John of Sardis’ Commentary on Aphthonius’ *Progymnasmata*: Logic in Ninth-Century Byzantium

Byron David MacDougall

To students of the state of philosophical studies in ninth-century Byzantium, the *prolegomena* and commentaries to the Corpus of Hermogenes offer a tempting body of material. It has been frequently noted that these texts, produced throughout the Late Antique and Byzantine periods, are closely related to the Alexandrian Neoplatonic *prolegomena* to philosophy, Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, Aristotle, and his *Categories*.1 The rhetorical *prolegomena*, more than thirty of which were edited in a collection by Hugo Rabe, bear several structural similarities to their philosophical counterparts, including:2 (a)

1 Most of these Neoplatonic texts were edited in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca and include Ammonius’ *prolegomena* to philosophy and the *Isagoge* (CIG IV.3 1–23) and to Aristotelian philosophy and the *Categories* (IV.4 1–15); Olympiodorus’ *prolegomena* to Aristotelian philosophy and the *Categories* (XII.1 1–18, 18–25); Elias’ *prolegomena* to philosophy and the *Isagoge* (XVIII.1 1–34, 35–39) and to Aristotelian philosophy and the *Categories* (107–134, with the discussion of *Cat.* beginning at 129); and David’s *prolegomena* to philosophy and the *Isagoge* (XVIII.2 1–79, 80–94). We should add here the incomplete commentary edited by Westerink and known as “Pseudo-Elias” with *prolegomena* to philosophy and the *Isagoge* (L. G. Westerink, *Pseudo-Elias [Pseudo-David] Lectures on Porphyry’s Isagoge* [Amsterdam 1967] 1–48 and 49–62). On the *prolegomena* to philosophy and Porphyry’s *Isagoge* see Christian Wildberg, “Three Neoplatonic Introductions to Philosophy: Ammonius, David and Elias,” *Hermathena* 149 (1990) 33–51.

2 Hugo Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Rhet.Gr. XIV [Stuttgart 1931]). For citations from this edition in what follows, the first Arabic numeral refers to the number of the *prolegomena* in question, then the page and line numbers; Roman numerals refer to Rabe’s introduction. For the similarities between

---

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 721–744

© 2017 Byron David MacDougall
the ten questions to be asked before beginning the study of Aristotelian philosophy on the one hand and rhetoric on the other; (b) the customary *kephalaia* or “chapters,” which vary from six in Olympiodorus to eight in Elias and David, and which are to be investigated before studying a specific text; and frequently (c) an application to rhetoric itself of the four Aristotelian questions—whether or not a thing exists, what it is, what sort of thing it is, and what its purpose is. Moreover, the

the rhetorical *prolegomena* and the *prolegomena* of the Alexandrian commentators see for example George Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Atlanta 2003): “These prolegomena were modeled on introductions to philosophy composed by Neo-Platonist philosophers and show the influence of the Neo-Platonic system of organization of learning” (90). See also George Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (Thessaloniki 1973) 26, and J. Mansfield, *Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled before the Study of an Author or a Text* (Leiden 1994) 52.

3 Elias (*In Arist. Cat.* 107.24–26) tells us that the tradition of the “ten questions” began with Proclus. Rabe, “Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften,” *RhM* 62 (1907) 539–590, at 541, notes that Proclus was not entirely innovative in this respect. For a comparison of the treatment of the ten questions by the various Alexandrian commentators see Kustas, *Studies* 101–126. For an outline of the ten questions to be asked before beginning the study of rhetoric see George Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton 1994) 221–222. See Rabe 541–542 for how several of the ten questions to be answered before studying rhetoric have counterparts in the ten questions of the philosophical tradition.

4 Olymp. *Prol.* 18.19; Elias *In Porph. Isag.* 35.6; David *In Porph. Isag.* 80.6. For the eight chapters in a rhetorical context consider Rabe, *Prol.* 8.73.11–12, from a set of *prolegomena* to Aphthonius’ *progymnasmata*, which Kennedy notes (*Progymnasmata* 90–91) cannot be dated more precisely than after the fifth and probably before the eleventh century: ζητητέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς τὰ ὀκτὼ κεφάλαια (“one should [as in philosophy] also consider the eight headings as they apply to rhetoric,” transl. Kennedy 91). Kennedy’s addition “[as in philosophy]” is meant to bring out the force of καὶ in καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, as these are the same eight chapters that are also studied before beginning the study of any work of philosophy. For other *prolegomena* that feature these eight (or seven) chapters see Rabe, *Prol.* 13 and 17.

5 See Rabe, *RhM* 62 (1907) 543, citing Arist. *An.post.* B 1.89b23, as well as the appearance of these questions at the beginnings of *prolegomena* of David (*CAG* XVIII.2 *Prol.Phil.* 1.13) and Elias (XVIII.1 *Prol.Phil.* 3.3). See also
rhetorical prolegomena also include a large amount of logical content, especially with respect to definition and division, two of the fundamental procedures or ‘methods’ of dialectic.\(^6\) Parallels such as this, between discussions of logical concepts in the rhetorical prolegomena and in the Alexandrian commentaries, particularly those of David and Elias, could be multiplied at length.\(^7\)

Moreover, because the Corpus of Hermogenes constituted the most basic component of the rhetorical curriculum, the commentaries on the five constituent texts of this corpus—the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius, the treatises On Issues and On Forms of Style of Hermogenes, and the On Invention and On the Method of Force falsely attributed to Hermogenes\(^8\)—offer an

---

Kennedy, *A New History* 222.

\(^6\) For the place of division and definition among the traditional ‘dialectical methods’ and their relationship to analysis and demonstration see A. C. Lloyd, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism* (Oxford 1998) 8–11. In both the rhetorical and the philosophical prolegomena, definitions of various subjects are given which are then broken down to identify which part of the definition represents the genus and which the constitutive differences (συστατικοί διαφοραί). Cf. the definition of rhetoric given in the prolegomena attributed to ‘Trophonius’ (Rabe, *Prol.* 1.11.8–14) with that of philosophy in David (*Prol.* Phil. 11.16–20). See also Rabe, *Prol.* 13.184.6–12 (on λόγος) and *Prol.* 4.30.14–20 (on rhetoric). Rabe, *Prol.* xxvi, associates ‘Trophonius’ closely with the tradition of commentaries on logical texts by Olympiodorus and his followers. For division, we can cite for example Rabe, *Prol.* 13.196.25–197.15, a list of five types of division that are identical with five of the six types given at Elias *In Porph.* Isag. 67.26–68.18. The shared types of division are as follows: genus into species, whole to parts, species of essence to accident, accident to essence, and word to meanings. The earliest MS. of *Prol.* 13, *Paris.gr.* 1983, has been dated to the 10th–11th centuries: Rabe, *Prol.* lx–lxiii.

\(^7\) For the close connections between David and Elias on the one hand and these prolegomena on the other see Rabe, *Prol.* xxxii. See also Rabe’s comments on another of the prolegomena (*Prol.* 17), whose author he suggests (*Prol.* lxx) may have attended the lectures of Olympiodorus himself.

\(^8\) See Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (Munich 1978) 141; for the canonization of Hermogenes and the finalization of the ‘Corpus of Hermogenes’ by the addition of the progymnasmata of
example of how fundamental logical concepts could have been disseminated widely across an entire educational culture.

However, the anonymity and frequently stereotyped content of these *prolegomena* and commentaries make them difficult to date, and they thus present a frustrating challenge to those who would try to draw a connection between their philosophical content and a learning environment in a particular time and place. Nevertheless, in one case we can assign a commentary and *prolegomena* to the ninth century, and indeed to an author closely connected to the logical turn that took place in iconophile theological discourse in the first quarter of that century.

The writings of John of Sardis may best illustrate the role played by rhetorical *prolegomena* and commentaries in the transmission and diffusion of logic in ninth-century Byzantium.

---

Aphthonius see Kustas, *Studies* 5–26. On the rationale behind the choice of Aphthonius’ *progymnasmata* to introduce the corpus see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata* 89.

9 See for example Kennedy’s remarks (n.4 above) on the difficulty of dating Rabe’s *Prolegomena* 8.


11 The identification of the John of Sardis, author of our Aphthonius commentary, with the John of Sardis who was an iconodule and correspondent of Theodore the Stoudite is now widely accepted. See e.g. Klaus Alpers, *Untersuchungen zu Johannes Sardianos und seinem Kommentar zu den Progymnasmata des Aphthonios* (Braunschweig 2009) 43; Juan Signes Codoñer, “Leer

---

*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 57 (2017) 721–744
His surviving works include a lengthy commentary on Aphthonius’ *Progymnasmata* and a set of *prolegomena* for another text in the Corpus of Hermogenes, the *De Inventione*, as well as a pair of hagiographical texts that are attributed to John. He was a participant in the tradition of composing *prolegomena* and commentaries on rhetoric for use in the classroom, and in addition to the two known commentaries of his, several scholars including Rabe himself have suggested that he may have produced commentaries for the remaining books of the Corpus of Hermogenes as well. John can thus offer insight on how...
the rhetorical curriculum could have served as a conduit for the dissemination of logic and logical concepts in ninth-century classrooms, even though the surprising rhetorical sophistication of his commentary helped temporarily to disguise from his editor Rabe the fact that John of Sardis belonged to the ninth century at all.

It was Rabe who not only discovered the only near-complete surviving manuscript of John’s commentary on Aphthonius (Vat.gr. 1408), and thus fleshed out the figure known thitherto to scholarship from later commentators only as the “exegete from Sardis,” but who also established John in his rightful place in the ninth century and as the correspondent of Theodore the Stoudite. However, Rabe’s dismissive judgment of John’s

Sardis. See also the discussion by Hock, The Chreia 13.

15 Rabe, Ioannes Sardianus xvii. On Rabe’s surprise at the ninth-century dating that he himself arrived at, see also Alpers, Untersuchungen 19–20.

16 John’s commentaries were a major source for Doxapates, who cites John not by name but as Aphthonius’ “exegete from Sardis” several times, and indeed notes in his own commentary on the De Inventione that his source was both a σύγκελλος and the metropolitan of Sardis (Rabe, Prol. 17.361.12–13; cf. n.12 above). This latter piece of information, combined with the fact that the manuscript of the commentary on Aphthonius discovered by Rabe gives the full name of the text’s author as “John of Sardis,” enabled Rabe to date him to the 9th century, as there were only two metropolitan of Sardis named John, and one of them lived in the 12th century, thus post-dating a 10th-century MS. (Coisl.gr. 387) with 14 folios from John of Sardis’ commentary (comprising the first 27 pages of Rabe’s edition). The other metropolitan of Sardis named John was the afore-mentioned correspondent of Theodore the Stoudite, in addition to being a known iconodule who was exiled after the second period of Iconoclasm began in 815. Thus, the evidence of Coisl.gr. 387 alone proves the commentary on Aphthonius to be no later than the 10th century, and the attributions in Doxapates and Vat.gr. 1408 to “the exegete from Sardis,” “the metropolitan of Sardis,” and “John of Sardis,” point very strongly to an identification with the John of Sardis we know as an iconodule and correspondent of Theodore. For the consensus on this point see n.11 above. For John of Sardis’ background as well as an account of Rabe’s discovery of his texts and fleshing out of his identity, see Hock, The Chreia 9–19. Hock notes (12 n.13) that in the ODB entry for John of Sardis, Alexander Kazhdan relies on a misreading of

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 721–744
compositional method—Rabe saw in him simply the ninth-century redactor of a hypothesized lost late antique commentary—led to a neglect of what John’s commentary could mean for the history of philological and rhetorical studies in ninth-century Byzantium.

Now, however, thanks to Klaus Alpers’ pioneering monograph on John of Sardis, his commentary on Aphthonius, and in particular his use of source material, we are in a much better position to see the significance of his commentary as an important specimen of Byzantine learning and philological activity in the first half of the ninth century. Indeed, Alpers has shown not only that John’s method of compiling a commentary involved first-hand study of classical texts in primary sources, but also that in several cases we have to push back in time by over a century the appearance of their respective minuscule archetypes. Thanks to this and other reappraisals of John’s legacy, 

Rabe’s introduction when he states that Rabe dated John to the mid-tenth century. On the dating of John’s episcopacy, Alpers, Untersuchungen 43, gives a thorough discussion and arrives at the years 824/5–858. See however Codoñer, Minerva 25 (2012) 256, who doubts that there was no intervening bishop of Sardis between John and a certain Petros who was installed by Photius and who thus provides Alpers with the terminus ante quem for John’s death. Codoñer is thus inclined to situate John’s composition of the Aphthonius commentary in the early years of the ninth century, as opposed to Alpers’ range that stretches into the middle of the century. See also Efthyimidis, RSBN, S, 28 (1991) 25, who assigns John’s episcopate to 803–815.

17 Rabe, Ioannes Sardianus xviii. After hypothesizing the existence of this late antique commentator, Rabe throughout his introduction continues to refer to this “vetus interpres Aphthonianus, Sardiani auctor” (xx).

18 See for example Alpers, Untersuchungen 52: “Dadurch ist sein Kommentar nicht nur für die Geistes- und Kulturgeschichte der ersten Hälfte des 9. Jahrhunderts von grosser Bedeutung, sondern liefert auch für die Überlieferungsgeschichte zentraler klassischer Autoren wesentliche Erkenntnisse.” See also Codoñer, Minerva 25 (2012) 257: “del trabajo de Alpers, que demuestra que la labor intelectual de Sardiano puede y debe ser considerada pionera en la recuperación del legado clásico en Bizancio tras los llamados siglos oscuros (VII–VIII), precediendo a la labor de Focio.”

19 For John’s method of composition and his philological interests (e.g. in
there is no need to follow Rabe in hypothesizing a lost and otherwise unknown late antique Aphthonius commentary that John slavishly redacted. Rather, John’s commentary needs to be seen as a product of his own time and as a testament to his own research and interests in rhetoric, poetry, philosophy—including and in particular the Aristotelian logical tradition.

The philosophical authors whom John cites by name in his commentary point to his familiarity with the Aristotelian tradition. Again, Rabe saw in these philosophical citations the work of his hypothesized vetus interpres Aphthonianus, Sardiani auctor. If however we follow the lead of Alpers and other more recent scholars, we should adopt the working hypothesis that John’s use, not only of classical authors like Homer and Thucydides, but also of these philosophical sources, relies on his own collection and research. Furthermore, even if we do not collecting manuscripts and collating variant readings) see Alpers, Untersuchungen 49–52. For John as evidence of the existence already in the ninth century of a Thucydides equipped with scholia and the vita by Marcellinus see Alpers 95–96.

20 For critique of Rabe’s method in hypothesizing a single lost source for John see Alpers, Untersuchungen 46–49. Cf. Codoñer, Minerva 25 (2012) 254: “El principal mérito del trabajo de Alpers es haber demostrado que Sardiano … es un comentarista original, que no bebe de una fuente única antigua, sino de varias, y que tiene acceso a los textos de muchos de los autores citados por Aftonio por disponer de una buena biblioteca de clásicos.” On Rabe’s dubious hypothesis see also Hock, The Chreia 19.

21 Alpers, Untersuchungen 49, calls him “ein sehr gelehrter und weit beselener Mann” as well as “ein methodisch bewusst vorgehender Philologe.”

22 See Rabe, Ioannes Sardianus xxi–xxiv. John cites for example Aristotle’s Topics by name (90.11), and Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on “philosophical theses” (233.18–19). Moreover, as Rabe’s apparatus fontium indicates, numerous lengthy sections in the commentary seem to have been drawn especially from David and Elias.

23 Rabe, Ioannes Sardianus xx.

24 See Alpers, Untersuchungen 149. Alpers’ study does not treat John’s use of philosophical material, noting simply that “philosophische Quellen benutzt wurden,” citing specifically David’s Prolegomena Philosophiae and his Isagoge commentary (45). Alpers’ explicit focus is on the classical literary tradition.
extend Alpers’ analysis of John’s first-hand use of classical ‘literary’ sources to his use of philosophical texts, it nevertheless remains clear that students (or, perhaps more likely, teachers) of Aphthonius—that is to say students of the foundational text in the rhetorical curriculum—now had at their fingertips in John of Sardis an exhaustive commentary that, on page after page, offers philosophically or logically informed interpretations of Aphthonius’ language and of the structure of the rhetorical discipline itself.

We begin with examples of how John’s knowledge of logic surfaces in the terminology he employs when discussing the organization of rhetoric as a discipline itself. We will then show how he turns to Aristotelian logic when analyzing and representing the actual arguments found in Aphthonius’ sample progymnasmata.²⁵

For our first example, we can cite John’s representation, in his commentary for the progymnasma “encomium,” of certain unnamed critics of Aphthonius’ organization of the progymnasmata (116.21–117.3):

ζητοῦσι δὲ τινες εἰ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τριμερῆς, ἐπ᾽ ἂν ἕστη ἀλλήλοις τὰ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν μετέχουσι, τῶν ἀποτελέσματων ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν δικανικὸν εἶδος καὶ συμβουλευτικὸν ἐν ταῖς τελείαις ὑποθέσεσιν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐγκωμιαστικὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀτελεῖσι τυχάνειν.

Some ask, “if rhetoric is tripartite, and species participate equally in their genera, then it is most absurd that the forensic

Moreover, John of Sardis himself, in the words that introduce his commentary, attests to his own work in researching and collecting materials: “A collection of explanatory comments on the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius, collected with great industry and zeal and arranged together correspondingly with the words of Aphthonius by me, John, the writer of the present work” (συναγωγὴ ἐξηγήσεων εἰς τὰ Αφθονίου Προγυμνάσματα φιλοπονών πολῆ καὶ σκοποῦντες ἔμοι τῇ γεγραμμῇ ἰοκάνυν συλλεγεισί τῶν ἀφθόνιον ῥητοῖς συναρμοσθεισῶν, 1.4–7).

²⁵ I cite the edition of H. Rabe, Aphthonii Progymnasmata (Leipzig 1926).

²⁶ Rabe’s apparatus indicates that he completed the sentence by collating τῶν γενῶν μετέχουσι from Doxapates’ commentary.
and deliberative species are among the perfect *hypotheses*, but the encomiastic species is among the imperfect *hypotheses*."[27]

John seems to be reproducing a straw-man argument here: If *encomium* is included among the *progymnasmata*, and the *progymnasmata* are all “incomplete” pieces of rhetoric that are used together to build up a “complete” *hypothesis*, then *encomium* is of course “incomplete.” But if forensic, deliberative, and encomiastic rhetoric are, in the time-honored scheme, the three species of the genus rhetoric, why are the former two considered “perfect,” while encomiastic is “incomplete”? John’s response is that encomiastic rhetoric is indeed equal to the other species of rhetoric, but that the *encomium* exercise itself, when considered as a distinct section of a speech used to build up a complete forensic or deliberative *hypothesis*, is “incomplete.” Our interest however is in the expression John uses for how “species participate equally in their genera,”[28] which is cast in the fashion of Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle.

For species participating equally in their genera,[29] we can compare for example Porphyry’s *Isagoge* on the difference between genus and accident: καὶ τοῦ μὲν γένους ἔπίσης τὰ μετέχοντα μετέχει (“what participates in a genus participates equally”).[30]

Further on in his commentary on the same *progymnasma* of Aphthonius, John cites a lost rhetorical treatise of Theophrastus[31] on how the material of encomia is structured according to two principles, that of quality and that of quantity: the latter consists of comparisons (συγκρίσεις) with other sub-

---

27 Unless otherwise noted, translations throughout are my own.
28 For this passage in John of Sardis, Rabe cites in his apparatus the *progymnasmata* of Nikolaos 47.12 (ed. Felten), but the cited passage refers only to species without mentioning participation in a genus.
29 For the predication of essence such as genus or species not admitting of degrees, compare also e.g. Arist. *Cat.* 3b33.
31 139.6–7: Θεόφραστος ἐν ταῖς Τέχναις διείλε διχῶς τὸ ἐγκώμιον.
jects; and the former, which has to do with the traditional encomiastic points of birth, upbringing, achievements, etc., is an investigation about the “essence” (τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἐξετάσεως) of the encomiand, while the latter is of an “accident” (τοῦ συμβεβηκότος) (139.11–15). Regardless of whether the contrast of essence versus accident derives from John’s source or his own addition, it is of a piece with the mention of genus and species discussed above, and together the terms would have been interpreted by John’s readers against the lasting legacy of Porphyrian terminology on Byzantine philosophical education. Our take-away from John’s invocation of terms such as species, genus, essence, and accident in his discussion of encomium is that students in a ninth-century rhetoric classroom would have been trained to conceptualize the framework of their discipline by using basic logical terminology. It also presupposes that these students would have already been exposed to sets of basic logical definitions before beginning their study of Aphthonius.32

It will come as no surprise that a commentary on Aphthonius’ exercises in composition involves some discussion of the logical nature of statements themselves. This is because part of the method of Aphthonius himself is to define the various types of composition that he presents in the exercises, and in these definitions he makes use of terms that John of Sardis in turn clarifies one by one. For a good example of how Aphthonius can mention a technical term which John then expands upon at length, we can turn to Aphthonius’ presentation of the progymnasma γνώμη, or maxim. As is his usual procedure, he begins with a definition (7.2):

γνώμη ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν ἀποφάνσει κεφαλαίωδης εἰπτὶ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων.

A maxim is a recapitulating utterance made up of statements and which urges one to do or not to do something.

John of Sardis, in his turn, breaks down the definition of Aphthonius one word at a time, sometimes explaining the rationale behind the latter’s choice of words, sometimes glossing them, and sometimes defining them. Thus after first explaining why Aphthonius calls the maxim a logos, he proceeds to the phrase ἐν ἀποφάνσεσι and offers a definition of the word ἀπόφασις (56.14–18):

η ἀπόφασις γενικὸν ἐστιν ὄνομα περιέχον τὴν τε ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ γνώμαι καὶ ἐν ἀποφάσει καὶ καταφάσει λέγονται, τούτων χάριν ὁ Ἀφθόνιος τῷ γενικῷ ὄνοματι ἀμφιε συμπεριέλαβεν, “ἐν ἀποφάνσεσιν” εἰρήκως.

A statement is a generic name that includes both negation and affirmation. Since maxims are said in the form of both negations and affirmations, for this reason Aphthonius included both in the generic name, saying “in statements.”

A few lines later, John refers to affirmation and negation as the “species” (εἴδη) contained within apophansis.33 John’s explication of apophansis as an affirmation or negation ultimately relies, however many degrees removed, upon Aristotle’s definition of the term in the sixth chapter of the De Interpretatione (5.17a8–6.17a26):

ἐστι δ’ ἡ μὲν ἀπόφασις φωνὴ σημαντικὴ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ὑπάρχει τι ἡ μὴ ὑπάρχει, ὡς οἱ χρόνοι διηρήνεται: κατάφασις δὲ ἐστιν ἀπόφασις τινὸς κατὰ τινὸς, ἀπόφασις δὲ ἐστιν ἀπόφασις τινὸς ἀπὸ τινὸς.

The simple statement is a significant spoken sound about whether something does or does not hold (in one of the divisions of time). An affirmation is a statement affirming something of something, a negation is a statement denying something of something.34

John is likely not drawing directly from the De Interpretatione, but

33 58.3–4: η δὲ ἀπόφασις περιέχει ός εἴδη τὴν ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν.

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 721–744
rather participating in a tradition of grammatical theory that has deep roots in the Aristotelian tradition. His definition of *apophansis* is a good example of how the study of rhetoric had become infused with a logically-inflected understanding of language and grammar.

In what follows, we present a sampling of further instances where John draws on the logical tradition when discussing Aphthonius’ language or the organization of rhetoric itself. Though by no means exhaustive, this brief set can still offer a useful overview of the understanding of logic and logical concepts that we find in John and that we should hypothesize for his audience.

a) John’s explanation of why definitions precede divisions in Aphthonius’ and Hermogenes’ discussions of *progymnasmata* relies on a motif familiar from the Alexandrian commentators (167.3–6):

> προτάττεται ο ὁρισμὸς ἐκάστου γνωμνάσματος παρὰ Αφθονίου καὶ Ἐρμογένους τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως δι’ αἰτίαν τοιαύτην, ὅτι ο μὲν ὁρισμὸς ἀναλογεῖ τῇ μονάδι, ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις τῷ πλήθει.

In Aphthonius and Hermogenes, the definition of each of the *progymnasmata* precedes their respective species and their division on account of the following reason, namely that definition is analogous to the monad, and division to the multitude.

This reads as if it comes straight from the pages of Elias or David, and indeed Rabe’s apparatus cites the latter.35

b) John’s discussion of the exercise *ethopoeia* invokes the distinction between universals and particulars: “both the universal man is animal and the particular man is animal, but the latter has certain properties” (καὶ γὰρ καὶ ο καθόλου ἄνθρωπος ζῷον καὶ ο μερικὸς ζῷον ἀλλ’ ἔχει τινὰ ἰδια, 202.13–14).

c) John criticizes other theorists of the structure of rhetoric who make arguments with implied premises that “do not convert” (οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει, 199.8).

d) Of particular interest is John’s discussion of the difference between enthymemes and logical syllogisms, where an enthymeme is characterized as an incomplete syllogism—i.e., the *syllogismus truncatus* (250.1–5):36

> ἐνθύμημα ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ προσενθυμεῖσθαι τὸν δικαστήν ἢ τὸν ἄκροατήν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ μίαν <τινὰ> τῶν προτάσεων-γίνεται γοῦν τὸ ἐνθύμημα προσλαβὸν τὸ λείπον τέλειος καὶ διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός.

An enthymeme is *called so* because it ‘reminds’ the juror or audience member of either the conclusion or one of the premises. An enthymeme becomes a perfect logical syllogism when it adds that part of it <i.e., the missing protasis or premise> that is missing.

Rabe’s apparatus notes as a parallel for this entire section on the difference between enthymeme and syllogism the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the *Topics*.37 The distinction between enthymemes and syllogisms may seem to be advanced material to refer to in a commentary on rhetorical exercises, but we should note that it appears in John’s discussion of the second-to-last of Aphthonius’ *progymnasmata*, namely the *thesis*. This is the examination of a proposition, such as whether or not one should marry, and is considered an exercise leading to full-blown pieces in deliberative rhetoric (τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν εἶδος, 230.8). It requires the student to produce his own arguments, anticipate those of his opposing side, and then offer counter-arguments.38 John’s discussion of enthymemes and syllogisms is at home in what is essentially a lesson

---


38 For the advanced nature of the *thesis* exercise see Hock, *The Chreia* 17.
on the production and analysis of arguments.

In all the passages discussed above, John’s method is to pass on more or less faithfully material from the commentary tradition that invokes concepts and terms from logic in order to clarify some point in the highly schematic organization of the rhetorical discipline that he has inherited. However, he has enough logical training to go beyond this basic level and actively apply his own knowledge of logic in order to analyse the rhetorical arguments he finds in Aphthonius’ *progymnasmata*. For a good example of this aspect of John’s knowledge of logic we can turn to his commentary on the *progymnasma ὁνασκευή*, *repetition*. For this exercise Aphthonius offers as an example a refutation entitled “What is said about Daphne is not probable.” Thus, in this exercise he sets out to demonstrate that the stories told by the poets about Daphne and Apollo are not true. Aphthonius constructs his refutation by granting to the poets various points and then demonstrating that, even allowing for the possibility of such details, the story itself could not be true. In the passage in question, he has granted to the poets that Daphne was born of Earth and Ladon, and that she was subsequently raised by them, although he has already rejected the possibility of both of these points of the story. He then proceeds to show that, even if Daphne’s miraculous birth and upbringing are granted, the rest of the story is not possible (12.15 ff.):

πῶς ἦρα θεὸς καὶ πόθῳ τὴν φύσιν ἐψεύδετο; ἔρως τῶν ὄντων τὸ χαλεπότερον, καὶ θεοὶ μαρτυρεῖν ἀσεβὲς τὰ δεινότατα: εἰ μὲν γὰρ πάντα νοσοῦσι θεοὶ, τί θνητῶν ἐπὶ διοίσουσιν; εἰ δὲ τὸ δεινότατον ἔρωτα φέρουσι, τί τῶν πολλῶν ἡλλοτριῶνται τὸ χαλεπότερον φέροντες; ἀλλ’ οὔτε τὸ πάθος σὲδεν ἡ φύσις σὺτε ὁ Πύθιος ἔρωτίς κατεφαίνετο.

How did a god feel love and how did he betray his nature with longing? Desire is the worst of all things, and it is impious to ascribe the most awful things to the gods. For if the gods suffer all diseases, how will they differ from mortals any longer? And if they endure the most awful thing, namely desire, in what way will they, in enduring the worst of all, have proven different from the many? But <Apollo’s> nature is not subject to pathos, nor did the Pythian become someone’s lover.

---

*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 57 (2017) 721–744
John’s most expansive discussion in his commentary on this passage takes its starting point from Aphthonius’ phrase “for if the gods suffer all diseases” (82.3–8):

“For if the gods have all diseases...” His construction of the inconsistency of the proposition [i.e., that Apollo could have felt desire] proceeds through demonstrations in the form of enthymemes, and from the difference between persons, which he also treats universally for a proof of the particular. For the most part, all refutational arguments against statements that have been proposed are woven in the second figure.

This will require some unpacking. Aphthonius has attempted to refute the Daphne story by demonstrating that Apollo could never have been subject to such a human pathos as desire in the first place. John sees here an argument based on logical reasoning, which he refers to as “demonstrations in the form of enthymemes.” He notes that Aphthonius builds his argument “universally for a proof of the particular”; here the universals he invokes are gods, and the particular that is to be proven is that Apollo could not have been subject to desire. We can extract from Aphthonius’ argument the premises that, in John’s eyes, proceed to the conclusion that Apollo was not subject to desire: our first statement is that “desire is the worst of all things” (ἔρως τῶν ὄντων τὸ χαλεπώτατον). Our second is that “it is impious to ascribe the most awful things to the gods” (καὶ θεοῖς μαρτυρεῖν ἁσεβὲς τὰ δεινότατα). We should note those two superlatives. Since it is clear from his own language that Aphthonius uses the expressions “the worst” (τὸ χαλεπώτατον) and “the most awful” (τὰ δεινότατα) as equivalent synonyms,

39 So his statement “if they endure the most awful thing, namely desire, in what way will they, in enduring the worst of all, have proven different from the many?” Indeed, the lack of an explicit statement that “the most awful is
the two statements together form a syllogism:

From “desire is the worst of all things,” we can say “the most awful is predicated of desire.”

From “it is impious to ascribe the most awful things to the gods,” we get “the most awful things are predicated of no gods.”

The conclusion is that “desire is predicated of no gods.”

To use the language of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, we have a syllogism in which the shared term (“most awful”) is the predicate of both premises. It is predicated of all of the major term in the major premise, and of none of the minor term in the minor premise. In other words, this is a syllogism of the second figure, of what came to be known as the Camestres type, which can be formulated using conventional notation:30

- M belongs to all N (MaN)
- M belongs to no X (MeX)
- N belongs to no X (NeX)

This seems to be how John extracted a syllogism from Aphthonius’ argument, as he notes that “refutational arguments against the proposition at hand are woven in the second figure” (δευτέρῳ πλέκονται σχήματι). The term John uses, σχήμα, is the proper term for the “figures” of syllogisms that Aristotle describes in the first chapters of Prior Analytics 1: τὸ μὲν σχήμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλὸ δεύτερον (26b35–36). Also, the verb πλέκω is commonly used in this sense of “weaving” arguments or

the same thing as the worst,” and the fact that this equivalence must be inferred from Aphthonius’ phrasing (“they endure the most awful thing … in enduring the worst of all”), may be precisely that missing logical premise in the chain of reasoning that led John to characterize Aphthonius’ argument as a “demonstration in the form of enthymemes.” We have already seen (734 above) that John understands an enthymeme as a syllogism that is incomplete because it lacks an intermediate premise.

30 For Aristotle’s proof of Camestres see An.prior. 27a9–14. In the notation system used here, the letter a represents universal affirmation, e universal negation. The vowels of the name Camestres are in turn derived from this sequence of letter symbols. For an introduction to these syllogistic types as well as the medieval mnemonics by which they are commonly known see Robin Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aristotle-logic/).
syllogisms.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, John’s phrasing here closely parallels that frequently employed by other exegetes to describe how arguments are structured in the texts they are commenting upon. As a representative example, we can cite Olympiodorus’ interpretation of a passage in the First Alcibiades (127a1–b3), where Socrates gets the titular character to concede that husbands are not loved by their wives and vice versa (In Pl. Alc. 195.6–10):

\[
\text{πλέκεται δὲ οι συλλογισμός ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι οὕτως: “γυνὴ καὶ ἄνὴρ οὐ όμονοοῦσιν, οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ γνωστὰ καταγίνονται: οἱ φιλοῦντες ἄλληλους όμονοοῦσιν, εἴτε δέδεικται ὅτι ἡ διχόνοια ἔχθρα ἐστίν: ἄνηρ ἄρα καὶ γυνὴ οὐ φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους.”}
\]

The syllogism is woven in the second figure as follows: “wife and husband do not feel accord with one another, for they do not deal with the same known things. Those who love one another feel accord with one another, if it has been demonstrated that discord is enmity. Therefore, husband and wife do not love one another.”

Once again we have the makings of a syllogism in the second figure, since the middle term “to feel accord” (ὁ ομονοοῦσιν in Olympiodorus’ summary, ὁ ομόνοια in I Alc.) is the predicate of both premises. Although Olympiodorus’ arrangement has the universal negative in the first premise, which would lead to a syllogism in the Cesare form, for the sake of simplicity we can switch the order of his premises in order to produce another example of Camestres.\textsuperscript{42} Again following Aristotle’s proof of Camestres at An. prior. 27a9–14, we can formalize Olympiodorus’ premises as follows:\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41} Cf. LSJ s.v. πλέκω II.2.

\textsuperscript{42} When formalized as a Cesare figure, Olympiodorus’ order would lead to a conclusion expressed in the form, “Being married is predicated of no persons who love one another.” Because the universal negation converts, we can then get “Loving one another is predicated of no persons who are married,” which is how Olympiodorus himself expresses the conclusion: “Therefore, husband and wife do not love one another.”

\textsuperscript{43} Note that there is a minor textual issue at play in Aristotle’s proof of
*Homonoia* is predicated of all people who love one another (MaN)

*Homonoia* is predicated of no people who are married (MeX)

Loving one another is predicated of no people who are married (NeX)

Olympiodorus has been able to locate in the *First Alcibiades* passage the framework of a second-figure syllogism by identifying in Socrates’ argument a repeated word (*ὁµόνοια*) that is predicated negatively in one statement and positively in another.\(^44\) This method of identifying “syllogisms woven in the second figure” can be identified in other commentaries on philosophical texts.\(^45\) It is precisely the same method which John of Sardis uses to identify an argument in the form of a second-figure syllogism in Aphthonius. Just as Olympiodorus found a repeated term in Socrates’ argument which was denied in one sentence and affirmed in another, so John’s method is to identify a repeated term—in his case “worst” or “most awful”—that is affirmed in one statement and then denied in another.

In saying that most refutational arguments are “woven in the second figure,” John seems here to mean that those attempting to refute a statement frequently have recourse to a form of argument which can be likened to a syllogism in which the shared term of each premise is the predicate (i.e., the second figure). This is because (a) all four syllogistic types in the second figure produce negative conclusions; and (b) of the three pos-

\(^{\text{Camestres. Ross’s edition gives for 27a9–10 πάλιν εἰ τῷ Μ τῷ μὲν Ν παντὶ τῷ δὲ Ξ μηδενί, οὐδὲ τῷ Ξ τῷ Ν οὐδενί ὑπάρχει. However, the apparatus indicates that instead of οὐδὲ τῷ Ξ τῷ Ν (i.e., XeN, which is a step on Aristotle’s way to the proof of NeX in lines 10–14), some MSS. have τῷ Ξ τῷ Ν or τῷ Ν τῷ Ξ, in other words the final outcome of the proof, which is then demonstrated in the lines that follow. The explanation of *Camestres* given by Smith (*Stanford Encyclopedia*) translates the reading for lines 9–10 given in Ross’s apparatus.}}\(^{45\text{For example John Philoponus’ commentary In De anima 496.29–36 and 579.22–26.}}\)}}
sible syllogistic types from which a universal negation can be deduced (Celarent, Camestres, and Cesare), two are in the second figure.46 Through such an implied syllogism, as John sees it, Aphthonius can prove the truth of a particular statement, that Apollo could not have been subject to desire, by building premises out of universals, viz. “x is predicated of no gods.”

John does not cite any Aristotelian authority here, nor does Rabe in his apparatus suggest possible sources for John’s reference to refutations being “woven in the second figure.” Nevertheless, this passage is a good demonstration of the logical training that John had internalized. It is a matter of course for him to approach a passage in the text he is commenting upon by breaking it down and reconceptualizing it in syllogistic terms.

We can perhaps better appreciate John’s application of Aristotelian syllogistic to his analysis of Aphthonius’ progymnasmata by adducing a peculiar feature that appears in commentaries and prolegomena related to the rhetorical curriculum, namely the characterization of Aphthonius’ progymnasmata as belonging to the organon of philosophy, that is, to logic. Thus in a set of prolegomena to Aphthonius, we find that the progymnasmata belong to neither the theoretical nor the practical part of philosophy, but to something between the two (Rabe, Prol. 8.79.18–24):

τινὲς δὲ καί τὴν ὑπὸ τὸ μέρος ἀναφοράν καί ἐπὶ τὸν παρόντος βιβλίων ζητοῦντες ἀναφέρεσθαι φασιν αὐτὸ οὔτε εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ φυσιολογεῖ ἢ θεολογεῖ ἢ μαθηματικεύεται, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ εἰς τὸ πρακτικόν – οὐδὲ γὰρ πῶς δεῖ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἡθη διδάσκει – ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ μέσον τούτων μεθοδικὸν καί ὀργανικὸν, ἔστι δὲ τούτῳ τὸ λογικὸν· κανόνας γάρ καὶ μεθόδους διδάσκει.

Some people, asking in the case of the present book as well [i.e. the progymnasmata of Aphthonius] what part [of philosophy] it

46 For the recognition that the second figure only produces negative conclusions, whether universal or particular, see Alexander Aphr. Commentarium in An. prior. 93.30–31 (ed. M. Wallies, CAG II.1 [Berlin 1883]): δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι συμπεράσματα ἀποφασικά (“It is also clear that all the conclusions in this figure are negations”).

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 721–744
belongs to, say that it belongs neither to the theoretical branch (since it does not treat questions of nature or the divine or discuss mathematics), nor to the practical branch (for it does not teach how one must build moral character), but rather to that part which lies between these two, the methodical and organikon part, and this is the logical part. For it teaches rules and methods.

If the author of this set of prolegomena\(^\text{47}\) can equate Aphthonius’ progyngasmata with the logical branch of philosophy, we should not be too surprised when we find that the author of another set of prolegomena—in this case prolegomena to a commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge itself—can in fact subordinate the study of this basic text in the logical curriculum to the study of Aphthonius. This particular set of prolegomena and its subsequent commentary are attributed in a late manuscript to John Philoponus, but since excerpts from them were first edited they have been recognized as the work of a later commentator drawing largely from David and Elias.\(^\text{48}\) To this day, the text is

\(^\text{47}\) For discussion and translation (to which I referred in producing my own translation here), see Kennedy, Progymnasmata 89–95, and n.4 above.

\(^\text{48}\) For selections from these prolegomena see Brandis’ text in O. Gigon’s revised edition of Bekker’s Aristotelis Opera IV: C. A. Brandis, Scholia in Aristotelem (Berlin 1836) 10–12. In the table of contents prepared by Gigon the text is listed as “Byzantinus anonymus in Porhyrii Isagogen Davidis et Eliae commentariis usus” (x). See also Busse, Porphyrii, at Supplementum Praefationis xxxvii–xxxix, where he notes that the anonymous commentator quotes Elias by name, although he draws more heavily from David. Busse also notes (xxxix n.1) that in a Madrid MS. (Mad. 4790) the text features the title ιωάννου φιλοπόνου τοῦ γραµµατικοῦ εἰς τὰς πέντε φωνάς. The MS. is dated to ca. 1480 (G. de Andrés, Catálogo de los códices griegos de la Biblioteca Nacional [Madrid 1987] 389). In the Oxford MS. used by Brandis (Barocci 145) the title names simply τοῦ σοφωτάτου φιλοπόνου, while a Modena manuscript (see the following note) has only τοῦ φιλοπόνου. A composite manuscript in Venice (Marc.gr. Z 202) once owned by Cardinal Bessarion, and with the relevant folios dated to the mid-13\(^\text{th}\) century, has no title but instead bears a note on the first page by Bessarion himself that “this commentary belongs neither to Ammonius nor to Philoponus nor any of those great ones, but instead someone more recent who followed in all respects what had already been said before” (οὔτε τοῦ Ἀµµονίου οὔτε τοῦ Φιλοπόνου...)}

_Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies_ 57 (2017) 721–744
only available in those excerpts published by Brandis which he drew from a single manuscript, Oxford Barocci 145 ff. 119–137, although the text is preserved in more complete form in other manuscripts. Among the many passages in the prolegomena which Brandis curiously chose not to print and whose elision he indicated only with ellipses, we find the following account of the purpose of studying Porphyry’s Isagoge:

διὰ γὰρ τὸ γινώσκειν ἡµᾶς τὰ ἐν τοῖς προγυµνάσµασι ἐγκείµενα, μανθάνοµεν τὸ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν µάθηµα, οὐ διὰ τὸ γινώσκειν τὰ ἐν ταῖς φωναῖς ἐγκείµενα µανθάνοµεν τὰ προγυµνάσµατα.

οὔτε τίνος ἐστὶ τῶν µεγάλων ἑκείνων, νεωτέρου γε µέντοι τίνος καὶ πάντα τοῖς προειρηµένοις ἐµοµένων; see E. Mioni, Bibliothecae Divi Marci Venetiarum codices græci manuscripti IV Thesaurus antiquus codices 1–299 (Rome 1981) 314–315, and Busse, Porphyrii xxxvi n.1. It seems plausible that at some point what was simply a generic description for the commentator (“the industrious”) was taken to refer to the most famous bearer of that epithet.

Not only did Brandis publish only excerpts from the prolegomena extant in the Oxford Ms., but the text of that manuscript breaks off in the middle of the commentary to the Isagoge (at Isag. 4.4–9)—where Brandis’ edition also ends—and the Ms. begins on the next page (138r) with David’s Prolegomena. According to Busse, Porphyrii xxxviii n.1, Brandis also used Marc.gr. Z. 202, mentioned in the preceding note, but this Ms. offers (ff. 1–40) a more complete version of this commentary, extending to the end of the Isagoge. Another version more complete than that used by Brandis is found in a Ms. dated by Puntoni to the 15th century, Modena α.V.6.02 (= Puntoni 195), at ff. 17–89r, where the commentary extends to Isag. 19.20–20.7–10. I would like to express my gratitude to Christophe Erismann and to the Bodleian Library, the Biblioteca Nationale Marciana, and the Biblioteca Estense for procuring reproductions from these manuscripts.

The passage is in the stretch of text elided by Brandis and marked by ellipsis at p.11 col. 1.12. In the Oxford Ms. used by Brandis (Barocci 145) it appears at f. 146r.12–16. In Marc.gr. Z 202 at f. 1r.2–3, διὰ γὰρ τὸ γινώσκειν ἡµᾶς τὰ ἐν τοῖς προγυµνάσµασι ἐγκείµενα, μανθάνοµεν is legible before a tear in the page has removed the two or three words that follow. The next legible words in line 3 are φωνῶν µάθηµα πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικήν (we would expect φωνῶν µάθηµα, οὐ διὰ τὸ γινώσκειν). The copyist seems mistakenly to have skipped down a couple lines in his exemplar to a subsequent passage in the text that indeed begins with the same words.

---

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 721–744
For it is in order to understand the content of the *progymnasmata* that we learn the lesson of the five predicables [i.e., the *Isagoge*]; we do not learn the *progymnasmata* in order to understand the content of the five predicables.

If Porphyry’s *Isagoge* represents to such a teacher a preliminary text not to Aristotle but to the rhetorical curriculum in general and the *progymnasmata* of Aphthonius specifically, then we can posit for this particular context an approach to education wherein the tradition of Aristotelian logic is utilized as training not for philosophy but for rhetoric. Such a dynamic certainly seems also to be at work in John of Sardis’ commentary on Aphthonius, which, as we have seen, presupposes on the part of the reader an extensive knowledge of logical terms and concepts. This would help explain why we find John applying Aristotelian syllogistic in his analysis of Aphthonius’ discussion of refutation. If he considered it useful to invoke “syllogisms in the second figure” in his discussion of the *anaskeue* exercise, then we need to consider an audience that has already been introduced to basic Aristotelian syllogistic, in particular material from *Prior Analytics* 1–7 or a pedagogical compendium thereof, even before beginning the proper study of Aphthonius’ *progymnasmata* and the rest of the corpus of Hermogenes.

John lends us some perspective on not only rhetorical but also philosophical education in the ninth century. Through his commentary on Aphthonius, we can identify a current within the tradition of the Byzantine rhetorical curriculum that presupposed (or perhaps in certain cases reinforced) on the part of both student and teacher an introductory education in logic. To judge from the passages cited above, this would have included a familiarity with terms like genus, species, accident, essence, *apophansis*, *kataphasis*, and *apophasis*, premise and conversion, as well as an understanding of the difference between universals and particulars, between syllogism and enthymeme, and between definition and division. Finally, as we saw with John’s interpretation of a sentence in Aphthonius’ *anaskeue* as an argument “woven in the second figure,” it may even be that, in classrooms where John’s commentary was used, the students had already been exposed to assertoric syllogistic itself. Finally,
even if we cannot assume that *Prior Analytics* 1–7 was systematically taught before the *progymnasmata*, nevertheless a teacher using John’s commentary would have had to unravel what John meant by the phrase “woven in the second figure.” And as we have just ourselves experienced, simply unpacking this statement requires a brief foray into the basics of Aristotle’s syllogistic. An engaging teacher in ninth-century Byzantium would have wanted to supplement his lessons on Aphthonius’ *Progymnasmata* with review and reinforcement of basic logical principles. In John of Sardis’ commentary he would have had the perfect tool to do so.\(^{51}\)

---

\(^{51}\) This paper was made possible thanks to the generosity of the European Research Council grant “9 SALT: Reassessing Ninth Century Philosophy. A Synchronic Approach to the Logical Traditions” (ERC CoG 648298), based at the University of Vienna. It is a pleasure to thank my 9 SALT colleagues Christophe Erismann, Dirk Krausmüller, Adam McCollum, and Philippe Vallat for their expert comments. I am grateful for the feedback of audiences at the 23rd International Congress of Byzantine Studies in Belgrade and at the Department of the Classics of Harvard University, where earlier versions of this material were presented. My warm gratitude goes to Alexander Riehle for all his help and encouragement. Finally, the welcome suggestions of Kent Rigsby, his editorial team at *GRBS*, and their anonymous reviewer have made this a better paper, and I am sincerely grateful to all of them.

April, 2017

Institut für Byzantinistik
und Neogriechistik
Vienna
byron.macdougall@gmail.com