Losing Confidence in Sparta: The Creation of the Mantinean Symmachy

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During the Peloponnesian War, the Arkadian city-state Mantinea built its own regional symmachy and assumed the role of hegemón over its allies. In doing so, Mantinea was breaking an agreement and changing the nature of its relationship with the hegemón of the Peloponnesian League, Sparta. Though recent studies have examined the relationship between Sparta and its allies during the archaic and classical periods,¹ the present paper offers a new perspective on the mini-hegemony of Mantinea and its efforts to preserve its autonomy and independence as one of the smaller city-states of Greece. Mantinea built its own mini-hegemony during a period of turmoil in the Peloponnesos when Spartan power had diminished (423–418 B.C.E.), and in an attempt to preserve its independence and protect what Sparta and the Peloponnesian League were failing to safeguard, Mantinea disaffiliated itself with Sparta.

Regional symmachies and the Peloponnesian League

Discussions of the rules that governed the Peloponnesian League, particularly the precise nature of the political relationship between Sparta and allies such as Mantinea, have revolved around a possible League constitution, the allies’ ability to limit Sparta’s executive power via an allied assembly, and

the dating of the famous oath of allies. Recent scholarship, on the other hand, has examined when and to what degree Sparta meddled in the domestic and foreign policies of its allies. For example, membership in the Peloponnesian League did not restrict cities from expanding and developing regional alliances (regional symmachies) during times of peace, as symmachies developed by Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea did co-exist within Sparta’s Peloponnesian League. Hegemonic alliances could,

2 A narrative of the history of the Peloponnesian League can be found in K. Wickert, Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Entstehung bis zum Ende des archaischen Krieges (Erlangen-Nürnberg 1962). See further W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta (New York 1968) 88–93; P. Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta (London 1987) 9–14. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972) 101–123, has provided a detailed account of the League’s nature and mechanics and supports the view that there was a formal constitution. G. L. Cawkwell, “The Decline of Sparta,” CQ 33 (1983) 364–376, believed that no League existed before the First Peloponnesian War. D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca 1969) 9–30, has also provided an excellent account of the League’s nature and favors a League governed by rules that were developed on an ad hoc basis; cf. de Ste. Croix 101–102. Consequently, D. Kagan, The Peace of Nicia and the Sicilian Expedition (Ithaca 1981) 41 n.21, altered his stance: “I would merely emphasize that the rules were few and the occasions when they were ignored or overridden many.” J. E. Lendon, “Thucydides and the ‘Constitution’ of the Peloponnesian League,” GRBS 35 (1994) 150–177, has defended Kagan’s view and argued that there was no constitution despite the references to allied assemblies and oaths. Lendon holds that the Spartans often needed to gauge allied support for a campaign or persuade the allies to vote along the same lines as Sparta, and agreements were made before a campaign or war and were not part of a constitution.

3 Yates, CQ 55 (2005) 65–76, has argued that before 451, Sparta did not impose obligations that interfered in the foreign policy of its allies; instead, Sparta used treaties that aimed at influencing domestic policy by preserving “influential pro-Spartan” factions within an allied community. Bolmarcich, GRBS (2005) 5–34, has examined the differences among the symmachoi and concluded that Sparta’s hegemony depended not upon allies like Korinth but rather on those symmachoi whom Sparta had defeated in war, imposing upon them oaths and obligations and encouraging oligarchies in them.

4 A symmachy can be defined as any military alliance or comradeship in arms, and for certain types of these organizations there was a decisive
therefore, develop within the limits of their agreement with Sparta and the League.\(^5\)

Our strongest evidence for this relationship between Sparta and the allied members of the League during the fifth century is Thucydides; for the Mantinean mini-hegemony, he is our sole guide and thankfully has provided enough information for us to reconstruct a narrative of Mantinea’s alliance and its relationship with the Peloponnesian League. On the other hand, because of the often blurry picture of Spartan policies, scholars have disagreed over the mechanics of the League and Sparta’s relationship with allies such as Mantinea. Nevertheless, for the present study there are three points that must be considered. First, by 432 Sparta had developed a reciprocal alliance with each ally individually wherein the Spartans swore in principle to defend them “with all their strength in accordance with their ability.”\(^6\) In return the allies swore to “have the same friends


\(^6\) Meiggs/Lewis, SGH\(^2\) (Oxford 1988) p.312, line 19. This, the only extant Spartan treaty, is between the Spartans and Aitolians. For discussion see Bolmarcich, GRBS 45 (2005) 22–28, who argued that the treaty is evidence that Sparta did interfere in the domestic policy of its allies but belongs to the period ca. 402–401. Although this particular treaty may belong to that later date, the reciprocal but not necessarily symmetrical relationship was in place by 432 and Spartan interference in the domestic policy of its
and enemies and follow wherever Sparta should lead." Second, because of this, once the Spartans decided to go to war in 432, the allies were bound to follow and support Sparta in its prosecution of the war against Athens; they could not therefore leave this alliance. Third, there was a pre-war agreement guaranteeing Peloponnesian League members that their pre-war boundaries would be preserved.

Despite earlier studies, there persists the need to explain why Mantinea sacrificed its membership in the Peloponnesian League, ignored an agreement among the allies to preserve pre-war territories, and risked war with Sparta. It is in response to these queries that the present paper examines events

allies began after 421, as a result of the growth of the regional alliances.

7 Xen. Hell. 2.2.20; for this translation and general description of the League see T. Figueira and S. R. Jensen, "Governing Interstate Alliances," in H. Beck (ed.), A Companion to Ancient Greek Government (Oxford 2013) 482. The language does not adequately capture what was most likely an asymmetrical agreement. The Spartans may have agreed in principle to defend allies with "all their strength" but as de Ste Croix (n.10 below) and more recently Bolmarcich have shown, the allies were not all of the same caliber and so were not all treated the same. We are unsure then that the Spartans would have defended Mantinea with "all their strength." However, in 421 (Thuc. 5.33.1–3) they marched with their entire levy to liberate the Parhiasians from the Mantinean symmachy; thus circumstances also influenced just how close to the letter of this agreement the Spartans were willing to go.

8 See Lendon, GRBS 35 (1994) 163 and 175: the allies were bound by their alliance with Sparta to fight wars "under set terms." Cf. Figueira and Jensen, in Companion 482.

9 In 421 the Eleans put forward the claim that "at the end of the war with Athens, places should be held by whoever held them before the war" (Thuc. 5.31.5) and thus were disputing territorial claims not necessarily rights to hegemony. See S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 1991–2008) III 73, for the translation and discussion of this passage. Lendon, GRBS 35 (1994) 162–165, has shown that this pre-war agreement was devised for the League to maintain its unity in order to survive periods of adversity. Hornblower (68–69) notes that the pre-war agreement could have been a new addition to the old oaths when they were reaffirmed in 432. Mantineans were therefore bound by this agreement and by their membership in the Peloponnesian League.

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between 423 and 418 to argue that in order to protect its autonomy, Mantinea developed its own regional alliance, which threatened Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnnesos and betrayed an established pre-war agreement among members of the Peloponnesian League.10

**Mantinea and Sparta before the creation of the regional alliance**

Before building its own mini-hegemony, Mantinea was a standing member of the Peloponnesian League. Unlike the Tegeans, the Mantineans are not reported to have fought against the Spartans in the sixth century,11 nor were they present when the Tegeans and the other Arkadians fought the Spartans at Dipaia in the 460s.12 Furthermore, Xenophon (*Hell. 5.2.3*) records that the Mantineans helped the Spartans during the Helot revolt of the 460s.

A precursor to Mantinean dissatisfaction with Spartan leadership was the campaign in 426 when a Peloponnesian army, under the leadership of the Spartan Eurypokhos, failed to take the city of Naupaktos. After retiring to the area around

10 De Ste. Croix, *Origins* 101–105, proposed a differentiation between the terms league and alliance. The Peloponnesian League, he held, was made up of those allies who formed the “hard core” of the alliance, those who were asked to vote and who were bound by the majority vote. The Spartan alliance, on the other hand, included those who were not necessarily asked to vote or bound by the decision. Likewise, Cartledge, *Agesilas* 11, noted that the term alliance referred to those who were not bound by a constitution but rather by ad hoc alliances and that league was used to describe an “inner circle” of allies. See more recently Yates, *CQ* 55 (2005) 65 n.3, and Kagan, *Outbreak* 10. Here I have chosen to use “Peloponnesian League” because it best describes the relationship between Sparta and Arkadia in the 430s wherein the Arkadians, such as Tegea and Mantinea, were most likely part of the League and not of the wider alliance (see de Ste. Croix 333).

11 See for example the battle between Tegea and Sparta at Hdt. 1.65–68.

12 Herodotus states that among the five contests that Teisamenos of Elis helped the Spartans win were “at Tegea, a victory over the Tegeans and the Argives; and next the victory at Dipaicens over all the Arkadians except the people of Mantinea” (9.35). A. Andrewes, “Sparta and Arcadia in the Early Fifth Century,” *Phoenix* 6 (1952) 1–5, dates the first battle early in 465 and the second in 465/4.
Kalydon, he was persuaded by the Ambrakians to attack the Amphilokhians (Thuc. 3.101.1–2). His Peloponnesian force was eventually lured into an ambush and defeated by an Athenian-Akarnanian army (106–109). After Eurylokhos and his men were cut to pieces, the Mantineans maintained their discipline better than the other troops as the entire Peloponnesian force retreated (108.3). There is no indication that the Mantineans were involved in this campaign for self-serving reasons, and they are not listed as the leaders of other Peloponnesians. No Mantinean alliance can be inferred; Mantinea’s membership in the League required it to join this expedition. Thucydides does not connect this fiasco in the north with a loss of confidence in Spartan leadership, yet the Mantineans had supported a campaign that had failed miserably, and the next time we read about them, they have begun to build their own alliance.

The creation of the Mantinean alliance and the battle at Laodokeion

The landmark event in Mantinea’s bid for regional hegemony was a victory in southern Arkadia at Laodokeion against its neighbor and historic Arkadian rival, Tegea. Thucydides, our only source for the event, records (4.134) that in the winter of 423 Mantinea and Tegea battled near the future site of Megalopolis in southern Arkadia. The two sides fought hard and the battle lasted into the evening; each side, we are told, was successful on one wing. Only the arrival of night brought an end to the fighting, and by sundown the battle was over; both sides, however, claimed to have won. Past studies have aptly noted the emblematic importance of the battle. Hornblower, for example, suggested that Thucydides’ description, isolated in

13 Gomme, HTC III 625, wrote that this battle was “almost a parody of the foreign policy of the small autonomous city,” as both Mantinea and Tegea had claimed the victory, erected victory trophies on the battlefield, and sent their spoils to Delphi. H. R. Immerwahr, “Thucydides,” in P. E. Easterling and B. M. W. Knox (eds.), The Cambridge History of Classical Literature (Cambridge 1985) 453, noted that this event symbolizes the confusion that was present in the Peloponnesos.
its context, prepares the reader for the events narrated in Book 5.14 Nielsen and Forsén, on the other hand, focused on the political importance and the attempts by both Tegea and Mantinea to build their own mini-empires or alliances.15 Accordingly, this battle was a duel between two alliances: the Tegean symmachy and the Mantinean symmachy. Lazenby added to this image of two dueling alliances the idea that the battle not only hinted ahead to the “turmoil” in the Peloponnesos that would end with the battle of Mantinea in 418, but that Laodokeion was also “symptomatic of the ill-feeling” between members of the Peloponnesian League.16 The battle was a sign of discontent, but it was not merely two Arkadian poleis fighting for power within Arkadia. Instead, by re-examining the battle and the events that followed, we can see that Mantinea was acting in an opportunistic and aggressive manner to build its own alliance and thereby distance itself from the Peloponnesian League.

The evidence for Mantinean expansion and departure from its alliance with Sparta thus begins with this battle at Laodokeion during the general truce in 423. Sparta was not involved in this fight because when the League was not at war, allies

14 Hornblower, Commentary II 416. Gomme, HCT III 626, found the chapter “to tell its own tale of unease within the Peloponnesian ranks and to hint at the future.”

15 Nielsen, in More Studies 77–87, and “Arkadia: City-Ethnics and Tribalism,” in More Studies 143. More specifically, B. Forsén, “Population and Political Strength of Some Southeastern Arkadian Poleis,” in P. Flensted-Jensen (ed.), Further Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis (Historia Einzelschr. 138 [2000]) 51–54, hypothesized that an ethnic group of southern Arkadians, the Maiinalians, had requested aid from the Mantineans to help free them from the Tegean symmachy. As a result, the Mantineans marched south and after fighting the Tegeans at Laodokeion, continued to expand their alliance in southern Arkadia. Similarly, D. M. Lewis, CAH² V (1992) 104: the “centralized Peloponnesian states are regularly found indulging in minor imperialisms of their own,” calling this battle an “extreme case of return to local priorities” (429 n.149).


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could pursue their own interests; this was an Arkadian affair. Thucydides describes the battle (4.134):

ἐν δὲ τῷ ἑπόντι χειμῶντι τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἰσόχαρε διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Μαντινής δὲ καὶ Τεγεάται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκατέρων ξυνεβαλον ἐν Λαοδοκείῳ τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, καὶ νίκη ἀμφότεροι ἐγένετο· κέρας γὰρ ἐκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ᾽ αὐτῶς τροπαῖα τε ἀμφότεροι ἔστησαν καὶ σκῦλα ἐς Δελ-φοῦς ἀπέπεμψαν. διαφθαρέντων μέντοι πολλῶν ἐκατέρως καὶ ἄγγελομάλου τῆς μάχης γενομένης καὶ ἄφθολομένης νυκτὸς τὸ ἔργον οἱ Τεγεάται καὶ Μαντινής οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔστησαν καὶ Μαντινής δὲ ἀπεχώρησάν τε ἐς Βουκολιῶν καὶ οἱ Τεγεάται ἀντέστησαν. Μαντινής δὲ ἀπεχώρησαν τε ἐς Βουκολιῶν καὶ οἱ Τεγεάται ἀντέστησαν. The Athenians and Lakedaimonians took a break from war because of the truce. But the Mantinians and the Tegeans and their respective allies fought a battle at Laodokeion in the territory of Oresthis. The victory was disputed, for the men on each side put to flight their opposite wing and both sides set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. Indeed, many men perished on both sides in a battle that was nearly equal. But when nightfall brought an end to the action, the Tegeans encamped on the battlefield and erected their trophy right away. The Mantinians, meanwhile, withdrew to Bukolion and set up (their trophy) later.

The language that Thucydides uses to describe the Mantinean force is consistent with his description of the Peloponnesian League,17 thus identifying the Mantinean force as an alliance and suggesting that the Mantinians must have already expanded within Arkadia.

Members were likely drawn from parts of central and southern Arkadia, including those communities near Laodokeion. This “Laodokeion in Oresthis” was situated along the road that led from the site of the future Megalopolis to Pal-

17 The common designations for the League were Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι (“the Lakedaimonians and their allies”) and Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι (“the alliance of the Lakedaimonians”). See Thuc. 2.9.1 and 2.9.3 respectively, and de Ste. Croix, Origins 102.
lantion and then Tegea and was just south of Megalopolis. It was adjacent to the southwestern border of Tegea, the northeastern border of Messenia, and the northwestern frontier of the Lakonike. This area was an important section of the Spartan-Arkadian border and mediated Spartan communication with both Arkadia and Messenia. In order to reach the battle site of Laodokeion in the south, the Mantineans would have needed to pass through Mt. Mainalos and into the upper Helisson river valley and, hence, past Dipaia and Trikolonoi.

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18 See Hornblower, *Commentary* II 416, for discussion of the location, including Pritchett’s suggestion that Mainalia and Oresthis were two different districts and that the plain west of Mt. Tsembrou was called Oresthis (W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* IV [Berkeley 1982] 74).


20 S. Dušanić, *The Arcadian League of the Fourth Century* (Belgrade 1970) 285–317, argues that the Arkadians founded Megalopolis to curb Sparta’s movements west into Messenia, and at the same time to be a threat if any movement north left Sparta unprotected. The predecessor for Megalopolis was, according to him, the Mantinean fort at Kypsela in Parrhasia. See Roy’s comments in A. Paradiso and J. Roy, “Lepreon and Phyrkos in 421–420,” *Klio* 90 (2008) 31–34, for Sparta’s attempt to eliminate enemy control of locations near its frontier. At the beginning of the fifth century, the most popular route out of Lakonia followed a north-westerly course and passed through Oresthasion. Andrewes, *HCT* IV 32, believed that this may have been an easier route for an army to follow, especially one with wagons, rather than the route that ran straight to Karyai. See Y. A. Pikoulas, “The Road-network of Arkadia,” in T. H. Nielsen and J. Roy (eds.), *Defining Ancient Arkadia* (Copenhagen 1999) 248–319, for a detailed discussion on the wheeled roads in Arkadia.

21 See Andrewes, *HCT* IV 32, for this area being traditionally under Mantinean influence. Andrewes identified the Heraians and Mainaloi as the Tegean allies, on the basis of Thuc. 5.29.1. Hornblower, *Commentary* II 416–417, corrected: “it would be better to say, ‘and most of the Mainaloi’, because the northern Mainaloi were perhaps allies of Mantinea.” According to Paus. 8.27.3 the following were among the Mainalian communities: Pallantion, Eutaia, Soumateion, Asca, Peraitheis, Helisson, Oresthasion, Dipaia, Lykaia, and Iasaia. See the map below; Iasaia and Soumateion are not located in R. Talbert, *Barrington Atlas* (Princeton/Oxford 2000) Map 58;
Several of these communities were later involved in other conflicts and some were connected with the creation of Megalopolis. This significant involvement in Arkadian affairs combined with their geographical location puts them among potential allies of Mantinea. Furthermore, Mainalia was not unified into any political or military alliance and these individual Mainalian communities were left to decide their own foreign policy and affiliations.22

Mainalia is the best-documented tribal group in Arkadia and, according to Nielsen, included fully developed *poleis* that existed within and alongside the tribal structure.23 These Mainalian communities may have belonged to the same ethnic tribe, but during the Peloponnesian War they were experiencing political fragmentation. Consequently, geography may have been a factor in their decision to side with Mantinea.24

22 Evidence of a divided Mainalia comes from the battle of Mantinea in 418. Thucydides lists Mainalians among the Spartan forces (5.67.1), and although he does not specifically mention other Mainalians as part of the Argive-led force, some Mainalians were also part of the Argive-led army, most likely among the Arkadians stationed next to the Mantineans (5.67.2). Proof of there being Mainalians in the Argive army comes after the battle (5.77.1) when the Spartans forced the Argives to restore the Mainalian men. These men were taken to Argos to ensure the loyalty of Mainalians fighting for the Argive-led coalition against other Mainalians who were part of the Spartan army. See Andrewes, *HCT* IV 104.

23 There were four tribal states in Arkadia in the classical period: Mainalia, Eutresia, Kynouria, and Parrhasia; see Hansen and Nielsen, *Inventory* 508. How these tribes made decisions is not directly attested, and as J. Roy, “*Polis* and Tribe in Classical Arkadia,” in *More Studies* 107–112, has noted, the “tribal identities” came before the development of the *poleis*, and communities took over or claimed “functions previously exercised by the tribe as a whole” as they developed the features of a *polis*. Therefore, some of the *poleis* of the Mainalian tribe could decide their own political fate while others acted under compulsion, forced into decisions by the larger *poleis*.

24 With Argos to the north and Tegea to the south, the only logical choice for Mantinean expansion was the southwestern territories, the land between...
Mt. Mainalos in the north, Tagyetos in the south, and Lykaion in the west, and thus included the Mainalian communities. Nielsen, in More Studies 143, commented that it was against the threats of the big poleis that “the Mainalians, presumably on the basis of a feeling of common ancestry but certainly on the basis of geographical proximity, formed a tribal state.” If they did form a tribal state on a geographic basis, then it is also plausible that their proximity to Mantinea and Tegea was a factor in deciding which alliance to follow when the tribal state could not provide unity and protection.

25 Locations are based on Nielsen, in More Studies 150–151; Hansen and Nielsen, Inventory 503–535; Barrington Atlas Map 58. For the location of Laodokeion see Andrewes, HCT IV 32. Background map was created by Rob Beutner from the “Greece Elevations” dataset available at DIVA-GIS (http://www.diva-gis.org). Cartographical marks are my own.

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Forsén has suggested that in an effort to end the Tegean influence over their communities, some of the southern Mainalians called in the Mantineans for support and together fought against the Tegeans at Laodokeion.²⁶ Though it is plausible that Mantinea came to the defense of some of the Mainalians who felt aggrieved with their status within the Tegean symmachy, it is also possible that another Mantinean objective in the battle at Laodokeion was to gain access to more land and increase the membership in its own regional alliance.²⁷ Thucydides notes that it was Mantinea, not Tegea, that “subdued a portion of Arkadia and made it into a subject” during the war (5.29.1). And we can surmise that a victory against the possibly larger polis Tegea was within Mantinea’s capabilities as Mantinea’s symmachy had gained allies before the battle, with the result that it could field a force equal to or greater than Tegea’s.²⁸ A victory would ensure Mantinea access to Mainalia and more of southern Arkadia, and whether anticipated or not, validate its hegemony within Arkadia vis à vis Tegea.²⁹ Hence, Mantinea’s objectives were attainable and the battle provided a fitting opportunity for the growth of its

²⁶ Forsén, in Further Studies 35–55, has argued that the traditional image of Mantinea and Tegea as equal in size and power is incorrect, urging that the population of Tegea was larger and as a longtime ally of Sparta, Tegea was the more dominant polis in the area.

²⁷ Mantinea may have also been after more cultivable land. See J. Roy, “The Economies of Arkadia,” in Defining Ancient Arkadia 356–357.

²⁸ According to Forsén, in Further Studies 51, Tegea could have had as much as twice the population of Mantinea, and thus Mantinea may have been taking a risk with such expansion since it was smaller and entering an area that was most likely already influenced by the larger city-state. However, Mantinea’s symmachy had been growing, and Lewis, CAH² V 104, notes that this was not the first attempt by Mantinea to expand.

²⁹ The Tegean alliance of this period is attested only by the Thucydidean passage describing the battle at Laodokeion. From this evidence it seems that Tegea, like Mantinea, was a hegemon of a symmachy. Beyond that, we know little else about this Tegean alliance. See Nielsen, in More Studies 86.
The battle, writes Thucydides, was a bloody one that lasted into the evening and ended without a definitive victor. The Mantineans chose to wait for the Tegeans to leave the battlefield before they set up their own trophy, and later both sides sent spoils to Delphi to commemorate the victory.\textsuperscript{30} Certainly the decision to set up their own trophy and send spoils to Delphi reflects the Mantineans’ belief that they were somehow victorious. And although the Tegeans were first to set up a trophy, Thucydides does not record that the Mantineans were chased from the battlefield; instead he remarks that it was nightfall that ended the fighting.\textsuperscript{31} Certainly the Tegeans must have faired better than the Mantineans since they did not leave the field, but they did not win the battle in such a way that Thucydides declared them the victors. Instead, he describes the victory as one that was ἀμφιδήρτος. Consequently, by setting up a victory monument and sending spoils to Delphi, Mantinea’s alliance appeared as powerful as Tegea’s.\textsuperscript{32}

Mantinea built on its success at Laodokeion and over the next two years moved westward into the Parrhasia and acquired even more allies. Unfortunately there is no account of Mantinea’s conquest of Parrhasia, but in 421 the Parrhasians

\textsuperscript{30} A. H. Jackson, “Hoplites and the Gods: The Dedication of Captured Arms and Armour,” in V. D. Hanson (ed.), \textit{Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience} (London 1991) 246, notes that both sent their spoils to Delphi, and not Olympia where an uneasiness in displaying spoils taken from other Greeks began to increase in the fifth century. Pausanias (10.13.4) saw the Mantinean offering, a bronze Apollo.

\textsuperscript{31} See J. F. Lazenby, “The Killing Zone,” in \textit{Hoplites} 91, for a stalemate being a possible outcome of many Greek battles because of the tendency to overlap on the right side of the battle line. Thucydides notes the tendency at 5.71.1. See also Lazenby, \textit{The Peloponnesian War} 100. Hornblower, \textit{Commentary II} 417, suggests that since the Tegeans did not leave the battlefield, they had “slightly the better of it.” Jackson, in \textit{Hoplites} 239, notes that the victor tended to set up a trophy after the enemy had fled. But the situation is different here as the Mantineans did not flee from combat; both sides ceased fighting because of nightfall.

are referred to as “subjects” (*hypekooi*) of Mantinea and hence dependent members of the Mantinean symmachy. In order to march into the Parrhasia from Mantinea, the Mantinean army would have passed through the area of some of the northwestern Mainalian communities, such as Haimonia, Paraitheis, and Eutresia. After the battle at Laodikeion, other Mainalians may have willingly or reluctantly joined Mantinea’s alliance. Thus, Mantinea’s mini-hegemony was created and strengthened before the chaotic events surrounding the Peace of Nikias in 421.

The preservation of the Mantinean alliance

In 421 politics began to change in the Peloponnesos. First, Mantinea had witnessed Sparta meddling in the affairs of another alliance, the Elean symmachy, and as a result began to fear Spartan interference in its own regional alliance. The events of this period provide insight into the Mantinean decisions and strongly suggest a fading of support for Spartan leadership and heightened concern for their own alliance.

According to Thucydides (5.31.2–4), before the Peloponnesian War the Eleans had provided military aid to their neighbors, the Lpreans, who were at war with some Arkadians. The Lpreans agreed to pay a tribute to Elis as compensation for this aid, but later used the Peloponnesian War as an excuse to cease these payments. The Eleans then asked the Spartans to arbitrate this disagreement, but the Eleans grew suspicious of the credibility of the Spartan tribunal, abandoned the arbitration process, and invaded Lepreon. Sparta responded by declaring the Lpreans to be independent, hence

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33 Thuc. 5.33.1. Cf. Nielsen, in *More Studies* 81, who posited that the Mantinean *symmachoi* and *hypekooi* are identical.
34 J. Roy, *Studies in the History of Arkadia in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods* (diss. Cambridge 1968) 183, suggested that those Mainalian communities that lay en route to Parrhasia would have been allied to Mantinea.
35 See also Paradiso and Roy, *Klio* 90 (2008) 32–33, who connect the Elean expansion and control of Lepreon with the Mantinean expansion in southern Parrhasia.
no longer subject-allies of Elis, and sent heavy infantry into Lepreon as a garrison.\textsuperscript{36} This Elis-Lepreon conflict has been discussed elsewhere. What is most pertinent here is that for the first time Sparta had emancipated a community from a League member’s alliance; that is, it interfered in a member’s ability to serve as hegemon.\textsuperscript{37} Soon after, Sparta summoned its allies to vote on the terms of a peace treaty with Athens, the Peace of Nikias. Elis and four of Sparta’s allies refused.\textsuperscript{38} Their insubordination was a sign that Sparta’s position as leader in the Peloponnesos was threatened, yet Sparta refused to alter the initial terms and instead concluded an alliance with Athens.\textsuperscript{39} Thucydides insinuates some level of disturbance within the

\textsuperscript{36} Paradiso in Roy and Paradiso, \textit{Klio} 90 (2008) 27–29, argued that the Spartan invasion and subsequent garrisoning of Lepreon included two different forces. The first was that mentioned in 5.31 that marched into Lepreon in the summer of 421. The second (5.49–50) were the reinforcements sent into Lepreon after the summer of 421 and before August of 420 (5.46–48). Thus, Sparta continued to garrison Lepreon after the summer of 421. See also Hornblower, \textit{Commentary} III 80–81.

\textsuperscript{37} See Capreedy, \textit{CW} 101 (2008) 485–503. The creation, preservation, and dissolution of the Elean symmachy in the western Peloponnesos is similar to the situation in Arkadia; like Elis, Mantinea was carving out its own regional symmachy and was ready to leave its alliance with Sparta to maintain its role as hegemon of its own regional alliance. In the case of Elis, the Eleans were ready to leave their alliance with Sparta, ally with Argos, and defend their right to Lepreon. The issue was not merely control of Lepreon, but Elis’ concern for the protection of its regional symmachy. Cf. Paradiso and Roy, \textit{Klio} 90 (2008) 32–33, and C. Falkner, “Sparta and Lepreon in the Archidamian War (Thuc. 5.31.2–5),” \textit{Historia} 48 (1999) 391.

\textsuperscript{38} The others were Megara, Boiotia, and Korinth (Thuc. 5.17.1). See Kagan, \textit{The Peace of Nicias} 19–26, for a discussion on why these four allies refused to sign the treaty; Lazenby, \textit{The Peloponnesian War} 106–130, for a discussion of the Peace of Nikias and subsequent events; and R. Seager, “After the Peace of Nicias: Diplomacy and Policy, 421–416,” \textit{CQ} 26 (1976) 249–269, for his narrative and analysis of the relationships between Sparta, Korinth, Athens, Boiotia, and Argos.

\textsuperscript{39} For the alliance see Thuc. 5.23–24. The allies refused a second time unless “a fairer one than the present one were agreed upon” (5.22.1). For the terms of the initial treaty see 5.18–19.
Peloponnesian League when he notes that Sparta formed this alliance in part so that, "the rest of the Peloponnesos would most likely remain at rest."\(^40\) While Sparta was attempting to maintain control of the Peloponnesos, Mantinea was growing even more apprehensive because of this Spartan-Athenian alliance that permitted each side (Sparta and Athens) to alter the terms of the alliance at their own discretion.\(^41\)

A few months later, in the summer of 421, Mantinea left the Peloponnesian League for an alliance with Argos. Thucydides narrates the Mantinean reasoning for defecting, and in doing so confirms that Mantinea was concerned with the preservation of its own alliance and its position as its hegemon (5.29.1):

Μαντινῆς δ᾿ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν πρῶτοι προσεχόρησαν, δεδιότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεύσι μέρος τι τῆς Αρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ύπήκοον ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸς Αθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφάς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον· ὡστε ἁσμένοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐπιτάχθησαν, πόλιν τε μεγάλην νομίζοντες καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἀτεί διάφορον, δημοκρατουμένην τε ἄσπερ καὶ αὐτοῖ.

The Mantineans and their allies were the first of them (the Greeks) to come over to them (the Argives), out of fear of the Lakedaimonians, for while the war was going on, the Mantineans subdued a portion of Arkadia and made it into a subject. They thought that the Lakedaimonians, since they were at peace, would not permit the Mantineans to govern. Consequently, they gladly turned to Argos, believing it to be a great polis, always at variance with the Spartans, and a democratic one like themselves.

In describing the context of the Spartan-Mantinean relationship, Thucydides does not mention that the Mantineans had


\(^{41}\) The stipulation found in the Peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5.18.11) was echoed in the terms of this Spartan-Athenian alliance (5.23.6).
broken the pre-war agreement invoked by the Eleans at 5.31.5. Nor does he mention that any of the allies objected to the terms of the Peace of Nikias on the grounds that the Mantineans had deprived them of any pre-war claims. But the Mantineans did keep a garrison in the Parrhasia and maintained a fort at Kypsela (5.33.1), much as Sparta had done in Lepreon when Elis invoked this pre-war agreement. Also, when the Parrhasians were liberated by the Spartans, they were made autonomous (5.33.3), thus indicating that the Parrhasians did not enjoy autonomy while in the Mantinean symmachy. Finally, Mantinea made decisions on behalf of its allies much as Athens did for its allies. These Mantinean allies, writes Nielsen, were “thus deprived of the complete control of their own land.” The Mantinean conquest of Parrhasia and movement south into Mainalia were therefore acts that ran contrary to the contractual understanding among the allies that “at the end of the war with Athens, places should be held by whoever held them before the war” (5.31.5). In 421, therefore, the Mantineans were legitimately concerned about their ability to govern (ἀρχεῖν) free from Spartan interference, and the preservation of their alliance was sufficient grounds for leaving the Peloponnesian League, joining the historic enemy, and risking war with Sparta.

42 M. Ostwald, Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History (Chico 1986) 5, argued that “the recognition of the territorial integrity” of a polis was associated with its autonomy. See n.27 above for the battle of Laodikeion and its connection to arable land.

43 Cf. Thuc. 5.47.1 and n.61 below for the use of ἀρχεῖν to describe the Mantineans’ relationship with their allies. Cf. Nielsen, in More Studies 81–84, and for a discussion on the similarity between Mantinea and Athens and the concept of autonomia see M. H. Hansen, “The ‘Autonomous City-State’: Ancient Fact or Modern Fiction?” Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis (Historia Einzelschr. 95 [1995]) 21–43. See n.37 above for the Spartan garrisoning of Lepreon that led Elis to remind Sparta of the pre-war agreement.

44 Nielsen, in More Studies 83. The Parrhasians are described by Thucydides as subjects (ὑπεκούοι) of the Arkadians; see J. Wickersham, Hegemony and Greek Historians (Lanham 1994) 33, that the Athenians treated their ὑπεκούοι however they wished.
This defection preceded any direct meddling by Sparta. The recognition that Spartan leadership would not countenance Mantinean autonomy and the fear of subsequent Spartan interference motivated the Mantinean policy. After witnessing the Spartans’ interference in Lepreon and the formation of the Athenian-Spartan alliance, Mantinea had good reason to be anxious (Thuc. 5.29.1) about its own role as hegemon of an alliance, especially since the terms under which allies entered the Peloponnesian League were clearly now reciprocal only in principle. Thucydides’ account of these events, from the winter to the summer of 421, presents the Mantinean departure from the League as a more abrupt reaction than it truly was. Upon closer scrutiny, his narrative does in fact imply the Mantineans’ trepidation and explains the decision to leave the Peloponnesian League (summer 421) despite initially agreeing to the terms of the treaty (the winter before).

Thucydides mentions at an earlier point (5.22.1) that there was unrest in the Peloponnesos before 421. The events of Book 5 lack full treatment and thus the nature of that unrest is left ambiguous. However, he mentions elsewhere that the Spartans’ misfortunes at Pylos and on Sphakteria in 424 had created a severe loss of allied confidence in their leadership. For example, ca. 421 the Argives had begun to negotiate alliances with other Greek poleis because their treaty with Sparta was expiring and they expected war with Sparta to follow (5.28). Furthermore, they had also hoped to gain the leadership of the Peloponnesos, “for this was a time when the reputation of Sparta had sunk very low indeed and she was despised for the losses she had suffered.” Thucydides also writes that the Spartan success at the battle of Mantinea “did away with all the reproaches that had been leveled against them by the

45 See 354–355 above for the nature of the agreement between allies and Sparta.

46 See e.g. 4.16 on the surrender of the Spartan troops.

47 Thuc. 5.28.2 (translation of Warner, which captures very well the negative opinion of Sparta). For 5.28.2 and 5.75.3 see below.
Hellenes at this time, whether for cowardice, because of the disaster on the island, or for incompetence and lack of resolution on other occasions” (5.75.3). The Spartans’ military and political failures on Sphakteria and at Pylos in 424 resulted in a crisis in which their reputation as a capable military hegemon suffered grave damage.48

In addition to this crisis of confidence, the affairs of Pylos had also altered Spartan policy during the period between 424 and 418. Falkner argued that the Athenian occupation of Pylos threatened the Messenian border, and consequently Sparta became concerned and increasingly nervous about the threat that the occupation posed to Spartan control of Messenia.49 Because of this threat to its own security, Sparta ignored any previous commitment to its allies, specifically Elis, and supported Lepreon’s autonomy despite having allowed Elis to build and expand its own alliance complete with dependents such as Lepreon. Such a change in policy allowed Sparta to counter the Athenian occupation of Pylos with its own direct control over the area of Lepeon and avoid the risk in Elean control of an area of such strategic importance. In sum, the losses at Pylos showed that if and when the Spartans’ security at home was threatened, they ignored obligations to allies and placed self-preservation before the interests of the allies and members of the Peloponnesian League. As a result, allies began to sever their relationship with Sparta.

48 We may also connect several other Thucydidean passages to this decline of confidence in Spartan leadership. At 7.18.2 the Spartans trace their misfortunes to the events of Book 5 and the Pylos affair. At 4.40 one of the Spartans who was captured on Sphakteria, when asked if those who died on Sphakteria were the “noble and good men,” responded that an arrow would be worth a lot if it could pick out the noble and good men from the rest; Thucydides notes the general surprise that Spartans had surrendered (4.40.2). Finally, after the losses at Sphakteria, the Spartans feared revolution in Messenia and began to be “seriously uneasy” about their situation (4.41.3); cf. 4.55 for a similar comment on their uneasiness due to the losses at Pylos.

Thucydides had not yet mentioned the affair of Lepreon (5.31) when he mentioned the unrest (5.22) in the Peloponnesos. However, it is reasonable that he was referring to more than the general disappointment and disillusionment with Spartan leadership. Rather, the unrest was quite likely more complicated and due to the aforementioned waning confidence in Spartan leadership, the threat to the Messenian border, and the growing interest of allies such as the Eleans and the Mantineans in building their own parochial alliances. As a result, the Mantinean polis opted to create and increase its own symmachy.

Later in his narrative, Thucydides writes that the other Peloponnesians also considered following Mantinea’s lead because they thought that Mantinea had good reason to change sides: νομίσαντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστήναι (5.29.2). The Mantineans may have known something that the rest of the Peloponnesians did not, and Thucydides explains that the Mantineans were upset over the clause in the Spartan-Athenian alliance that permitted each side to alter the terms of the alliance without consulting the allies. This clause aroused suspicions that the Spartan-Athenian alliance might have had ambitions to reduce the Peloponnesians to slavery. Therefore, although Mantinea had agreed to the initial terms of the treaty, it seems logical that their allegiance to Sparta was beginning to wane before their decision to defect to Argos and that they proceeded cautiously before making their decision publicly known. The foreign policy of the Mantineans may not have been uniform—no polis could navigate foreign policy without some level of internal disagreement—but its policy did aim to protect the polis and for this much there was unity for its actions to

50 M. Hammond, *Thucydides* (Oxford 2009) 274, translates this as, “there was a belief that the Mantineans had made their move on privileged information.”

51 See Seager, *CQ* 26 (1976) 252–255, for Korinth and Argos spreading this fear that was believed by Mantinea.
administer and defend the *polis*. Mantinea’s initial silence regarding the terms of the Peace of Nikias therefore was not necessarily a sign of compliance, but rather of circumspection. The Mantineans had supported the Spartans in the early years of the war but now that their alliance with Sparta was more intrusive, they seized the opportunity of the disaster at Pylos to continue to build their own alliance. Moreover, the truce between Argos and Sparta was coming to an end and once it was certain that Sparta would not permit them to remain in control of their alliance, the Mantineans defected and made clear that they no longer supported Sparta’s leadership in the Peloponnesos. As Westlake noted, Mantinea thus influenced the events surrounding the Peace of Nikias and helped to increase rivalry within the Peloponnesos.

**Spartan reaction and the end of Mantinea’s mini-hegemony**

The Spartans’ apprehension about the growth and defection of the Mantinean symmachy and the Mantineans’ fear of Spartan intrusion were both validated when even later in the summer of 421, a Spartan force under Pleistoanax responded to a request from certain Parrhasians and invaded the Mantinean territory of the Parrhasia (Thuc. 5.33.1–3):

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52 A *polis* administered a legal order in a territory over a population, and there were different types of *poleis*; each was nevertheless a “highly institutionalized political community”: M. H. Hansen, “95 Theses about the Greek ‘Polis’ in the Archaic and Classical Periods,” *Historia* 52 (2003) 622. Cf. R. MacMullen, “Foreign Policy for the ‘Polis’,” *G&R* 10 (1963) 118–122. Finally, the Mantinean state, according to Aristotle (*Pol*. 1318b6–27), was a type of democracy based on a farming citizenry. Their choice to defect to the Argives was only bolstered by the similarity in constitutional principles. See E. W. Robinson, *The First Democracies: Early Popular Government outside Athens* (Stuttgart 1997) 113, and *Democracy beyond Athens* (Cambridge 2011) 203.


54 For the area see Andrewes, *HCT* IV 31–34. Pausanias (8.27.4) provides a list of the Parrhasian communities: Lykosoura, Thoknia, Trapezous, Proseis, Akakesion, Akontion, Makaria, and Dasea. Proseis, Akakesion, and
During the same summer under the leadership of the Spartan king Pleistoonax son of Pausanias, the Lakedaimonians marched out with their entire levy against the Parrhasians of Arkadia who were subjects of the Mantineans and a faction of whom had summoned the Spartans. They (the Lakedaimonians) intended to destroy at the same time, if they could, the fort at Kypsela, which the Mantineans themselves had fortified and garrisoned and which was situated in the Parrhasia threatening Skiritis in the Lakonike. The Lakedaimonians, then, ravaged the land of the Parrhasians; and the Mantineans, after handing over their city to Argives to protect, went out to defend their alliance. But as the Mantineans were unable to save the fort at Kypsela and the poleis in the Parrhasia, they departed. After making the Parrhasians autonomous and taking down the fort, the Lakedaimonians went back home.

Not all of Mantinea’s allies were happy with its leadership, as clearly some Parrhasians were displeased with the state of affairs; indeed their status as subject allies must have contributed to their discontent. According to Thucydides, a faction of these Parrhasians invited Sparta to liberate them from Mantinean rule.\textsuperscript{55} But liberation of the Parrhasians was not the

\textsuperscript{55} Akontion are not located in \textit{Barrington Atlas} Map 58. See Hansen and Nielsen, \textit{Inventory} 506–507.

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Forsén, in \textit{Further Studies} 54.
Spartans’ sole objective. Seizing the Mantinean fort at Kypselas and alleviating a potential threat to its border was crucial to Sparta’s security, for the territory that Mantinea had acquired via its Parrhasian and Mainalian allies bordered the Laconian territories in two areas, Messenia and the Skiritis. Furthermore, according to Thucydides, the fort at Kypselas was fortified by Mantinea to threaten the area of the Skiritis. With a potential Argive-Mantinean alliance, Sparta could not risk leaving its border to be occupied by enemies. Conveniently for Sparta, the march against Kypselas coincided with the liberation of the Parrhasians. We can understand, therefore, why the Spartans marched with their entire levy and ravaged the territory of the very same people they came to free; by liberating the Parrhasians and removing or subduing any pro-Mantinean Parrhasians, not only did the Spartans secure the Messenian border, they began the dissolution of the Mantinean alliance.

The Mantineans responded by deploying what must have been their entire levy, for they had to ask the Argives to guard their city while they themselves marched out to preserve their alliance (τὴν ξυμμαχίαν). Unfortunately, Thucydides does

56 G. Shipley, “Lakedaimon,” in Hansen and Nielsen, Inventory 570–571, discusses the difference between the Lakedaimonian territory and the Laconian territory, called Lakonike. The latter formed the wider Spartan territory and included the Skiritis.

57 Andrewes, HCT IV 34, noted that the fort aimed to disrupt Spartan communications to the north and west, particularly with Messenia.

58 See also Roy in Roy and Paradiso, Klio 90 (2008) 33.

59 Falkner, Historia 48 (1999) 392, argued that the Athenian occupation of Pylos in 425 eventually led to Sparta’s decision to declare Lepreon autonomous and that the change in Spartan policy (from Elean control of Lepreon to Spartan control) was due to their concern over the Messenian border.

60 The MSS. have ξυμμαχίαν which Andrewes, HCT IV 33, noted has a territorial meaning. The Mantineans were indeed defending their territory, but were also trying to preserve the dependent status of the Parrhasian cities.

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not mention any battle or skirmish between the Mantineans and Spartans, yet the compact nature of his narrative suggests that however it was accomplished, the Spartan liberation of the Parrhasians and conquest of the fort at Kypseli were effective. Despite losing Kypseli and the Parrhasian cities, the rest of the Mantinean alliance remained intact, and in response to Sparta’s interference, Mantinea on behalf of itself and its allies formally entered into a new alliance with Argos, Elis, and Athens in the summer of 420 (Thuc. 5.47). The terms of this alliance included a promise to protect not only the signatories themselves but also the territories of their alliances: ὑπὲρ σφῶν ὁμοτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἀρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι (“on behalf of themselves and the allies over whom each ruled”).

Mantinea continued to pursue its hegemonic right to govern without Spartan interference. This new arrangement provided enhanced security against what Sparta threatened, and Mantinea had the support it needed to maintain its alliance. Soon after its formation, the new Argive-led coalition began an offensive against Sparta by attacking Orchomenos. Sparta was unable to organize a campaign in time to protect that ally, and without support from

61 Thuc. 5.47.1. See Hornblower, Commentary III 113, for the translation of this passage. The terms of this new treaty were binding on Mantinea’s allies, and yet Mantinea alone negotiated and concluded the terms. Unfortunately it is unknown whether Mantinea’s allies had any say in these deliberations, but since many of the dependent allies were, as Thucydides states, obtained by force, it seems probable that the Mantineans did not allow them this privilege. Nielsen, in More Studies 84, noted that Mantinea ruled its allies in a manner similar to Athens; and M. H. Hansen, “Were the Boiotian Poleis Deprived of their Autonomia during the First and Second Boiotian Federations? A Reply,” in More Studies 128, remarked that swearing an oath on behalf of others, “could be taken as an indication that these others had been deprived of their autonomia.” Membership in a symmachy was not, however, in itself the limiting factor on autonomy, see Rhodes, in The Ancient Greek City-State 166–167. Cf. R. Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time (Oxford 1993) 242–244.

62 Thuc. 5.61–62. After the Peace of Nikias and the subsequent formation of the Argive alliance, Orchomenos remained a faithful ally to Sparta.
Sparta. Orchomenos was forced to yield to the alliance and hand over hostages to the Mantineans. It seems likely that in doing so Orchomenos became a dependent ally of the Mantinean alliance. After the capitulation of Orchomenos, the Argive-led coalition chose to attack Tegea. Mantinea, in fact, insisted on this course of action. Tegea was an obvious target of the coalition for its geographic location, its logistical importance to the Spartan army, and its political significance in the Peloponnesos. In addition, the coalition assumed victory, for they anticipated help from a faction in Tegea that, as Thucydides notes (5.62.2, 64.1), was willing to betray the city to the new alliance. For Mantinea, a victory over Tegea was of paramount importance to its position in Arkadia; Orchomenos had already been captured, and if Tegea were defeated, then Mantinea could maintain its mini-hegemony within Arkadia.

The support of this Argive-led alliance that Mantinea relied upon faded quickly when the Spartans prepared a major offensive to check the new coalition and restore Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos. In 418, the forces met near Mantinea where almost three thousand Mantineans and approximately five hundred of their allies were stationed on the right wing of the allied army. During the battle, the Mantineans fought

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63 Thuc. 5.61.3–5. For the possibility of a fourth-century Orchomenian alliance see Paus. 8.27.4; Nielsen, in More Studies 84–86; Andrewes, HCT IV 32.

64 Thuc. 5.62.1–2. See Hornblower, Commentary III 163, for a brief discussion of the decision to attack Tegea and not Lepreon. Andrewes, HCT IV 88, noted the importance of attacking Tegea rather than Lepreon.

65 The coalition itself was not united in its policy, for Elis' request to attack Lepreon was denied in favor of an attack on Tegea. Consequently, Elis' forces withdrew back home and were late for the battle of Mantinea: Thuc. 5.62, 75.5. Cf. Seager, CQ 26 (1976) 256, on the deficiencies of this anti-Spartan alliance.

66 Thuc. 5.66–74. Diodorus said that the Mantineans had provided the Argive forces with almost three thousand hoplites (12.78.4). On the other side, there were three groups of Arkadians: the Tegeans, the Heraians, and the Mainalians.
well but it was the Spartans who were the victors in the end. The battle had grave consequences for Mantinea’s own regional alliance. The anti-Spartan coalition dissolved when the Argives renounced their alliance with Athens, Mantinea, and Elis and then concluded a treaty and formed an alliance with Sparta. Later, Mantinea also came to an agreement with Sparta and was forced to relinquish control over its cities (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων). Spartan fears concerning Arkadia were alleviated and Mantinea’s hegemony and regional alliance were gone.

Conclusion

Mantinea’s mini-hegemony is a prime example of Sparta’s early policy that did not restrict or prohibit allies from building regional alliances; after all, a divided Arkadia was good for Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnesos. Since the rivalry between Mantinea and Tegea did not interfere with any Peloponnesian League expedition, Sparta not surprisingly allowed the two states to battle one another in 423. But by expanding

67 Thuc. 5.73.4. The Mantineans put to flight their opposing ranks: the Brasideioi, Neodamodeis, and Skiritai; two hundred Mantineans died. See J. F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (Warminster 1985) 124–125.

68 Thuc. 5.78–80. Athens and Sparta had not renounced their own treaty and alliance (5.48), though the two were clearly on opposite sides.

69 Thuc. 5.81.1. The terms of Sparta’s treaty with Argos after the battle of Mantinea included a clause (5.77.5) that all cities in the Peloponnesos should be autonomous. The subsequent alliance also included a stipulation that all those cities taking part in this alliance should be autonomous and that any disputes between cities should be settled by an impartial city (5.79.2, 4). The Mantineans then abandoned their alliance and gave up their rule over their cities (5.81), thus making their allies autonomous. The Spartans must have had Mantinea and Elis in mind when they included these terms in the treaty and alliance with Argos. See Hornblower, Commentary III 202, for discussion of the terms.

70 Without any effort on Sparta’s part, Sparta’s divide-and-rule policy prevented a united Arkadia and thus helped preserve Sparta’s hegemony. See Roy, in More Studies 111, for Sparta’s condoning of tribal coalitions to keep Arkadia disunited.

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within Arkadia, Mantinea would abandon a pre-war agreement. More importantly, when Spartan power diminished and the fear of Spartan interference swelled, Mantinea chose to protect its own interests by joining Argos and betraying its alliance with Sparta.

The growth of the Mantinean mini-hegemony was a direct result of Mantinea’s lack of trust in Spartan leadership; in order to protect their own freedom and interests against the more powerful hegemon, the Mantineans chose to act in an aggressive and opportunistic manner as evidenced by the events surrounding the battle at Laodokeion. While Sparta may have overlooked the growth of the Mantinean alliance, the growth of this mini-hegemony eventually posed a significant hazard to Sparta, and when Mantinea allied with Argos, the threat to Spartan security became too great. As a result, Spartan policy became more restrictive and by 418 the alliance which Mantinea had so resolutely built was forcibly dissolved.\footnote{I would like to thank the editors and anonymous readers at \textit{GRBS} for their valuable contributions.}

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