Aristotle and Chamaeleon
and Anonymous in the
Margins of Genev.gr. 44

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In Iliad 5, Zeus addresses Ares with a surprising level of hostility (890–891):

ἔχθιστος δὲ μοι ἐσσι θεῶν οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν·
ἀιεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοι τε μάχαι τε.

To me you are the most hateful of the gods who hold Olympus;
for strife and war and battle too are continually dear to you.

In Iliad 21, Zeus watches with pleasure as the gods take sides in the war and fight each other (388–390):

ἄϊε δὲ Ζεὺς
ἡμενος Ὅλυμπῳ ἐγέλασσε δὲ οἱ φίλοι ἢτορ
γηθοσύνη, ὡθ' ὥρατο θεοὺς ἐρίδι ξυνίντας.

And Zeus heard it,
seated on Olympus; and the dear heart in him laughed
with joy, as he beheld the gods coming together in strife.

A relatively long scholion on γηθοσύνη (Il. 21.390) in the thirteenth-century MS. Genev.gr. 44¹ is usually taken to be contrasting two views of these passages: Aristotle’s (from his Homeric Puzzles), and Chamaeleon’s reply (from his On the Iliad).²

In what follows, I present a photograph of the scholion and

¹ Bibliothèque de Genève, Ms. gr. 44: Homer, Iliad with scholia and an interlinear paraphrase of Books I to XII (http://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/en/list/one/bge/gr0044). The scholion can be found at http://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/en/bge/gr0044/720/0/Sequence-116, whence PLATE 1.
² This is Chamaeleon of Heraclea, the Peripatetic philosopher (4th–3rd centuries B.C.).
transcription of the text, and then discuss each part of it separately (three parts, in my view, not two), before drawing more general conclusions about the relationship among its parts.

I transcribe this as follows:\(^3\)

\(^3\) I have for the most part accepted the transcription of G. Giangrande, “Two Passages of Chamaileon and a Fragment of Aristotle,” EEAth 25 (1974) 162–166, at 163–164, and I was aided on a couple of points by T. Dorandi (personal communication). I have expanded the abbreviations, added capitalization, and—in the case of the Homeric text—quotation marks. I indicate, in footnotes, the liberties Nicole (followed by Wehrli) has taken with the text: see J. Nicole, Les scolies genevoises de L’Iliade I (Geneva 1891) 206–207, and F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles IX (Basel 1969) 53. The revisions of H. Erbse, Scholia Graeca in Homerii Iliadem V (Berlin 1977) 217–218 (also noted) are less extreme. I register as well the differences in the most recent collection of the fragments of Chamaeleon: A. Martano, “Chamaeleon of Heraclea Pontica: The Sources, Text and Translation,” in A. Martano et al. (eds.), Praxiphanes of Mytilene and Chamaeleon of Heraclea (New Brunswick 2012) 157–337, at 218. Note that Giangrande was critical of Giordano’s edition of this scholion in his Chamaeleontis fragmenta (Bologna 1977), as Giordano too accepted many of Nicole’s emendations. But Giordano was convinced by most of Giangrande’s suggestions, and in his second edition of this work (Bologna 1990) 50–51, the text is much closer to the manuscript. (All references to Giordano are to the second edition.) In what follows, page references to these scholars by name alone are to these works.
“γηθοσύνη”. Αριστοτέλης ἐν Ἀπορήμασι ζητεῖ πώς, τῷ Αρεί ἐπι-
πλήξας ὅτι αὐτῷ “ἐρις φίλον πόλεμοι τε,”4 οὕτως5 γέγονεν ἐπὶ
tοῦτος: φησὶ δὲ ὅτι6 ὀρθὸς ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ Αρεί. οὐ γὰρ ἐχαίρειν:
ἄλλʼ ὅτι αἰεὶ οἰνόφλυξ; οὐδὲ φιλόμαχος ὅστις χαίρει οἶνῳ ἄλλʼ
ὅτι αἰεὶ καὶ σφόδρα. Ἀριστοτέλεων ἐν σ’ Περὶ8 Ἡλιάδος μέμφεται
tο Εὐθλόκακον τοῦ Διός καὶ φησίν ὁσπερ εὖ7 τι κιλὸν ὁρῶ.8 ἄλλʼ οὐ
tὴν τὴν ἔθελοκακὸν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ φησιν ὡσπερ ἡμιλ-
λάντο· οὐ γὰρ ἤσαν θηντοί ἵνα κινδυνεύσοσι.

Here is my translation of the Aristotle-portion of our text,
without any emendations (though I do ignore the manuscript’s
punctuation in a couple of places):

Aristotle in [Homeric] Puzzles12 inquires how, having chastised
Ares because for him “strife and war are dear” [Il. 5.891], this

4 This differs slightly from the text of Il. 5.891 that has come down to us
in the manuscript tradition: ἔρις τε φίλον πόλεμοι τε.

5 Nicole (followed by Wehrli and Erbse) emends οὕτως to αὐτῶς—
unnecessarily, as Giangrande argues.

6 Nicole omits ὅτι.

7 Nicole (followed by Wehrli) radically emends the text here (οὐ γὰρ
ἐχαίρειν … αἰεὶ καὶ σφόδρα) as follows:
οὐ γὰρ ὅστις χαίρει οἶνῳ, ἄλλʼ ὅστις αἰεὶ καὶ σφόδρα, οἰνόφλυξ, οὐδὲ
φιλόμαχος <ἀν ὁ Ἁρεῖς ὅτι τῷ πολέμειν> ἐχαίρειν, ἄλλʼ ὅτι αἰεὶ.
Erbse does not stray quite so far from the manuscript (but note the trans-
position of οἰνόφλυξ and φιλόμαχος):
οὐ γὰρ <ὅτι ἥρθι> ἐχαίρειν, ἄλλʼ ὅτι αἰεὶ, φιλόμαχος, οὐδὲ οἰνόφλυξ,
ὅστις χαίρει οἶνῳ, ἄλλʼ ὅτι αἰεὶ καὶ σφόδρα.

8 Nicole (followed by Wehrli, Giordano, Giangrande, and Martano)
prints τῆς after Περὶ.

9 Erbse and Martano print ὁσπερεί (which is of course identical to ὁσπερ
eῦ).

10 Nicole (followed by Wehrli) emends ὁρῶ to ἄρα, Erbse to ὀρῶν.

11 Nicole, Giangrande, Giordano, and Martano print οὖν between ῥητέον
and ὅτι.

12 This text is clearly from Aristotle’s lost Homeric Puzzles, as is recognized
by Erbse. Diogenes Laertius’ list of Aristotle’s works includes an Ἀτονη-
πάτων Ὁμήρου ῥαί in six books (5.26 [p.361 Dorandi]), as does the list in the
biography of Aristotle attributed to Hesychius (no. 106; p.14 Rose). The
publication of this text by Nicole post-dates V. Rose, Aristotelis qui ferebantur

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very person [i.e. Zeus] rejoiced in these. He says, however, that [Zeus] correctly rebukes Ares: for [Ares] does not [simply] take pleasure [sc. in strife and war], but\(^1\) [he does so] continuously; a wino,\(^2\) not a war-lover, is whoever takes pleasure in wine, but continuously and excessively.

Giangrande intelligently defends just such a rendering of our text, commenting: “According to a well-known topos, both the man who drinks wine as a means of becoming warlike (φιλό-μαχος) and the alcoholic like wine, but the alcoholic likes it permanently and in excess.” On this interpretation—which does respect the manuscript reading—Aristotle is contrasting a wino (a flawed character) with a war-lover (an admirable one). Ares is more like a wino in his attitude toward war, whereas Zeus’ attitude is proper.

Giangrande is certainly right to insist that Nicole’s radical revision of the manuscript is unwarranted. I maintain, however, that a couple of Erbse’s emendations, in the same spirit as Nicole’s but not as intrusive, are justified: namely, switching οἰνόφλυξ and φιλό-μαχος, and inserting something after γάρ:

οὐ γάρ <Ὅτι>\(^3\) ἔχαρεν, ἀλλ’ ὁτι ἀεί φιλό-μαχος. οὐδὲ οἰνόφλυξ ὡστὶς χαίρει οἶνῳ, ἀλλ’ ὁτι αἰεὶ καὶ σφόδρα.

\(^1\) Translating the text as it comes down to us requires accepting Giangrande’s interpretation of ἀλλ’ ὁτι: “Instead of ἀλλά ὁτι, we find in the passage ἀλλ’ ὁτι, a well-known vulgarism. Whether this vulgarism proceeds from the scholiast’s pen, who quoted Aristotle from memory and wrote ἀλλά ὁτι instead of ἀλλά ὁτι, or from Aristotle himself, is impossible to say.” In the end, I do not find this a natural or necessary way of reading ἀλλά ὁτι.

\(^2\) Perhaps ‘wino’ is not a perfect rendering of οἰνόφλυξ (LSJ s.v.: given to drinking, drunken)—cf. Giangrande’s ‘alcoholic’—but I want to make clear the οἶνο- connection.

\(^3\) Erbse inserts ὁτι ἔριδι, based on bT-schol. Il. 5.890–891 (the relevant part of which is quoted below). This is certainly plausible, and arguably better; but I want to limit my changes to the received text as far as possible.
For he is a war-lover not <because> he takes pleasure [sc. in strife and war], but because [he does so] continuously. Nor is a wino whoever takes pleasure in wine, but [he is one] because [he takes pleasure in wine] continuously and excessively.

I think this more likely represents what Aristotle said. On this interpretation, he is not contrasting the wino and the war-lover (as in Giangrande’s reading), but comparing them. The difference between Ares and Zeus is that Ares is a war-lover: he is to war what a wino is to wine (whereas Zeus is to war what a properly moderate drinker is to wine). So there is no contradiction (as some ancient critics must have claimed there was) between Zeus’ expression of contempt for Ares’ love of war in Iliad 5, and Zeus on a certain occasion laughing “with joy as he beheld the gods coming together in strife.”

This interpretation gets some support from bT-schol. Il. 5.890–891, part of which I present here. After paraphrasing Il. 5.890 (μεμησήθαι ... τῷ Διῒ τὸν Ἀρεα, “Ares is hated by Zeus”), the scholiast writes:

"ἄχθεται δὲ αὐτῷ οὐχ ὅτι ἔριδι χαίρει—ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς γελᾷ, "ὅθ’ ἀφταὶ τῃθὺς ἔριδι ξυνόντας”—ἀλλ’ ὅτι άεὶ καὶ πάνυ. καὶ οἷνόφλυξ λέγεται ὁ οἴνῳ χαίρων (bT) καὶ σφόδρα καὶ άεί. ... (T)

But [Zeus] is not vexed by him because he takes pleasure in strife—since [Zeus] himself laughed, “as he beheld the gods coming together in strife”—but because [he does so] continuously and too much. Indeed, the one taking pleasure in wine intensively and continuously is called a wino.

Hintenlang discusses our Geneva scholion in connection with b-schol. Il. 24.569 (fr.168 Rose), on the supposed unevenness

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16 See the possibly Porphyrean scholion on Il. 21.388–390 quoted below.
17 It is impossible to determine the exact connection between these two texts. On the complicated relationship between the bT-scholia and the Geneva scholia, and their sources, specifically with reference to Iliad 21, see M. van der Valk, Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad I (Leiden 1963) 440–446.
of the characterization of Achilles.\textsuperscript{19} That is a worthwhile comparison to make, as it shows that in some cases Aristotle is capable of criticizing Homer, and specifically for inconsistency in characterization—which seems to have been a charge also leveled against Homer’s Zeus, as he is portrayed in \textit{Iliad} 5 and 21, thus prompting (in this case) Aristotle’s defense of Homer. But I think a better understanding of the text is indicated in part of a scholion on \textit{II.} 21.388–390, the source of which is perhaps Porphyry. It claims that the apparent contradiction between \textit{II.} 21.388–390 and 5.890–891 is resolved by attending to the word \textit{αἰεί} in the latter: \textit{ἡ δὲ λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως· τὸ γὰρ “αἰεί” προσκείμενον τὴν διαφωνίαν λύει (“The solution comes out of the language: for the ‘continually’ placed [in \textit{II.} 5.891] resolves the inconsistency”).\textsuperscript{20} So I think an even more apt comparison (than the one suggested by Hintenlang) is with B-schol. \textit{II.} 2.649 (fr.146 Rose),\textsuperscript{21} according to which Aristotle solves a Homeric problem involving an apparent contradiction, by explaining why in the \textit{Iliad} (at 2.649) Homer refers to Crete’s one hundred cities, whereas in the \textit{Odyssey} (at 19.172–174) he refers to her ninety cities: one possible explanation is that ‘one hundred’ is a metaphor for ‘many’ (μὴποτε δὲ καὶ μεταφορὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐκατόν).\textsuperscript{22} As a sympathetic critic of Homer,


\textsuperscript{21} Porphyry is likely the intermediate source of this text: see MacPhail, \textit{Porphyry’s Homeric Questions} 68–69.

\textsuperscript{22} It is unclear whether this is Aristotle’s second suggestion for a possible solution (as I think it is), or the solution of someone else (which is how MacPhail presents it).
Aristotle here, as he does in our Geneva scholion, defends Homer against the charge of contradiction.\textsuperscript{23}

I next present not my own translation of the remainder of the Geneva scholion on \textit{Il.} 21.390 (as transmitted), but as a foil one based on Giangrande’s interpretation, using his actual translation where he provides one:\textsuperscript{24}

Chamaeleon in \textit{On the Iliad}\textsuperscript{25} criticizes the military-cowardice of Zeus and says [ironically]\textsuperscript{26} “As it were, I see here something beautiful, and not the greatest absurdity. One must say that they [sc. Zeus and Ares] were quarreling about excellence; for they were not mortals, such as to risk their lives.”\textsuperscript{27}

Giangrande concludes his discussion as follows: “Aristotle’s ‘Rechtfertigung des Zeus in Ilias XXI, 390’,\textsuperscript{28} which Chamaileon criticizes here, would make Zeus a coward (τὸ ἐθελόκακον τοῦ Διός): this is absurd, so argues Chamaileon, because Zeus and Ares ‘were not mortals, such as to (ἵνα, consecutive) risk their lives (κινδυνεύσωσιν) when taking part in war.’”

I have numerous problems with this interpretation. First, I see no indication that Zeus is a coward in \textit{Il.} 21.388–390. Now it could be the action of a particular kind of coward to laugh at people taking part in war while avoiding it himself; but this is not what cowardice is essentially, nor is there any reason to think this is part of Zeus’ character in the Theomachy of \textit{Iliad} 21 (or in any other scene). So against Giangrande’s explicit

\textsuperscript{23} On the problem of (apparent) contradictions in the Homeric epics, and how to solve them, see Arist. \textit{Poet.} 25, 1461a31–b25.

\textsuperscript{24} Whereas the first half of this scholion was not included in collections of the fragments of Aristotle (see n.12 above), the second half was included in collections of the fragments of Chamaeleon: Wehrli fr.18, Giordano fr.18, Martano fr.20.

\textsuperscript{25} A scholion on Apol. \textit{Rh. Arg.} 2.904–910a (Wendel = fr.17 Martano) indicates that Chamaeleon’s \textit{On the Iliad} was a work in at least five books.

\textsuperscript{26} Giangrande: “Chamaileon’s words are ironic.”

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Martano’s translation, in \textit{Praxiphanes} 219.

\textsuperscript{28} He is quoting Wehrli, \textit{Schule des Aristoteles} IX 77.
claims to the contrary. I think it makes much more sense to take τὸ ἐθελόκακον to refer to ill-will or malevolence (its original meaning), and not to military cowardice or willful neglect of duty (a derivative meaning). It is malevolent (Chamaeleon claims) for Zeus to laugh with joy at the other gods engaged in war. Second, I think that it is quite a stretch to attribute irony to Chamaeleon here, and that a more straightforward interpretation is desirable, even if that requires a minor emendation (described below). Third, I see no clear connection between the two halves of this part of our text—the material that comes before ῥητέον, and the comment that begins with ῥητέον—and there is no reason to assume that there is a connection (that is, such a connection would have to be established). In fact, though I would not claim certainty here, I think it most likely that these two halves represent the views of two different Homeric scholars, this last one unknown (more on this shortly). Fourth (and related to the third), it is not clear (in fact it is unlikely) that Chamaeleon is discussing both II. 5.890–891 and II. 21.388–390 (as Aristotle is), and therefore there is no

29 “Τὸ ἐθελόκακον does not mean ‘intenzionale stortura’, as Giordano takes it ... Τὸ ἐθελόκακον means military cowardice (cf. LSJ, s.v. ἐθελόκακος, II).”


32 Cf. Bouchard, De la poétique à la critique 88 n.207: “La formulation particulière de cette phrase (commençant par ῥητέον) exclut son appartenance à la citation de Chaméleon, pace Wehrli ad loc.”
compelling reason to think that the implied subject of ἡμιλά-λῶντο and κινδυνεύσωσι is Zeus and Ares (as opposed to the Olympian gods that Zeus was watching). Finally, it is not obvious that Chamaeleon was originally replying to and criticizing Aristotle, though that is one possibility. Another, however, is that the scholiast put together lines from different Homeric scholars who had commented on Il. 21.390, and Aristotle’s and Chamaeleon’s were simply two of these.\textsuperscript{33}

So, I think it best (1) to accept Erbse’s emendation of ὅρω and to follow him in treating the line that contains it as a direct quotation, and (2) to treat the content of this part of the scholion as two distinct views. I would therefore translate the remainder of the scholion as follows:

Chamaeleon in On the Iliad 1 criticizes the malevolence of Zeus and says: “as if seeing something noble, and not the greatest oddity.”\textsuperscript{35}

One must say that they [sc. the gods Zeus was observing] were quarreling about excellence; for they were not mortals, such as to risk their lives.

As for the relationship between the Aristotle-comment and the Chamaeleon-comment, it is unfortunately impossible to say much with certainty. On the one hand, we should not simply assume that because the one comment follows the other, Chamaeleon was originally criticizing or reacting to Aristotle.\textsuperscript{34} On the other hand, we should not rule out that possibility: that is, one should not conclude that, because Aristotle deals with two Iliad passages (5.890–891 and 21.388–390) and is concerned

\textsuperscript{33} It may not be a coincidence that the scholiast placed Χαµαιλέων and ῥητέον flush left, each at the beginning of a new line, just as Αριστοτέλης immediately follows the lemma.

\textsuperscript{34} See e.g. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles IX 77: “Ch. stellt sich mit seiner Kritik also in Gegensatz zu Aristoteles”; and A. J. Podlecki, “The Peripatetics as Literary Critics,” Phoenix 23 (1969) 114–137, at 120–121: “Chamaeleon was having none of this [sc. Aristotle’s defense of Zeus]; he blamed Zeus for neglect of duty, τὸ ἐθελοκακόν, and found the divine battle in 21 extremely strange.” Cf. Martano, in Praxiphanes 219 n.3.
with resolving an apparent contradiction between them whereas Chamaeleon deals with only the latter passage and is concerned to criticize Zeus (and thus Homer),\(^35\) the Chamaeleon-comment could not have been part of a reply (or in part a reply) to Aristotle.\(^36\) Chamaeleon was part of Aristotle’s school, and must have known his work on Homer. So it is highly likely that he was aware that his own appraisal of Il. 21.388–390 was different from Aristotle’s, and that this difference might well have been taken to be a reply to or criticism of Aristotle.

I should mention in this connection evidence of one other case in which Aristotle and Chamaeleon comment on the same Homeric passage. The adjective αὐδήεσσα (‘speaking or able to speak with a human voice’) appears five times in the Odyssey (never in the Iliad), in every case applied to a minor goddess or female divinity, referring to her ability to speak to mortals: Ino (5.334), Circe (10.136, 11.8, 12.150), and Calypso (12.449). According to a scholion and to Eustathius, in at least one of these cases (5.334), Aristotle and Chamaeleon both thought that αὐδήεσσα should be replaced with οὐδήεσσαν, which is said to be similar in meaning to ἐπίγειος (‘terrestrial’).\(^37\) Here is schol. Od. 5.334ε1 (Pontani) (= Arist. fr.171.2 Rose = Chamaeleon fr.

\(^{35}\) Mirhady, in Praxiphanes 407: “The scholiast cites Chamaeleon as criticizing Zeus, but of course this may be short-hand for a criticism of Homer.”

\(^{36}\) I tend to agree with Bouchard here, though I take it she regards the second possibility as less likely than I do: De la poétique à la critique 88–89, “Le fragment aristotélicien ... porte donc sur deux passages juxtaposés et en contradiction apparente l’un avec l’autre (Il. 5.891 et 21.390). Celui de Chaméleon, en revanche, ne concerne apparemment que le passage de la Théomachie. Leur succession dans les scholies ne doit pas donner l’illusion que l’un représente une réponse à l’autre (bien que cela demeure possible).”

\(^{37}\) I assume with most scholars that the source in Aristotle’s case is his lost work on Homer (see n.12). The source in Chamaeleon’s case is likely either a work entitled On the Odyssey (though there is no ancient evidence for such a title) or On Homer (Diog. Laert. 5.92 [p.405 Dorandi]), though we should not rule out its coming from his On the Iliad.
ο μὲν Ἀριστοφάνης τὰς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς θεῶς ἀνύδηθεσσας φησίν ὁμοίως φωνῆς μετειληφυίας, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ὀυδήθεσσαν γράφει ὁμοίως ἐπίγευσιν. οὕτως καὶ Χαμαιλέων.

Aristophanes [of Byzantium] says that the anthropomorphic goddesses are ‘able to speak with a human voice’, as if having exchanged their voice, whereas Aristotle writes οὐδήθεσσαν, as if [it meant] ‘terrestrial’. So too Chamaeleon.

Chamaeleon in this case agrees with Aristotle. This text does not shed much light on the scholion that concerns us, however. At most it provides further support for Chamaeleon’s awareness of Aristotle’s work on Homer, unless of course in both cases it is merely a coincidence that the scholiasts juxtaposed the opinions of Aristotle and Chamaeleon.

Now let us turn to the third comment, which I believe is likely from an anonymous source. First, I think Podlecki (who expresses doubt about whether this is part of Chamaeleon’s comment) inadvertently indicates the contradiction involved in attributing this to Chamaeleon and connecting it to his criticism of Zeus’ malevolence: Chamaeleon “apparently went on (if Wehrli is right in including the next sentence in the citation) to defend the scene on the grounds that the gods were striving περὶ ἀρετῆς, and were in no danger, as they would have been had they been mortals.” So on this view Chamaeleon would be simultaneously criticizing Zeus’ behavior in the Theomachy

38 Cf. Eust. Od. 5.334 (I p.228 Stallbaum) = Arist. fr.171.3 Rose = Chamaeleon fr.24B Martano. I would like to thank F. Pontani for giving me access, prior to publication, to his edition of this text: *Scholia Graeca in Odysseam III* (Rome 2015) 99.

39 One might argue that the absence of the word ἄλλως at the beginning of this comment (standard in scholia to indicate an alternative source) supports treating these words as coming from Chamaeleon as well. The absence of ἄλλως, however, and with it the conflation of sources, is common in the scholia. See E. Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship* (Oxford 2007) 108–109.

40 Podlecki, *Phoenix* (23) 120–121.
while at the same time defending the scene, and that to me seems implausible.\footnote{Cf. Martano, in Praxiphanes 219–221 n.3. Arguably one way to attribute both parts to Chamaeleon while avoiding contradiction is to see the second part as a different point that Chamaeleon makes. Thus Mirhady, in Praxiphanes 407: “Chamaeleon goes on to another novel analysis in criticizing the gods’ competition over aretē because they are not really risking their lives.” This third comment, however, does not seem to be a criticism.} I think it best to treat this as an entirely different comment on Ili. 21.390, which is how Richardson takes it: “One defence offered that Zeus was pleased because the gods were contending περὶ ἀρετῆς and yet without risk”\footnote{Richardson, The Iliad 87.}—that is, Zeus was not taking pleasure in war (which would have been the basis for a charge of malevolence) but in his fellow Olympians taking virtue seriously.

This same interpretation is found in a couple of scholia on Ili. 21.389, one of which connects Ili. 21.388–390 to Od. 8.75–78, which depicts Agamemnon being pleased that the best of the Achaeans—Odysseus and Achilles—are arguing (purportedly over virtue, though that is less clear from the context in the Odyssey):

\begin{quote}

ἐπεὶ ὁρᾷ περὶ ἀρετῆς αὐτοὺς ἠγωνιζομένους, χαίρει ὁ Ζεὺς. (T-schol. Ili. 21.389a1 Erbse)

since he sees them arguing about virtue, Zeus takes pleasure in it.

Ἀγαμέμνων ἔχασεν, “Ὅτ’ ἄριστοι Αχαιῶν ἀριείωντο,” ἐπεὶ ὅρα περὶ ἀρετῆς αὐτοὺς ἠγωνιζομένους. (b-schol. Ili. 21.389a2 Erbse)

Agamemnon took pleasure, “because the best of the Achaeans were wrangling,” since he was seeing them arguing about virtue.
\end{quote}

These scholia, and the third comment in Ge-schol. Ili. 21.390, may have the same source. The point would seem to be—in reply to those who are critical of Homer here or at least think he needs defending—that Zeus is to be praised for rejoicing in the gods’ clashing over virtue or excellence (or perhaps clashing owing to a desire to be excellent).
Another possibility is that the source of the third comment comes from the allegorical tradition of interpreting Homer. According to Heraclitus, one purpose of the Theomachy in Iliad 21 is to illustrate the opposition of virtues and vices (the chapter opens ἀντιπαράγει γοῦν κακίας μὲν ἄρετας, “Now in fact [Homer] has opposed virtues and vices…”). The pairing of the gods in battle is said to be philosophically meaningful (τῶν θεῶν ἡ ζεῦξις οὕτω πεφιλοσόφηται): most of the chapter is devoted to Athena’s defeat of Ares, which Heraclitus says represents the superiority of wisdom (φρονήσις) over folly (ἀφοσόνη). And at the end of the chapter, we are told that Athena’s defeat of Aphrodite represents the superiority of wisdom over lack of self-control (ἀκολασία). So in contrast to the two scholia (on Il. 21.389) just mentioned, on this interpretation of the third comment Zeus is admirable not because of his joy in watching the gods at war, but because of his (and so Homer’s) approval of the result of their fighting: the victory of virtue over vice. All we can say, however, given the scant evidence, is that this interpretation is one possibility.

One final point about the third comment in the Geneva scholion: there is no reason to assume, though it is not impossible, that it was originally part of a criticism leveled against Chamaeleon—though the scholiast may have considered it such in placing it after Chamaeleon’s criticism of Zeus.

In conclusion, I would summarize the three comments contained in Ge-schol. Il. 21.390 as follows: Aristotle claimed there is nothing improper about Zeus’ character as portrayed in Il. 21.388–390; he is enjoying with due moderation watching the other Olympians engaged in war (and there is no inconsistency between that portrayal and Zeus’ chastisement of Ares in Iliad...
5). Chamaeleon would disagree: Zeus as portrayed in 388–390 is malevolent, in that he is gleefully watching this fighting, and so this was improper on the part of Homer. The anonymous scholar would disagree with that: there is nothing improper about Zeus’ character as portrayed in 388–390, since he is enjoying watching the gods fighting (without risk)—not because they are fighting, but because they are fighting about virtue or excellence (which they take seriously)—or, since he is watching the victory of virtue over vice.45

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45

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 56 (2016) 68–81