Invective Oratory and Julian’s *Misopogon*

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One of the most well-studied episodes in Julian’s eventful reign is his troubled stay in Antioch during the winter of 362/3. The mismatch of dispositions between the austere monarch and licentious population was exacerbated by religious tension, scarcity of food, and exchanges of insults.¹ When Julian departed from Antioch, he left a trail of bitterness in his wake, swearing that he would never return.² Meanwhile, the Antiochenes were abandoned to the administration of an especially harsh magistrate, whom Julian had appointed in order to punish them.³ A retrospective approach to Julian’s time in Antioch permits its interpretation as

¹ Perhaps the most extreme example was Julian’s reaction to the fire that destroyed the temple of Apollo at Daphne on 22 October 362, which led him to close the Great Church at Antioch (Amm. Marc. 22.13). Ammianus states that the cause of the fire was a few unattended candles left burning after an offering made by a philosopher who had come to visit the emperor. For the most recent assessments of Julian’s response to the grain shortage at Antioch see K. Rosen, *Julian, Kaiser, Gott, und Christenhaßer* (Stuttgart 2006) 280–285, and D. Potter, *The Roman Empire at Bay* (London/New York 2014) 502–504.

² *Mis.* 364D testifies to Julian’s desire to leave Antioch and take up another residence, as does 370b. Amm. Marc. 23.2.4 preserves the threat that he would never return: *cumque eam prefecturam deduceret multitudo promiscua, itum felicem reditumque gloriosum exspectans oransque ut deinde placabilis esset et lenior, nondum ira, quam ex conpellationibus et probris conceperat, emollita loquebatur asperius se esse eos adserens postea non visuram.*

³ On the cruelty of Alexander of Heliopolis, whom Julian selected to be governor of Syria on his departure, see Amm. Marc. 23.2.3, and Lib. Ep. 1351. Notably, Zosimus omits this detail, and creates an altogether more pleasant impression of Julian’s time at Antioch (3.11).
one of many questionable decisions of leadership that preceded Julian’s death on campaign. As the emperor’s stay in Syria’s first city was mismanaged and troubled, so was the military expedition that he planned there. But this could not have been Julian’s perspective. He believed he would return from Persia, and when he did, he planned to enjoy better relations with another community. Julian began to implement strategies that would rehabilitate his reputation before he left Antioch, foremost among them the Misopogon, a work of satirical self-criticism meant to demonstrate both Antiochene flaws and Julian’s virtues. His position was that he had been badly misunderstood by a populace predisposed by its debauchery to a misapprehension of virtue. I argue that he reused the strategies and commonplaces of classical Athenian invective to reinforce this narrative.

Scholarly approaches to the Misopogon admit numerous interpretations and acknowledge its pursuit of diverse goals. Satirical and panegyric elements coexist and combine, each subject to manipulation and subversion. The former have been addressed by Jacqueline Long and most recently Tom Hawkins, the latter by Arnaldo Marcone and Alberto

4 See Potter’s assessment, “Antioch, Persia, and Catastrophe,” in The Empire at Bay 502–507. Both ancient and modern criticism often regard these two episodes as failures, and their combination into one narrative of decline was anticipated by Ammianus, who interpreted Julian’s arrival at Antioch during the Adonis festival (thus, to cries of grief for the dead) as ominous (22.9.13–16). The most strident ancient voice is that of Gregory of Nazianzus (Or. 5, esp. 5.12), who styled Julian the general as a failure; for modern analysis see R. Browning, The Emperor Julian (London 1975) 187–213, and J. Matthews, The Roman World of Ammianus Marcellinus (Ann Arbor 2007) 130–161, esp. 135. Modern and ancient critics agree in highlighting Julian’s decision to burn his fleet (Greg. Naz. Or. 5.12; Browning 208–209; Potter 505; Matthews 158–159) and his substitution of abundant self-confidence for the planning of a campaign with a restrained objective (Greg. Naz. 5.8; Browning 191–192; Matthews 136–139, although this assessment is far more favorable to Julian the tactician, see also Potter 504–505).

Quiroga, both of whom demonstrate Julian’s keen understanding of rhetorical theory and the strategies for praise and blame.\textsuperscript{6} Beyond questions of composition, the motivation behind such an unusual and polyvalent work also demands analysis. Maud Gleason interpreted the Misopogon as a “festive satire,” a product of the New Year’s festival at Antioch, albeit with the serious aim of chastising the Antiochenes.\textsuperscript{7} Gleason’s influential approach has recently been re-examined by Lieve Van Hoof and Peter Van Nuffelen, who see the piece as Julian’s “word of goodbye to Antioch” and interpret it not as evidence of a good-natured exchange, but as Julian’s attempt to have the last word. They acknowledge, however, that the Misopogon creates the impression of a dialogue while actually representing a “massive, one-sided, post-factum interpretation of what happened during the seven and a half months he spent in Antioch.”\textsuperscript{8}

The composition and publication of the text were followed closely by the emperor’s death, and upon dying Julian ceded control over the Misopogon’s reception forever. Van Hoof and Van Nuffelen demonstrate that this textual power vacuum was quickly filled by the Antiochene rhetorician Libanius, who managed to reduce the damage done to Julian’s reputation through careful presentation of the conflict.\textsuperscript{9} Libanius, more than Julian himself, generated the favorable reading later reproduced in Sozomen, Socrates, and Eunapius/Zosimus.\textsuperscript{10}


\textsuperscript{8} Van Hoof and Van Nuffelen, \textit{JRS} 101 (2014) 174–175.


\textsuperscript{10} Socr. \textit{HE} 3.17, Soz. \textit{HE} 5.19. While Zosimus is widely thought to have

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After the emperor’s death, Libanius assumed the double task of rescuing the city’s reputation alongside Julian’s. He attempted to minimize the tract’s accusations of Antiochene debauchery, while simultaneously presenting Julian as a sympathetic figure. Modern receptions of the piece are colored by both Libanius’ intervention and by historical consideration in hindsight. In order to investigate potential contemporary responses to the *Misopogon*, I examine how Julian reuses and inverts the value discourses of Attic invective oratory so as to emphasize his value to his host community and the depth of misunderstanding at Antioch. Rather than study precise allusions, I argue that the general strategies and tropes of invective were deployed to emphasize how badly Julian had been misunderstood by the Antiochenes.11

Genre, Community, and the *Misopogon*

Ἀνακρέοντι τῷ ποιητῇ πολλὰ ἐποιήθη μέλη χαρίεντα· (τρυφὰν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἐκ Μοιρῶν). Ἀλκαίῳ δὲ οὐκέτι οὐδὲ Ἄρχιλόχῳ τῷ Παρίῳ τὴν μοῦσαν ἐδώκεν ὁ θεὸς εἰς εὐφροσύνας καὶ ἥδειας τρέψῃ· μοχθεῖν γὰρ ἄλλοτε ἄλλας ἀναγκαζόμενοι τῇ μουσικῇ πρὸς τούτῳ ἐχρῶντο. κουφότερα ποιοῦντες αὐτοῖς ὃσα ὁ δαιμονίου ἐδίδω ἐν τοῖς ὑδικοῦντας λοιδορίας. ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀπαγορεύει μὲν ὁ νόμος ἐπ’ ὀνόματος – ὡσπερ οἴμαι καὶ ἄπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις – αἰτίασθαι τοὺς ἀδικοῦμένους μὲν οὐδὲν, εἰναι δ’ ἐπιχειροῦντας δυσμενεῖς, ἀφαιρεῖται δὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι μουσικῇ ὁ νῦν ἐπικρατῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔλευθεροις τῆς παιδείας τρόπος.

relied on Eunapius, it may be that Sozomen also depended on him. They describe the *Misopogon* in very similar terms: Zos. 3.11 λόγον ἀστεῖον ~ Soz. κάλλιστον καὶ μάλα ἀστεῖον λόγον. Of these later judgments, Socrates’ portrayal is the least positive, and he explicitly condemns Julian at *HE* 7.22 for losing control and giving way to anger. See Gleason, *JRS* 76 (1986) 106–107.

11 A similar approach is adopted by R. Cribbiore in her study of Libanius: “Demosthenes and Aeschines were more than cultivated references for late antique orators; they had uncontested authority as models, and their influence saturated Libanius’ prose both stylistically and thematically, even though he rarely quoted them directly.” *Libanius the Sophist: Rhetoric, Reality, and Religion in the Fourth Century* (Ithaca 2013) 77.
Anacreon the poet composed many delightful songs; for a luxurious life was allotted to him by the Fates. But Alcaeus and Archilochus of Paros the god did not permit to devote their muse to mirth and pleasure. For constrained as they were to endure toil, now of one sort, now of another, they used their poetry to relieve their toil, and by abusing those who wronged them they lightened the burdens imposed on them by Heaven. But as for me, the law forbids me, as I believe it does all others, to accuse by name those who, though I have done them no wrong, try to show their hostility to me; and on the other hand the fashion of education that now prevails among the well-born deprives me of the use of the music that consists in song.\footnote{Mis. 337\textit{A–B}: ed. H.-G. Nesselrath; transl. W. C. Wright with slight modification to account for differences between her text and Nesselrath’s. Texts of Julian not in Nesselrath are from C. Lacombrade.}

Julian begins his piece with programmatic statements that foreground iambic poetry and, as I shall show, oratory as models. He aligns himself with a lighthearted, abusive mode by explaining that the earliest invective poets were able to effect catharsis through abuse (λοιδορία), and that he is effectively writing an invective poem in prose (338\textit{A–B}). As Gianfranco Agosti has observed, iambic poetry was relatively unpopular in the late antique period—its generic connotations and colloquial language rendered it unsuitable to the literary pretensions of the age.\footnote{G. Agosti, “Late Antique Poetics and \textit{Iambikè Idea},” in A. Cavarzere et al. (eds.), \textit{Iambic Ideas: Essays on a Poetic Tradition from Archaic Greece to the Late Roman Empire} (Oxford 2001) 219–255, at 222–224.} Thus, Julian’s decision to adopt the iambic voice is already strange, and is rendered even more so by his earlier statements about the dignity of such poetry. In his \textit{Letter to a Priest}, he explains that no priest should ever read Hipponax, or Archilochus, or anyone with a similar style.\footnote{“Fragment of a Letter to a Priest” in Wright vol. II = 89b Bidez.} As high priest, therefore, Julian judged the iambic mode as beneath him, and he indicated this in a letter to his uncle, the former \textit{comes Orientis}: he advises his elder relative on the appropriate way to handle a dispute with another governor. After urging him to
practice restraint, the emperor mentions the moderation that characterizes his own approach (Ep. 29 Wright = 80 Bidez):

τίς γὰρ ἁσέλγεια, τίς ύβρις, τίς προπηλακισμός, τίς λοιδορία, τίς αἰσχρορρημοσύνη ταῖς ἐμαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἐγεράφη ποτε; ὡς γε, καὶ εἰ πρὸς τινὰ τραχύτερον εἶχον, διδούσης μοι τῆς ὑποθέσεως ὥσπερ έξ ἀμάξης εἰπείν οία πευδός ἐπὶ τοῦ Λαυδακίδου Ἀρχίλοχος, σεμνότερον αὐτὰ καὶ σωφρονότερον ἐφθεγξάμην, ἢ εἰ τις ἱερὰς ὑπόθεσις μετήει.

Have I ever in my letters employed brutality or insolence, or abuse or slander, or said anything for which I need to blush? On the contrary, even when I have felt resentment against someone and my subject gave me a chance to use ribald language like a woman from a cart, the sort of libels that Archilochus launched against Laudakides, I have always expressed myself with more dignity and reserve than one observes even on a sacred subject.

In disputes involving a written response, then, Julian’s σεμνότης and σωφροσύνη prevent him from engaging in the bitter, insulting, and comic remarks that typify the iambic mode. Clearly, the situation that produced the Misopogon is different, and iambic ideas are invoked explicitly in the opening lines. But Julian’s mode of expression also invokes oratory. The Misopogon was written as a response to a series of crises, unfortunate coincidences, and catastrophes that happened during his stay in Antioch. One of the tract’s most fundamental questions is whether the emperor or the Antiochenes are responsible for the problems that continued to arise. The work constitutes a discourse of blame, common territory for both iambic poetry as well as Attic invective, and Julian engages both genres to demonstrate both his own innocence and the Antiochene failure to understand and appreciate him.

The presence of Attic oratory in the Misopogon is unsurprising. Julian was, after all, a man who reacted to other (governmental) crises through carefully worded documents and meticulous self-fashioning (e.g. his Letter to the Athenians or his

15 On Julian’s mention of Laudakides as the opponent of Archilochus rather than Lycambes see Hawkins, Iambic Poetics 274.
Furthermore, Julian came of age at a time when performances of *paideia* were essential for acquiring and maintaining power,\(^{17}\) and self-presentation that relied on shared literary and intellectual sympathies had already proved effective in the past.\(^{18}\) Following the rhetorically focused approach espoused by Marcone, Quiroga, and Baker-Brian, I propose that the *Misopogon* represents another instance of careful self-fashioning that is in dialogue with earlier oratory. While Julian clearly inverted rhetorical topoi to serve his mock invective, I will show that he also engaged the commonplaces of genuine invective to demonstrate how badly he had been misunderstood.\(^{19}\) References to Attic invective highlight issues of community that have long been recognized as central to the *Misopo-

\(^{16}\) See M. Humphries, “The Tyrant’s Mask? Images of Good and Bad Rule in Julian’s *Letter to the Athenians*,” in S. Tougher and N. Baker-Brian (eds.), *Emperor and Author: The Writings of Julian the Apostate* (Swansea 2012) 75–90, esp. 81–86. Shaun Tougher examines Julian’s panegyrical attempts to engage and subvert the agenda of Constantius II while preserving his agency and creating space to discuss his own imperial virtues: “Reading between the Lines: Julian’s *First Panegyric on Constantius II*,” in *Emperor and Author* 19–34, esp. 25–30. Ammianus calls both the lost *Letter to the Romans* and the *Misopogon* “invective” compositions (21.10.7, 22.14.2).


\(^{18}\) Particularly in the panegyric for Eusebia. For Julian’s pivot from Eusebia’s gift of books to his own intellectual self-fashioning, as well as the delicate nature of his position, see S. Tougher, “Julian’s Speech of Thanks to Eusebia,” in Mary Whitby (ed.), *The Propaganda of Power* (Leiden 1998) 105–125, esp. 119–121.

Exploitation of invective commonplaces demonstrates a desire on Julian’s part to participate in the community that he resides in, while simultaneously establishing Antioch as a bad polity, incapable of the good judgement necessary to appreciate him.

The work begins with a kind of *recusatio* that explains its generic affiliations with both iambic poetry and invective oratory. After invoking Archilochus and Alcaeus as indirect models, Julian explains his position (*Mis.* 338A–B):

> τὸ δὲ ἄσσιμα πεζῇ μὲν λέξει πεποίηται, λοιδορίας δὲ ἔχει πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας, οὐκ εἰς ἄλλους μὰ Δία – πῶς γάρ, ἀπαγορεῦντος τοῦ νόμου; – εἰς δὲ τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν ξυγγραφέα. τὸ γάρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν γράφειν οὐτε ἐπαίνους οὐτε ψόγους εἴρητι νόμος οὐδέτες.

However the song that I now sing has been composed in prose, and it contains much violent abuse, directed not, by Zeus, against others—how could it be, since the law forbids?—but against the poet and author himself. For there is no law to prevent one’s writing either praise or criticism of oneself.

Law and custom prevent Julian from fully engaging the iambic mode, but the frequent references to a law and its provisions also suggest an affiliation with forensic oratory. Furthermore, the notion of writing invective poetry in prose indicates imitation of classical Athenian orators. There had always been contamination between the iambic and invective oratorical genres, and the emperor’s legal posturing suggests a work of

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20 I refer primarily to Gleason’s idea that the Kalends festival strengthened social bonds and reinforced hierarchies. At the same time, the temporary suspension of those hierarchies “might open the way for the experience of community in a wider sense”: *Festive Satire* 111–112. See also Hawkins, *Iambic Poetics* 275. Similarly, Van Hoof and Van Nuffelen’s approach to the *Misopogon* as a failure of ritualized communication between emperor and citizenry highlights similar issues, although the word ‘community’ is not used (*JRS* 101 [2014] 166–184).

oratory as much as the reference to Archilochus suggests the iambus. Julian thus establishes generic models for himself while simultaneously claiming even greater aspirations: the Misopogon is a work of satire aspiring toward the iambic, and a work of epideictic oratory that aspires toward forensic speech (inasmuch as it is apologetic).

Furthermore, the emphasis on obedience to the law establishes the civic character that inheres in both Attic oratory and iambic poetry. Rather than exist outside of the community and exploit his unique position as emperor, Julian adheres to the strictures that bind a polis. As Agosti has observed, the iambic idea is characterized by a sense of “the community and the polis,” and oratory engenders the same spirit. Attic litigation represented a contest for τιµή held before the δῆµος—in Julian’s case, the οἰκουµένη—and engaging Attic oratory reflects a willingness to define values (and personal worth) dialogically with a community of readers/hearers. Although rebuking the Antiochene polity, Julian by his frequent references to the law and its power to shape his actions suggests that he still takes part in the community but has a grievance. While legal constraints and tradition prevent him from naming names, he explores a novel solution in attacking himself. His

\[22\] Rather than a single law, this seems to be a long-standing body of both law and tradition that restricted nomination attacks of this kind. LaFleur observes that such constraints hindered the writing of ‘true’ satire, which traditionally attacked its subjects by name: R. A. LaFleur “Horace and Onomastik Komodein: The Law of Satire,” ANRW II 31.3 (1981) 1790–1826, esp. 1792–1793.

\[23\] This also evokes Julian’s construction of ideal imperial behaviour in the first panegyric for Constantius (45D, 14A, with Tougher, Reading between the Lines 28 and n.70).

\[24\] Agosti, in Iambic Ideas 238.


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decision to target himself does little to conceal his intention to vindicate his actions at Antioch, but the generic programming highlights Julian’s participation in the communities where he resided as it simultaneously raises the question of which polities were fit to host an emperor like him.

**Julian’s use of Attic invective**

After the programmatic introduction, Julian begins the invective proper by attacking his beard, a move which allows him to deploy invective commonplaces immediately. He is quick to admit that he is ugly (338B–C: ἀρξάµενος ὑπὸ τοῦ προσώπου. τοῦτο ἔχω ὑπὲρ φύσει γεγνότι μὴ λίαν καλὰ µὴ εὐπρεπεῖ) and that his other undesirable characteristics (δυστροπία, δυσκολία) compelled him to punish his face for its ugliness by covering it with a beard. It is a further punishment that lice inhabit his beard “as though it were a thicket for wild beasts” (338C). Each of these statements conforms to the tropes of Attic invective: the accusations of physical repugnance, depicted graphically by Julian’s lice-infested beard, are routine. Speeches in both the Greek and the Latin traditions often supposed that a poor appearance by itself served as evidence of wrongdoing. Cicero himself attacked Piso for being bearded (Pis. 1.1), while Aeschines maintained that Timarchus was once very attractive, but because of his wanton lifestyle and otherwise unworthy behaviour he became unattractive and unbecoming to the city (1.63, 189). Julian’s appearance provides an excellent point of departure, as it provides supporting evidence for the other objectionable characteristics that he manifests.

The traits that compel Julian to compound his physical unattractiveness by adding a beard, his δυστροπία and δυσκολία, feature prominently in attacks on the defendant’s civic virtue, both in the Misopogon and in Attic oratory generally. An ill disposition was closely linked to the behaviour of a µισόφιλος or µισόπολις, and Julian’s ill-mannered, anti-social qualities

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26 Noted by Davies, who also points out that Vatinius is attacked for his appearance, namely a struma: Prometheus 11 (1985) 32.
recur in his strategy of self-incrimination. Accusations of unpleasantness, combined with the misunderstanding of behavior as deliberately unpleasant or misanthropic, constitute some of the *Misopogon’s* few explicit literary allusions to Attic oratory, although wider similarities of language are also present. At 364D Julian announces his intention to abandon Antioch in favor of another city, explaining his reasoning as follows:

πεπεισμένος μὲν οὐδαμός ὅτι πάντως ἐκείνος ἀρέσω, πρὸς σὺς πορευόμενοι, κρίνον δὲ αἰρετῶτερον, εἰ διαμάρτωμι τοῦ δῶρος γοῦν ἐκείνος καλὸς κάθαρος, ἐν μέρει μεταδοῦναι πᾶσι τῆς ἀβίδας τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ μὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονία ταύτην ἀποκαίνασαι πάλιν ὠσπέρ δυσοδίας τῆς ἐμῆς μετριότητος καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῆς σωφροσύνης.

Not indeed because I am convinced that I shall be in all respects pleasing to those to whom I am going, but because I judge it more desirable, in case I should fail at least to seem to them an honourable and good man, to give all men in turn a share of my unpleasantness, and not to annoy this happy city with the evil odour, as it were, of my moderation and the sobriety of my friends.

W. C. Wright already noted the potential allusion to Demosthenes’ *Against Meidias* (21.153):

εἰ μὲν ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τὸ λητουργεῖν τούτο, τὸ ἐν ὑμῖν λέγειν ἐν ἀπάσις ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις καὶ παντοχω, ἡμεῖς οἱ λητουργοῦντες, ἡμεῖς οἱ προεισφέροντες ὑμῖν, ἡμεῖς οἱ πλούσιοί ἐσμεν, εἰ τὸ τὰ τοιάτα λέγειν, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν λητουργεῖν, ὑμεῖς οἱ Μειδίαν ἄπαντον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει λαμπρότατον γεγενηθαί ἀποκαίνατε γὰρ ἀπὸ δήσου καὶ ἀναισθησία καθ’ ἑκάστην τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ταύτα λέγον.

If, men of Athens, public service consists in saying to you at all the meetings of the Assembly and on every possible occasion, “We are the men who perform the public services; we are those who advance your tax-money; we are the capitalists”—if that is all it means, then I confess that Meidias has shown himself the

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27 For the incidence of these words in the *Misopogon* see the Appendix; cf. Süss, *Ethos* 250–251.
most distinguished citizen of Athens; for he bores us at every Assembly by these tasteless and tactless boasts.\textsuperscript{28}

Wright’s parallel largely persuades. The metaphorical use of ἀποκναίω to mean “harass” is relatively rare, and there is great similarity between the contexts. The misunderstanding of Meidias’ unpleasantness and ignorance as λαμπρότης and λειτουργία are similar to the misapprehension of Julian’s modest and prudent behaviour as unpleasantness (ἀηδία). Julian’s reference to Against Meidias reveals a strategy of misapprehension and reinterpretation borrowed from invective oratory accompanied by a reuse of language, both of which will continue to occur throughout the Misopagon.

The tactic of reimagining faults as virtues (and vice-versa) is crucial to the Misopagon. Julian constantly refers to his own misanthropic and boorish behaviour (and often reinterprets them as prudence or temperance), placing his satirical self-portrait into dialogue with the city-haters of Attic invective. The emperor’s earliest mention of his sullen disposition and the beard that resulted from it indicates both his clash with the Antiochenes and his position as an outsider who seemingly hates the city. Since Julian is bearded, it is impossible for him to engage in gluttony (338C, ἐσθίειν δὲ λάβρως ἢ πίνειν χανδὸν οὐ συγχωομαι). While this would typically be viewed as something positive, Julian constructs his inability to gorge himself as inimical to the luxurious lifestyle of Antioch. His philosophical restraint thus becomes an impediment to his integration. If Julian represents a μισόπολις, then, he also inhabits a city that has inverted the norms of an ideal πόλις.

The connection between a sullen disposition, its potential to be misunderstood by other citizens, and a lack of civic virtue also appears in Demosthenes, and provides a point of departure for further examination of Julian’s invective language and strategies. Consider his attack on Stephanus (45.68–69):\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} Text M. Dilts, transl. J. H. Vince.

\textsuperscript{29} The authorship of Dem. 45 has been contested, although Dilts’ edition
Neither should the airs which the fellow puts on as he walks with sullen face along the walls be properly considered as marks of sobriety, but rather as marks of misanthropy... This demeanor, then, is nothing but a cloak to cover his real character, and he shows therein the rudeness and malignity of his temper. Here is a proof. You have been far better off than you deserved, yet to whom among the whole host of Athenians have you ever made a contribution? To whom have you ever lent aid, or to whom done a kindness?

Like Stephanus, Julian occupies the territory that lies between modest reserve and misanthropic scorn, and risks being misunderstood as a result. Julian deploys deliberate and Atticizing language in order to present himself as this kind of city-hater. At Mis. 340B–C he claims that, because of his inability to indulge in excessive eating and drinking, he is πικρός... καὶ τρυφώσῃ πόλει πολύμιος. The phrase πόλει πολύμιος is particularly relevant, perhaps, for πολύμιος δήμω is employed by Aeschines to attack Demosthenes as someone who is naturally disposed toward hatred of the Athenian πόλις.30 Furthermore, Julian’s use of πικρός resonates with the earlier characterization of Stephanus as a μισόπολις, who was called ἄγριος καί

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awards authorship to Demosthenes. For a consideration of the evidence see J. Trevett, Apollodoros the Son of Pasion (Oxford 1992) 50–76. Trevett concludes that “Demosthenes almost certainly wrote 45. My only doubt is caused by the failure of Aeschines to reproach him for having done so, but it is possible that his authorship was successfully kept secret” (73).

30 Aesch 3.172: οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ πάππου πολύμιος ἄν εἴη δήμω, θάνατον γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῶν προγόνων κατέγνωτε, τὰ δ’ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς Σκύθης. Notably, Julian also presents himself as aligned with the Scythian Mardonius (Mis. 348D) and admits that he is a Thracian at 367C.
πικρός. It is unrealistic to suppose that these exact textual loci would be evoked by these parallels, but any generally educated audience would have been familiar with Attic oratory, and therefore attuned to the fact that Attic orators attack their opponents as hating the city by criticizing them as πολέμιος, πικρός, or ἁγριός.32

Julian capitalizes on the stereotype of the μισόπολις as ἁγριός as well, attributing ἀγροικία or an ἁγριον ἡθος to himself nearly ten times, especially noteworthy given the short length of the Misopagon (337–371). Julian’s first accusations of ἀγροικία establish the program for further deployments of the commonplace. The emperor’s ἀγροικία serves as proof of his inability to coexist (ἁρμόσειν) with the Antiochenes, and contributes meaningfully to his characterization as a city-hater.33 Julian’s rustic and boorish behaviour reflects a specific incompatibility between the emperor and the citizens of Antioch, but

31 For the high value placed on the study of oratory, particularly Demosthenes, see A. F. Norman, “The Library of Libanius,” RbM 107 (1964) 158–175, esp. 159 n.4, relying on Libanius Ἐπ. 1036. For Libanius’ opinion that Demosthenes was not read enough see Lib. Ὁμ. 3.18, with R. Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (Princeton 2001) 144 n.62. If Libanius can be taken as paradigmatic, it should be observed that students were encouraged to read and memorize large portions of Demosthenes, and engage with his classical Athenian context (Cribiore 224–238). This Libanian evidence is balanced, somewhat, by Themistius, who, while careful to mention Demosthenes as a master of eloquence, makes clear references only to De Corona: see B. Colpi, Die παιδεία des Themistios (Bern 1987) 81–82. It seems unlikely that this was the only speech he read, however, and Colpi’s study focuses on citations. For Themistius’ readings in the other Attic orators see Colpi 79–83.

32 It is possible that the controversy surrounding this speech would have increased its visibility to the late antique reading audience. Both Plutarch and the much later life by Zosimus record that Demosthenes composed speeches for both Phormio and Apollodoros (Dem. 15), and there is further evidence to suggest that there was an ancient controversy over the authorship of this speech (Trevett, Apollodoros 55).

33 Hawkins, Iambic Poetics 282, also discusses the importance of ἀγροικία for Julian’s ironic and iambic program.
ἀγροικία often indicates misanthropy and an inimical disposition toward the city. 34 Mis. 342D includes accusations of boorishness alongside other tropes that typify Attic invective. 35

τὴν δὴ σὴν ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀπανθρωπίαν καὶ σκαϊότητα τούτοις ἀρμόσειν ὑπέλαβες; οὕτως ἄνθρωπον ἄντι σοι καὶ φαύλον, ὢ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀμαθέστατε καὶ φιλαπεχθημιστάτε, τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγεννεστάτων σώφρον σωμάτων, ὅ δὲ σὺ κοσμεῖν καὶ καλλοπιζέιν σωφροσύνη χρήναι νομίζεις; οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη ὥ τι ποτέ ἐστίν οὐκ ἴσιμον, οὐνόμα βε' αὐτοῖς ἄκουστες μόνον ἔρθον οὐχ ὀρθῶς.

“What then?” you answer, “did you really suppose that your boorish manners and savage ways and clumsiness would harmonise with these things? O most ignorant and most quarrelsome of men, is it so senseless then and so stupid, that puny soul of yours which men of poor spirit call temperate, and which you forsooth think it your duty to adorn with temperance? You are wrong; for in the first place we do not know what temperance is and we hear its name only, while the real thing we cannot see.”

σκαϊότης, which Julian accuses himself of here, is used by Demosthenes to impugn his opponent’s judgement in matters of civic virtue (particularly where it concerns the ability to recognize and evaluate virtue). 36 In one example of this sort of criticism, σκαϊότης is explicitly connected to hating the city (19.312):

τίς γὰρ ἦστιν Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων οὕτω σκαϊός ἢ ἀνήκοος ἢ σφόδρα μισῶν τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἡμετέραν, ὡστε, εἰ τις ἔροιτο, ἔτει μοι, τῆς νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλάδων ταυτησὶ καὶ οἰκουμένης ἐσθ' ὥ τι ταὐτὴν ἀν τὴν προσηγορίαν εἶχεν ἢ ὀρθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν

34 Theophrastus records an affinity between the ἀγροικὸς and the μισό-φιλος/μισόπολις, since the former is typified as someone who “distrusts friends and family, preferring to discuss important business with his slaves, and he reports the proceedings of the Assembly to the hired labourers working on his farm” (Char. 4.3, transl. Diggle).

35 The underscored terms are words that are frequent in Attic invective (see Appendix).

36 Especially the civic crown and its importance to political life at Athens: Dem.18.120, 22.75.

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ἐχόντων Ἑλλήνων, εἰ μὴ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὑπὲρ οὗτῶν ἐκείνας οἱ Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι παρέσχοντο, οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόσοντο;”

οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς εὖ ὀίδ᾽ ὅτι φῆσειν, ἄλλα πάντα ταύθ’ ὑπὸ τῶν βαρ-βάρων ἄν ἐκλωκέναι.

Lives there a man, Greek or barbarian, so boorish, so unversed in history, or so ill-disposed to our commonwealth that, if he were asked the question, “Tell me, in all the country that we call Greece and inhabit today, is there an acre that would still bear that name, or remain the home of the Greeks who now possess it, if the heroes of Marathon, and our forefathers, had not in their defence performed those glorious deeds of valor,” is there one man who would not make reply: “No; the whole country would have become the prey of the barbarian invaders”?

Julian’s self-criticism at Mis. 342D recalls the attack on Stephanus. Both Julian and Stephanus are characterized by ἀγροικία, as well as ἀπανθρωπία or μισανθρωπία. Most importantly, Julian inverts the conclusion of the argument against Stephanus. In the Demosthenic text, the orator observes that the misanthropic Stephanus can rely on σωφροσύνη to cloak what is truly a sullen nature. Unlike the situation in Demostenes’ Athens, where sullen μισανθρωπία and its attendant vices are deceptively called σωφροσύνη, the Antiochenes see Julian’s σωφροσύνη and interpret it as the misanthropic dis-temper of the μισώπολις. Thus Mis. 342D represents a crucial point in the development of the μισώπολις trope. While the characterization of Julian as a boorish city-hater continues throughout the speech, Mis. 342D stands out as a moment where the reading audience may most easily realize that a fine line separates misanthropy and σωφροσύνη, and that the Anti-ochenes were not equipped to make the distinction correctly.37

The reuse of the μισώπολις trope emphasizes misunder-

37 Baker-Brian, in Emperor and Author 270–273, identifies this scene as a moment in which Julian identifies himself with σωφροσύνη and acknowledges that it is a crucial component of ideal imperial behaviour. He goes on to mention the importance of φιλανθρωπία, which may also play a role here.
ing rooted in rash and uncritical judgement, and a similar instance of misapprehension, connected to a different rhetorical commonplace, occurs at Mis. 345. Here the emperor recalls an earlier dispute with the Antiochenes, which leads him to criticism of their behaviour and piety. Homer is the chief weapon in Julian’s arsenal, and he cites numerous passages which he believes ought to be instructive. As he finishes this recollection, he makes a show of catching himself in an error, saying that he is “crafting phrases” (345B, ἵδο, πάλιν ἐγὼ τὰ συνήθη τεχνιτεύο λέξείδια). The collocation τεχνιτεύω λέξείδια is unique to the Misopogon, but it must be interpreted as a variant of the phrase τεχνίτης λόγον used in Attic oratory. 38

Both Aeschines and Demosthenes identify their opponents as τεχνίτης λόγον or τεχνίτης τοῦ λέγειν. These “workers in words” were skilled rhetors who could mislead the jury through their sophistry, while the younger, inexperienced orator could only present the facts. Notably, the only sources from classical Athenian oratory that preserve the phrase are the most famous: Demosthenes and Aeschines. 39

Consider Demosthenes’ characterization of the τεχνίτης (22.4):

νῦν δ’ οἶδα σαφῶς ὅτι οὗτος ἀπλοῦν μὲν οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι, ἐξαποτάτων δ’ ὡμᾶς πειράσεται πλάττων καὶ παράγων πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων κακούργους λόγους. ἐστι γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τεχνίτης τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πάντα τὸν βίον ἐσχόλακεν ἐν τούτῳ.

but I am quite certain that he cannot have any simple and honest plea to put forward, but will try to hoodwink you, inventing malicious answers to each charge and so leading you astray. For he is a τεχνίτης τοῦ λέγειν, men of Athens, and has devoted all his life to that one study.

38 While the phrase appeared in other contexts, it enjoyed frequent use in later descriptions of classical Athenian oratory and its actors. A similar phrase occurs in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, applied to the orator Isaeus:

Isae. 4.3, ἤν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ δῶξα παρὰ τοῦς τότε γοητείας καὶ ἀπάτης, ὡς δεινὸς ἀνήρ τεχνιτεύσατο λόγους ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα.

39 Demosthenes 22.4 and Aeschines’ own accusations that Demosthenes was himself a τεχνίτης (1.170, 3.200) constitute the only examples.
The phrase τεχνίτης τοῦ λέγειν/τεχνίτης λόγων occurs elsewhere in late antique literature, albeit infrequently, and often retains its negative meaning.\(^{40}\) Sozomen clearly uses it to evoke the deceptive power of the heterodox bishop Eunomius, whom he characterizes as a “worker of words, a querulous man who delighted in argument” (HE 6.26, τεχνίτης λόγων καὶ ἐριστικῶς καὶ συλλογισμῶς χαίρων).\(^{41}\) In Ep. 1242, however, Libanius speaks of another teacher, whom others have described as a λόγων ἀγαθὸς τεχνίτης, an opinion that Libanius now confirms himself. In spite of this seemingly positive meaning,\(^{42}\) Libanius also uses the phrase negatively in the declamations set in classical Athens, demonstrating that fourth-century audiences were still sensitive to its original invective context. In *Declamations* 17, he criticizes Aeschines as a τεχνίτης τοῦ λέγειν who cheats and deceives the judges (17.1.5):\(^{43}\)

\(^{40}\) This usage extends beyond late antiquity into the Byzantine period and may still evoke Attic oratory for much later readers. In a poem written against the monk Sabbaites, Michael Psellus attacks an opponent, calling him τεχνίτα λεξεῖδιων (Poemata 21.163). For this dispute and the use of this term in later iambic attacks see F. Bernard, *Reading and Writing Byzantine Secular Poetry* (Oxford 2014) 280–290, esp. 286. Bernard does not interpret the phrase as a reference to oratory, but this does not seem impossible given the context (see the line immediately following the τεχνίτης insult: ὦ καινὲ ῥῆτορ).

\(^{41}\) Cf. R. Lim, *Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley 1995) 130.

\(^{42}\) Libanius’ use of the phrase does not seem to imply sarcasm or veiled criticism, although it should be observed that ἀγαθός is critically important (without it, the phrase would almost certainly be read as negative). R. Cribiore reads Libanius’ response positively, asserting that he “responded with impeccable savoir faire”: “The Education of Orphans: A Reassessment of the Evidence of Libanius,” in S. Hübner and D. Ratzan (eds.), *Growing Up Fatherless in Antiquity* (Cambridge 2009) 257–272, at 263. Cribiore’s translation is “a good craftsman of discourses”: *The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch* (Princeton 2007) 265.

\(^{43}\) *Declamations* 17 is generally thought to be authentic. Although A. F. Norman, *Libanius, Selected Works* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1969), numbers 17 among the spurious declamations, R. Penella believes this to be a typo-
δεῖ δὲ ύμᾶς αὐτοὺς, ὅταν τοῦτο ποιῆτε, μειξόνως ὑγριζέσθαι καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔχειν, εἰ τεχνίτης μέν ὁ τοῦ λέγειν καὶ σοφισμάτων γέμων παντοδιπόν πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἐχθρὸν τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπάντων μυρίας ἔχον ἀφορμὰς λόγων καλὰς οὐδὲν οὐτε εἰπὲν οὐτε ἐφθέγξατο, κατὰ δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν χρῆται τῇ τέχνῃ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδικῶν τε καὶ πείθειν ἐπιχειρῶν ὡς οὐκ ἴδικτην.

But if, being a τεχνίτης τοῦ λέγειν, full of every kind of sophistry, a man who has thousands of lovely (verbal) tricks [to use] on behalf of the enemy of the city and of all of the Greeks, if he [Aeschines] should speak his nonsense or make a sound, whenever he does that, you must take it ill and become very angry.

Using his craft against them he does an injustice to the citizens, and tries to persuade them that they have not been wronged.

Libanius’ description of the Athenian τεχνίτης λόγων and his actions corresponds well to the criticisms Julian encountered at Antioch. Declamations 17 uses the phrase to indicate someone who masquerades as a friend of the city while secretly acting in his own interest. Julian’s mock identification with the deceptive “worker of words” is one of the supreme ironies of his address to the Antiochenes. Rather than mislead the Antiochenes for his own advantage, like Libanius’ Aeschines, he wished to provide genuine counsel as a ruler and fellow citizen. The identification also serves as a backhanded attack on the sophistication of the population. Julian deploys a concept interpretable on two levels: τεχνίτευω λέξειδια will read differently depending on the audience’s relative familiarity with Attic oratory.44

44 Julian’s attempts to speak to both the wider audience whose sympathy he hoped to gain and the Antiochene audience whom he hoped to tarnish are also made clear by L. Van Hoof and P. Van Nuffelen, “No Stories for Old Men: Damophilus of Bithynia and Plutarch in Julian’s Misopogon,” in A. J. Quiroga Puertas (ed.), The Purpose of Rhetoric in Late Antiquity (Tübingen

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Readers familiar with invective commonplaces will realize it as a complaint that Julian has been unfairly misunderstood, while the pejorative connotations of λεξείδιον continue to announce an agenda of mock satire to the entire audience.\textsuperscript{45} The Athenian τεχνίτης is someone who hates his city, and who is justly hated in turn if exposed. Julian’s alignment with this figure underscores the central point of the \textit{Misopogon}: Julian offers genuine counsel and goodwill to the cities that host him, but the Antiochenes’ gross misunderstanding of his character makes the opposite seem true.

Interaction with these rhetorical commonplaces makes it clear that, as in Attic oratory, the audience must judge the matter. The \textit{Misopogon} presents Julian’s case as one that has already been tried in Antioch. In the eyes of the Antiochenes, Julian is a τεχνίτης and a sullen µισόπολις. Throughout the work, however, he consistently impugns Antioch’s ability to make good decisions while highlighting his own capacity for discernment. This point of difference is focalized, not surprisingly, by Julian’s beard. His hairiness is repellent in the eyes of the Antiochenes, but the beard is proof of his masculinity and σωφροσύνη (cf. \textit{Mis.} 338C). These differences are articulated early in the work, as Julian compares himself to a lion (339B):\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{quote}
εύοι δὲ οὐκ ἀπέχρησε μόνον ἡ βαθύτης τοῦ γενείου, ἄλλα καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ πρόσεστιν αὐχύμος ... εἰ δὲ βουλεσθέ τι καὶ τῶν ἄπορρητων μαθεῖν, ἔστι μοι τὸ στήθος δασὺ καὶ λάσιον ὀστέρ τῶν λεόντων, οἵτε βασιλεύουσι τῶν θηρίων, οὐδὲ ἐποίησα
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{2013} 209–221, esp. 213–217 on the use and citation of sources in the Cato exemplum (\textit{Mis.} 358A–359B): Julian styles himself as someone like Plutarch, a philosopher whom the Antiochenes (and others) cheaply deride, while the Antiochenes exhibit the same superficiality that characterized a compiler like Damophilus of Bithynia.\textsuperscript{45} For the well-attested use of λεξείδιον to indicate a “vain, empty, or meretricious word or expression” see Lampe s.v. 4.\textsuperscript{46} Noted also by Long, \textit{AncW} 24 (1993) 16.

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λέιον αὐτὸ πόστε διὰ δυσκολίαν καὶ μικροπρέπειαν, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος εἰργασάμην λέιον οὐδὲ μαλακόν.

But as though the mere length of my beard were not enough, my head is disheveled besides … And if you would like to learn something that is usually a secret, my breast is shaggy, and covered with hair, like the breasts of lions who among wild beasts are monarchs like me, and I have never in my life made it smooth, so ill-conditioned and shabby am I, nor have I made any other part of my body smooth or soft.

The statement engages the invective commonplace of comparison to an animal—the Antiochenes are beasts to be ruled over, perhaps, but Julian is the subject of actual assimilation to a beast.47 Julian’s choice of the lion is particularly apt, however, as it evokes a royal nature, Homeric ἀρετή, and, in the physiognomic tradition, both perfect masculinity and a devotion to the liberal arts.48 A wordplay that turns on the phonetic similarity and semantic dissonance of λέων and λεῖον is present here, and may reinforce the themes of misunderstanding and failure to recognize a person’s true nature that are crucial to the Misopogon. While λέων and λεῖον are outwardly (orthographically) similar, they differ greatly in meaning and value, just as the worthless µισόπολις and valorized champion of

47 For a concise overview of animal comparisons in invective oratory (and other Athenian sources), as well as other studies that explore the wide range of animal references in invective, see Davies, Prometheus 11 (1985) 36 n.25: a variety of animals are found, including foxes, apes, and bats; the lion is mentioned, albeit through a Homeric reference.

48 For the lion as perfectly masculine in physiognomic thought see [Arist.] Phgn. 809b. While the works of ancient physiognomy do not explicitly connect the lion and the liberal arts, the man dedicated to learning exhibits the same physical characteristics as the lion: see E. C. Evans, “Roman Descriptions of Personal Appearance in History and Biography,” HSCP 46 (1935) 43–84, at 66. Evans (73–74) goes on to connect this portrait of a lion-like man to Augustus, with whom Julian seems to share some physiognomic characteristics. The lion was not expressly positive in all of Julian’s work, nor in late antique thought generally, but the physiognomic dimensions were likely more salient in discussions of physical appearance such as these. For Julian’s negative depictions of lions see Or. 2.84D, 98C–D.
Julian stands out as the masculine and regal lion and reaffirms his unwillingness to become like the lion’s antithesis, the soft, smooth, and base Antiochene. In contrast to their emperor, the citizens of Antioch are attacked as “smooth-skinned and beardless” (342C–D, λείοι καὶ ἀγένειοι). Julian relies on this predilection for grooming to assimilate the Antiochenes to women, explaining (339A):

εξὼν οἶμαι λείον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ψιλόν, ὃποῖον οἱ καλοὶ τῶν παιδίων ἔχουσιν ἀπασάι τε αἱ γυναικεῖς, αἷς φύσει πρόσεστι τὸ ἐρασίμων. ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ γῆρῳ ξηλοῦντες τοὺς ὑμῶν αὐτῶν υἱές καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ὑπὸ ἀβρότητος βίου καὶ ἵσως ἀπαλότητος τρόπον λεῖον ἐπιμελῶς ἐργάζεσθε, τὸν ἄνδρα ὑποφαινόντες καὶ παραδεικνύντες διὰ τοῦ μετώπου καὶ οὐχ ὄσπερ ἡμεῖς ἐκ τῶν γνάθων.

I might, I suppose, make it smooth and bare as handsome youths wear theirs, and all women, who are endowed by nature with loveliness. But you, since even in your old age you emulate your own sons and daughters by your soft and effeminate dispositions, carefully make your chins smooth, and your manhood you barely reveal and slightly indicate by your foreheads, not by your jaws as I do.

Julian’s hair is proof of his virtue and manhood (associated in Attic oratory with the qualities of restraint and good judgement), while the Antiochenes’ hairlessness is proof of their femininity, which the Attic orators align with wantonness and poor decision-making. Julian reprises this point later in the

49 See also Hawkins, Iambic Poetics 279.

50 J. Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens (New York 1997) 174–180, esp. 176. Carson also demonstrates a widely-held philosophical belief that indulgence and behaviour typical of women was an impediment to one’s perspicacity and good judgement: A. Carson, “Putting Her in Her Place: Woman, Dirt, and Desire,” in F. Zeitlin et al. (eds.), Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World (Princeton 1990) 135–170, at 137–145, with 142–145 for a discussion of women’s incompatibility with σωφροσύνη. Perhaps one of the clearest examples of an Attic orator accusing an opponent of being woman-
work, and redefines σωφροσύνη in the process. Hailing the Antiochenes as πολίται σώφρονες (356A), he goes on to praise the city for the educational process that created such citizens, abandoning them to the care of women, who teach them to be unrestrained in all things.51

Yet Julian goes on to complicate these carefully constructed contrasts, proclaiming that it is he who is unmanly, since he does not have the courage to revel and flout the law in the cavalier manner of the Antiochenes (342B):

ἐρυθριῶν γὰρ πρέπει τοῖς ἀνάνδροις, ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἀνδρείοις – ἔσπερ ὑμεῖς – ἐπεὶ οὖσαν κοιμάζειν, νύκτωρ ἡδυπαθεῖν, ὡσπερ τῶν νόμων ὑπερορᾶτε μὴ λόγῳ διδάσκειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐνδείκνυσθαι.

For the blush of modesty befits the unmanly, but manly fellows like you it befits to begin your revels at dawn, to spend your nights in pleasure, and to show not only by your words, but by your deeds also that you despise the laws.

Here Julian combines an attack on the Antiochenes with his own reflections on the unfeasibility of coexisting with Antioch as a polity. Their perverse interpretation of what constitutes manliness undermines the most essential element of civic life: the law. Because of their degenerate effeminacy, the Antiochenes are incapable of observing the laws of their own community. Their inability to make even this most basic political compromise renders their judgement of Julian a forgone conclusion. They will, of course, be unable to interpret his bearing appropriately, and they will see his attempts to advise them as the self-centered meddling of the τεχνίτης, his austere bearing as the antisocial behaviour of the µισόπολις.

ish in order to cast aspersions on his ability to make civic-minded decisions is Aeschin. 2.179. This also likely plays a role in Aeschin. 1 (cf. 1.42). For an overview of that case see E. Harris, Aeschines and Athenian Politics (New York/Oxford 1995) 101–105.

51 Long, AmW 24 (1993) 19, also observes that this interacts with and inverts Menander Rhetor 364.1, which recommends praising a city for controlling its female inhabitants.
Conclusion

Julian used the *Misopogon* to vent his frustration with Antioch and present his conflict with its citizens in a more favorable light. He wrote to prove that the burden of responsibility for the misunderstanding at Antioch was not his to bear, and addressed both the internal, Antiochene audience, and the larger, empire-wide audience. What is most fascinating about the *Misopogon*’s interaction with Attic oratory is how effectively it demonstrates the inevitability of misunderstanding and conflict between Julian and the city. By choosing to highlight the μισόπολις and the τεχνίτης λόγων, Julian identifies two figures that are easily misunderstood, but whose virtue is unimpeachable if understood properly. The use of the τεχνίτης trope is particularly effective, since the accusation appears in classical oratory only in the works of Aeschines and Demosthenes, particularly in their dispute. Given the circumstances of the conflict between those orators, only one man can be the τεχνίτης λόγων. If the wrong party is determined to be the τεχνίτης, there will be terrible consequences for the city. A failure in judgement on the citizens’ part will lead to the exile of a true councilor and the retention of a con man. As Aeschines himself opined (3.200):

καὶ τί δεῖ σε Δημοσθένην παρακαλεῖν; οὗτος ὁ ψυχρησίας τὴν δικαιον ἀπολογίαν παρακαλής κακούργων καὶ τεχνίτην λόγων, κλέπτεις τὴν ἄκροασιν, βλάπτεις τὴν πόλιν, καταλύεις τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

Why need you call Demosthenes to your support? When you overleap the just defence and call forward a rascal and a τεχνίτης λόγων, you cheat the ears of the jury, you injure the city, you undermine the democracy.52

From the Antiochene perspective, it was undeniable that Julian “injured the city.” But such an accusation is true only if the emperor really was a τεχνίτης rather than a virtuous member of the community who wanted to counsel and improve it.

52 Text Dilts, transl. C. D. Adams.
Julian, therefore, uses the commonplaces of Attic oratory to suggest that this kind of misunderstanding was inevitable in a place as morally base as Antioch, but he simultaneously makes clear how obvious his value is to a city capable of evaluating him properly.

At the same time, the decision to appropriate invective language and invoke the iambic mode places renewed emphasis on Julian’s style of citizen-like governance. Fellow inhabitants of the empire must choose either to embrace him or reject him, not only as a ruler but also as a participant in their communities. While his decision to subject the Antiochenes to the rule of a harsh magistrate belies this position, the iambic and invective style of the *Misopogon* presents Julian’s reaction as that of a wronged party who cannot hope for a redress of grievances, but turns to literature as a venue for vengeance and complaint. The references to earlier Greek oratory and poetry embedded in the *Misopogon* only emphasize Julian’s misgivings and his preferred means of understanding the conflict. Antioch’s boorish citizens form the nominal audience of the piece, but their lack of sophistication likely prevents them from understanding such allusions or the author who made them. Julian surely hoped for better relations with another city once he returned from Persia, and the literary references of the *Misopogon* represent one strategy for creating a better rapport with his would-be fellow citizens.

APPENDIX: Atticizing Terms of Abuse in Julian

ἀβελτερία: 339C, 349D
ἀμυθῆς: 349B, 349D, 359A
ἀναισθητος: 339C, 351C
ἀνανδρος: 342B
ἀνδρεῖος: 360C
ἀνόητος: 342D, 340B, 367B
ἀπανθρωπία: 341D, 342D
ἀσελγής: 350C, 359D, 367B
γελοῖος/γελοίων: 360B
δοῦλος: 356C–D
δύσκολος: 342B, 344C, 349C
δύστροπος/δυστροπία: 344B, 364C (of an associate of Julian’s)
μοχθηρός: 340A
πονηρός: 345C
σκαιός/σκαιότης: 345B, 345C, 341D, 349A, 349B
ὑβρίζω: 342C, 355C
φαῦλος: 342D
φιλαπεχθήµων: 342D, 351B, 362B

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