text leaves this official anonymous.

\textsuperscript{37} For a parallel see the alleged Macedonian assassination attempt on Eumenes II of Pergamon at Delphi in 173 (Livy 42.15–16).

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Fouilles de Xanthos} VI: line 2.
(a.51), but the Lycian B or Milyan verse text on the same monument, shortly after another reference to Kaunos (c.46), mentions a Persian named Hystaspes who may be the same individual (c.48). According to both Schürr’s and Thonemann’s readings, the relevant section of the Lycian A text states that the haxlaza at Kaunos ordered another Persian, Amorges, to confront an “Ionian” army near Mts. Mykale and Thorax, probably referring to Lysikles’ raiders.39 The distance between Kaunos and the mouth of the Maeander was substantial, about 215 kilometers by the most direct route across inland Caria from Idyma to Tralles; but if Hystaspes arrived at Kaunos soon after the Athenian raid’s failure, he might have been able to warn Amorges that the enemy was headed in his direction.40 Perhaps Pissouthnes of Sardis had sent Hystaspes to Kaunos in the hope of acquiring a strategic port, building on his local successes at Kolophon and Nition, and extending his protection to opponents of Athens farther down the southwest coast.41 Whatever the Persians’ motives, they are likely to have encountered a mixed response from the Kaunian community. Not only had Kaunos been a long-standing Athenian ally, but some of its residents likely recalled ancestral traditions of resistance to Achaemenid imperialism. Kaunos had participated in the

39 Schürr, Kadmos 37 (1998) 152–156; Thonemann, in Interpreting the Athenian Empire 176–179; Schürr, Kadmos 48 (2010) 168–170. As noted by Schürr, Hystaspes’ name suggests that he was Pissouthnes’ son; the homonymy with Pissouthnes’ father may suggest that he was of higher familial status than the “nothos” Amorges (see also Hyland, Persian Interventions 39, 183 n.9). Schürr stresses Hystaspes’ and Amorges’ mutual cooperation, while Thonemann overlooks the role of Pissouthnes in viewing Hystaspes as a senior Persian general with authority over western Anatolia.

40 See Hyland, Persian Interventions 183 n.9; one might compare the later campaign in which a Persian hyparch’s capture of Athenian raiders in Lydia prompted Tissaphernes to rush troops from all over his satrapy to the defense of the Ephesian Artemision (Xen. Hell. 1.2.4–6).

41 For further discussion of Pissouthnes and Athens in the 420s see Hyland, Persian Interventions 38–40, 43.
Ionian Revolt, and Herodotus suggests that its earlier inhabitants chose mass suicide over surrender at the time of the sixth-century Persian conquest (1.176.3). If part of the citizen body also resisted its ‘liberation’ by Hystaspes, this would go a long way toward explaining the otherwise inexplicable conclusion to Ctesias’ story, the claim that Amestris had Alkides impaled.

The execution itself is likely historical, since it pertains to a named contemporary of Ctesias from a nearby city and the method employed was gruesomely memorable. But the responsibility of Amestris and the implied motive of retribution for Zopyros’ assassination are dubious. A few older studies, taking Ctesias at his word, accept that the Kaunian fell victim to a senseless act of Persian female cruelty. But given the recurring trope of the vengeful queen in Ctesias’ narrative, it would be dangerous to place too much stock in a literal interpretation. The tale is all too similar to the lurid accounts of Parysatis’ revenge on the men involved in the downfall of Cyrus the Younger at Cunaxa (two of whom actually seem to have died for contradicting the King’s claim to sole responsibility for Cyrus’ death). One suspects that there was a better justification for the execution of a royal benefactor, who had killed a prominent rebel and exile, than the grief of the rebel’s royal grandmother.

Perhaps Alkides offended Artaxerxes and his subordinates through the unauthorized killing of a fugitive whom the Persians hoped to take alive, so that the King might rule on his fate. Zopyros possessed first-hand knowledge of Athens’ internal politics, and one might imagine Persian annoyance at the loss of the opportunity to debrief him; given the story of his grandfather, it is tempting to speculate whether his ‘exile’ was in fact a front for a fact-finding mission. But even if this was the case,

42 Wells, JHS 27 (1907) 43; Eddy, CP 68 (1973) 255–256; Brown, Ancient World 15 (1978) 73.


Zopyros’ killer could not have known of any such arrangement, and one would expect apparent treason and public estrangement from the King to justify Zopyros’ elimination, just as Darius II later called for the apprehension of the rebel Amorges “dead or alive” (Thuc. 8.5.5). A parallel case in Herodotus, the execution of the rebel Histiaios, who allegedly retained Darius’ sympathy, resulted in reprimands but no serious punishment for the parties responsible.\(^{45}\) It is difficult to understand why the Persians would have viewed Alkides’ killing of Zopyros as a crime deserving of death in its own right, and possible that Ctesias correctly recorded the event but failed to understand its cause.

The manner of Alkides’ death hints at a better explanation. Studies of capital punishment in Achaemenid Persia and the Ancient Near East have demonstrated that such penalties were not random acts of sadism, but endowed with specific judicial and ideological meanings.\(^{46}\) Impalement almost always occurred in response to acts of political rebellion.\(^{47}\) Darius I notably employed it against secessionist kings and opponents of his bid for power in 522–521, and Artaxerxes I inflicted a variant on the Egyptian rebel Inaros.\(^{48}\) Impalement’s primary purpose was to

\(^{45}\) Hdt. 6.30; Artaphernes remained the satrap of Sardis and his son held joint command of the Marathon expedition.


\(^{47}\) Jacobs, in Extreme Formen von Gewalt 130–134; cf. Carsten Binder, Plutarchs Vita des Artaxerxes: Ein historischer Kommentar (Berlin 2008) 250–251. An exception is Xerxes’ alleged impalement of an Achaemenid noble, Sataspes, for raping Megabyzos’ sister (Hdt. 4.43); but this might fall within the related category of “crimes of contempt against the crown and state” discussed by Radner, Zeitschr. f. altorientalische und biblische Rechtsgeschichte 21 (2015) 118.

\(^{48}\) Bisitun inscr. §32–33, 43, 50; Hdt. 3.125.3, 3.159.1, 6.30.1; Thuc. 1.110;
endow the victim’s punishment with maximum visibility, displaying the terrible price of treason in the sight of the victim’s community. Both Darius I and Alexander the Great, when executing the assassin of Darius III, impaled their victims in a major regional center where a large crowd could be assembled, and in some cases where the rebellious act had taken place. Ernst Badian suggests that the Persians could have “lured” Alkides to court with false promises of reward; but there were reasons both ideological and pragmatic to carry out the sentence at the location of greatest resonance, rather than wasting resources to convey him 2500 kilometers from home and execute him beyond the gaze of his fellow citizens. Other Near Eastern parallels suggest that Persian officials at Kaunos probably carried out Alkides’ execution in or near his native city, where other Kaunians could bear witness.

In light of the comparative evidence on execution by impalement in Achaemenid Persia, it seems most likely that Persian authorities identified Alkides as a culprit in Kaunian resistance to their efforts to establish control. The specific circumstances are beyond our reach, but it is understandable that the Persians, if claiming to offer Kaunos protection from Athens, would have interpreted any local opposition as inherently treacherous. It would have been easy for local rumor, if not Ctesias’ imagination, to assign the ultimate responsibility for Alkides’ death to Amestris and draw a connection with his role in Zopyros’

Ctes. F 14.39 (Ctesias also associates the impalement of Inaros with Amestris’ anger at his killing of Xerxes’ brother—actually the King’s uncle according to Hdt. 3.12.4). For a full catalogue of Near Eastern and Greek evidence see Rollinger in Der Achämenidenhof 559–566.


50 Badian, Plataea to Potidæa 36.

51 See Radner, Zeitschrift für altorientalische und biblische Rechtsgeschichte 21 (2015) 122: “Impalement and the exhibition of corpses were always performed on location, never in a context where the victim had been removed to another setting.”
murder, just as later Greek authors speculated that the killing of the Persian general Tissaphernes in Phrygia had something to do with his earlier enmity towards Cyrus and Parysatis’ consequent malevolence.⁵² Ctesias or his epitomator may have omitted the details of Alkides’ anti-Persian activity in order to develop the more melodramatic connection between his execution and the anger of Amestris.

**Conclusion**

To summarize the reconstruction advanced above, Kaunos probably revolted from Athens in 429 or 428, shortly after the Athenian defeat in Lycia. Athens sent a naval squadron, possibly that of Lysikles, to retake the city, and Zopyros may have accompanied it in order to persuade rebel communities not to call in Persian aid. Some of Kaunos’ leaders attempted to surrender, offering a compromise that would place Zopyros in authority over their city while avoiding further punishment, but Alkides’ killing of Zopyros as he entered the walls forced the city into a firmer anti-Athenian stance. Persian forces, probably led by the Hystaspe mentioned on the Xanthos stele, then occupied Kaunos by late 428, and Alkides’ involvement in resistance to their takeover resulted in his impalement as a warning to opponents of Achaemenid rule.

In the end, there was never much hope of a Kaunos for the Kaunians, free of the influence of either imperial power. Persia’s hold on Kaunos quickly gave way to a renewed period of Athenian control. It is unclear whether Athens had already recaptured the city when it raised Kaunos’ tribute assessment to ten talents in 425, but a securely dated tribute list shows that a Kaunian payment to Athens occurred in 421/0 (ATL II p.42, A9.98—unfortunately the sum is lost). There is insufficient evidence to explain the reasons for Kaunos’ return to the Athenian fold, although some studies speculate that Alkides’ execution backfired, causing a shift of Kaunian public opinion away from the Persians.⁵³ If the Athenians sent an unattested force to attack the

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⁵² Diod. 14.80.6; Plut. Artax. 23.1; Polyaen. 7.16.1.
⁵³ Wells, *JHS* 27 (1907) 43; Eddy, *CP* 68 (1973) 256.
city directly, its geographical isolation and considerable distance from Sardis may have complicated Persian efforts at defense. Raymond Descat suggests that Persia ceded Kaunos back to Athens by treaty, in the Peace of Epilykos early in the reign of Darius II. It finally fell back into long-term Achaemenid possession a decade later, with Persia’s full-fledged intervention in the Peloponnesian War.

This interpretation of Kaunos’ revolt and Zopyros’ murder must remain tentative, given the limits of the evidence. But despite many lingering questions, the episode offers a valuable glimpse of the complexity of Anatolian resistance to the Athenian archē. A bipolar ‘Cold War’ model that explains revolts as the product of Persian-Athenian competition cannot fully account for the agency of the rebel cities themselves, which acted in pursuit of local objectives, while proving vulnerable to internal violence over how to define their self-interest. In closing, Alkides’ death offers a pointed reminder that an opponent of Athens did not always have to be a partisan of Persia.

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54 Descat, in *Erol Atalay Memorial* 39–40.