The Public Payment of Magistrates in Fourth-Century Athens

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That the Athenian democracy did not give magistrates misthos, pay, in the fourth century B.C. has long been argued by M. H. Hansen. This article questions his argument and makes the opposite case that fourth-century Athenians paid their officials with public funds as their forebears had certainly done from the late 430s.¹ Hansen founds his case on the silence of our ancient sources.² In 411/0 the oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred made Athenian magistrates, excepting the nine archons, amisthoi or unsalaried ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.5; cf. Thuc. 8.65.3, 67.3). If, after they were ousted, this form of remuneration was restored, it was once more taken away by the oligarchic regime of 405/4.³ For Hansen there is simply no evidence that the democracy in the following year, that is, immediately after its second restoration, or at any point in the fourth century started to pay all of its magistrates again. In his account of the Athenian constitution of the 320s Aristotle’s pupil noted the remuneration of only a fraction of the 329 archontes, magistrates, which he got around to describing.⁴ They were the nine archons, five overseas magis-

¹ The earliest evidence of misthos for Athenian magistrates is IG I 32.8–9.
⁴ I follow P. J. Rhodes in seeing the author of the Ath. Pol. as a pupil of

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strates, and ten others who managed the new training program for ephes (42.3, 62.2). On misthos, at least, Hansen holds that the Ath. Pol. is not “ridiculously incomplete” and is corroborated by the silence of the century’s inscriptions on mistophoria, receipt of pay, for magistrates. Thus this treatise’s short list of salaried officials suggests that the Athenians never reversed what the oligarchs had done. For Hansen the democracy which they restored was more conservative than the fifth-century one. He concludes: “Considerable concessions were made to the oligarchic criticism of radical democracy, and the principle ‘no misthos for archai’ may well have been one of these concessions.”

In almost all cases, fourth-century magistrates may have no longer received misthos but Hansen argues that many of them still found other forms of compensation. Certainly the state gave some of its religious officials a share of sacrificed animals, produce from a sanctuary’s lands, or free meals in the lead-up to a festival. Hansen adds that magistrates also relied on their own initiative to get compensation: some demanded cash-gifts from those requiring their help, while others held onto public funds and used them privately for years. Generals too, he


8 Hansen, SymbOslo 54 (1979) 18.


argues, pocketed large gifts from foreigners and most of the booty which they captured. He holds that a magistrate’s taking of such benefits was common and was generally accepted by the dēmos. But if his requests or acts went beyond “the accepted limits,” he could be prosecuted for taking bribes or misappropriating public funds. Isocrates in three of his treatises discussed the money which Athenians apparently earned as magistrates (7.24–27, 12.145, 15.145–152). Hansen asserts that in two of these treatises Isocrates only had in mind these benefits which arkhontes secured independently, while in the third the reference is instead to pay for a different form of political participation.

The initial reception of Hansen’s argument about the lack of pay for postwar magistrates was mixed. P. J. Rhodes rejected it immediately. V. Gabrielsen published a critique of it as a book. Admittedly some did quickly support Hansen, but just as many did not. To this day historians take different sides in this debate. Settling it one way or another is important for

15 Hansen SymbOsl 54 (1979) 22 n.46; Rhodes, Commentary 695.
16 He published Remuneration when he was an undergraduate. Hansen managed to publish his response (CiMed 32 [1980] 105–125) before the book’s appearance.
our understanding of the development of Athenian democracy. Hansen and others argue that the democracy which was restored for a second time in 404/3 curtailed the power of the dēmos. But E. M. Harris and J. Ober make the opposite case: the fourth-century democracy increased their power to change nomoi and the jurisdiction of their law-courts. Certainly fifth-century Athenians were seriously committed to the poor’s participation in the law-courts and in politics. From the 450s on, they introduced different forms of public remuneration to make it easier for non-elite citizens to do so. Hence the claim of Pericles that poverty was no barrier to political participation appears to be fully justified (Thuc. 2.37.1). Therefore the failure of fourth-century Athenians to restore misthos for magistrates would be a lessening of this commitment. It would indeed support the argument that the restored democracy was more conservative than its fifth-century predecessor.

I believe there to be three reasons why Hansen’s thesis must be called into question. The first is that the dēmos simply did

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21 Rhodes, Commentary 338.

22 Arist. Ath. 27.1–4; Arist. Pol. 1274a8–9; Pl. Grg. 515E; Plut. Per. 9.1–3.

23 In their own refutations Gabrielsen and Rhodes canvassed these three reasons to varying extents. Gabrielsen touched on the first only in passing and did not develop fully the second; he was immensely strong on the third. Rhodes dealt briefly with the second only.

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not tolerate the misuse of public office for personal gain. This makes unlikely the common accepting of bribes and stealing of funds which Hansen proposes. The second reason is that poor Athenians served as magistrates. Citizens of this social class had to earn a living. Since many of the arkhai, magistracies, which they filled were full-time, they could not have done so unless they received compensation for lost earnings. This could come only as misthos from the state. The third reason is evidence. Hansen’s treatment of the treatise of Aristotle’s pupil is inconsistent. On public pay for magistrates he argues that it is not seriously incomplete. But, when it comes to their number, he argues just the opposite. Indeed, Hansen himself has put beyond doubt that Athens of the 330s had twice as many magistrates as the 329 mentioned in the Ath.Pol. Much more serious is that we do in fact have evidence for the state’s payment of officials in the fourth century, and we lack evidence for what we should see if Hansen were right. Thus we have no reason to doubt that misthos for magistrates was reintroduced at the same time as it was for councillors and jurors: immediately after the second restoration of democracy in 404/3.

1. The lack of public tolerance of financial misconduct by magistrates

Athenians of the fourth century had a negative view of magistrates who took bribes or misappropriated public funds. For them this behaviour was “terrible and abominable” (Antiph. 6.49). Public speakers consistently described such acts as adikēmata, wrongs (e.g. Antiph. 6.35, 49; 2.1.6; Dem. 24.5, 102,

26 The first reference to jury pay postwar is Ar. Eccl. 683–688. For the quick restoration of council pay see Hansen, SymbOslo 54 (1979) 15–16; Rosivach, G&R 58 (2011) 182.
110–111; Lys. 27.4, 6). The dēmos believed that bribes corrupted magistrates (e.g. Lys. 28.9; 30.2, 5, 25). In no way were accepting bribes or stealing public money thought of as norms (e.g. Aeschin. 1.106, 110–113; Dem. 24.14, 112; Lys. 27.2–3, 6–8; 28.3–4), while “just” or “good” magistrates committed neither crime (Lys. 28.9, 15–16). The nine archons vowed not “to take dōra, gifts, on account of their magistracy” (Ath. Pol. 55.5). The dēmos acted on this strongly-held belief: they made it illegal for a magistrate to take gifts or to steal public funds (54.2, 59.3).28 “Nor were the Athenian people loath to inflict severe penalties on magistrates who failed them.”29 When it came to these graphai—indictments for public offences—their jurors showed no leniency (e.g. Dem. 19.273, 22.39, 24.112; Lys. 28.3–4, 29.6), convicting archontes for, for example, a short delay in returning public funds or accepting small-scale bribes (Dem. 19.293). A magistrate who was convicted of either was fined ten times what he had taken illegally (e.g. Din. 1.60, 2.17).

For the sake of catching such wrongdoers the fourth-century democracy monitored its magistrates closely.30 In the kuria ekklēsia or main assembly-meeting of each prytany a vote was taken on their performance ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 43.4, 61.2).31 This was the opportunity for anyone to accuse a magistrate of wrongdoing (e.g. Aeschin. 1.110; [Dem.] 50.12; Dem. 58.28). Private citizens could also accuse a public official of “not using the nomoi” before the council ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 45.2);32 a bouleutês, councillor, could do the same (Antiph. 6.12, 35, 45, 49). Such denunciations normally ended up before a law-court (e.g. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 45.2, 61.2). In addition, the accounts of every

28 Gabrielsen, Remuneration 100; Rhodes, Commentary 598.
31 Hamel, Athenian Generals 122–123; Hansen, Athenian Democracy 220–221; Rhodes, Commentary 540–541.
32 Hansen, Athenian Democracy 221–222.
magistrate were regularly checked. A committee of the boule did so every prytany (Arist. Ath. Pol. 45.2, 48.3; Lys. 30.5). At the end of his term, finally, a magistrate underwent an euthuna or scrutiny. The mainstay of it was the auditing of his logos or accounts (e.g. Arist. Ath. Pol. 48.4–5, 54.2; Dem. 18.117, 19.273; cf. Aeschin. 3.23). He had to be present for his audit’s results. They were announced before a jury of 501 so that, if evidence of malfeasance was revealed, he could be prosecuted straightaway under one or more of the graphai concerning magistrates (Aeschin. 3.10).

Wealthy Athenians could afford lessons in public speaking and hence found it easy to denounce a magistrate on the Pnyx or in the bouleutērion or council-chamber. The motivation for their doing so usually was that the official whom they were denouncing was a personal enemy (e.g. Antiph. 2.1.5, 6; Aeschin. 1.100; Dem. 24.8–9). Thus it is no surprise that many of the known archontes who were prosecuted were wealthy politicians. It was taken for granted that poor citizens as individuals were far less capable of pursuing wrongdoers in the law-courts (e.g. Dem. 44.28; 21.123–124, 141, 219; Lys. 24.16–17). Importantly, however, the democracy’s monitoring of its officeholders relied only in part on this initiative of wealthy individuals, because the checking of accounts was in the hands not of individuals but of committees. In particular it was a board of ten logistai or auditors who scrutinised a magistrate’s logos at the end of his term (Aeschin. 1.107; Arist. Ath. Pol. 54.2). If they suspected him of committing an offense, prosecution did not depend on their ability as public speakers, as they

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33 Hansen, Athenian Democracy 221; Rhodes, Commentary 540–541.
35 For the elite’s purchasing of such lessons see D. M. Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2013) 5, 46, 107.
38 Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 8.
had the use of ten sunēgoroi or public prosecutors for this purpose.\textsuperscript{39} The result was that poor Athenians too were regularly convicted for financial crimes which they had committed as magistrates (e.g. Lys. 27.4–6; Dem. 24.112).

This lack of public tolerance of bribe-taking and stealing public funds makes it very unlikely that they were common practices among the 700 or so Athenian magistrates. The dēmos strongly believed that good officeholders did not commit such acts. Thus aiskhunē or a sense of shame would have dissuaded the vast majority from engaging in such adikēmata.\textsuperscript{40} Magistrates feared too the nomoi regulating their service. They did not need to be reminded of the constant monitoring under which they carried out their duties and the penchant of their fellow citizens for punishing harshly arkhontes who erred. Poor magistrates especially would have struggled to pay the ten-fold fine which a conviction brought. The fact that public debtors suffered atimia, loss of citizenship-rights, made this penalty in itself a strong deterrent.\textsuperscript{41}

The prosecution of stratēgoi by fourth-century Athens shows that there was little acceptance of financial wrongdoing by magistrates. With the collapse of the Athenian empire, generals regularly were required to raise funds in the field.\textsuperscript{42} But they could not treat them as their own as the imperatores of the Roman Republic would come to do.\textsuperscript{43} Money so raised was judged to be public property.\textsuperscript{44} The dēmos authorised its collec-

\textsuperscript{39} Hansen, Athenian Democracy 222–223.
\textsuperscript{41} For the atimia of public debtors see Dem. 59.6.
\textsuperscript{43} Hamel, Athenian Generals 158, pace Taylor, G&R 48 (2001) 61.
\textsuperscript{44} E.g. Dem. 24.11–14; Lys. 28.1–4, 6, 10; 29.2, 5, 8–11, 14; Xen. Hell. 1.2.4–5.
tion and use either before a stratēgos departed or during a campaign (Dem. 8.9, 21.3; Diod. 16.57.2–3; Lys. 28.5–6). On his return he submitted a logos of what he had raised in the field and handed over any surplus to the city (Dem. 20.17–80; Lys. 28.6). In the fourth century, on average two of each year’s ten generals were the targets of an eisangelia eis ton dēmon, a denunciation before the people. This prosecution was employed in cases of treason or political corruption (e.g. Dem. 49.67; Hyp. 3.7–8). Almost every case involving a stratēgos resulted in conviction (Dem. 19.180). Generals understandably feared the possibility of such a denunciation back home (e.g. Thuc. 1.49.4, 3.98.5, 7.48.4–5; Diod. 15.31.1). Some of these cases centred on a general’s handling of funds. In 380/79, for example, Ergocles was denounced for accepting dōra and stealing funds which he had raised as a general (Lys. 28.1–2, 11; 29.2, 5, 11). He was condemned to death by the dēmos and quickly executed (29.2). In 356/5 Timotheus, who had won many victories for Athens, was denounced by a fellow general for accepting gifts from foreigners (Din. 1.14, 3.17). The people fined him an unprecedented 100 talents (Isoc. 15.129;


48 Hansen, Athenian Democracy 212–215.

49 Hamel, Athenian Generals 132, 136.

50 Hamel, Athenian Generals 118.

51 Hamel, Athenian Generals 148.

52 Hamel, Athenian Generals 135, 155.
Nep. Timoth. 3.5). He was unable to pay and so went into exile where he died soon afterwards (Plut. Mor. 605f). Such denunciations left Athenian stratēgoi in no doubt about the danger of any appearance of financial wrongdoing.

2. The prevalence of poor citizens serving as magistrates

Poor Athenians volunteered to fill magistracies that required a full-time commitment. Demosthenes assumed that they regularly served as, for example, 

astunomoi (24.112). This board’s responsibilities were the safety and the cleanliness of the streets (e.g. IG II² 380). Five of its members worked in Athens and five in its port ([Arist.] Ath.Pol. 50.2). Aristotle’s pupil writes: “They prevent buildings which encroach on the streets, balconies which extend over the streets, overhead drain pipes which discharge into the street, and window-shutters which open into the street.” In addition the astunomoi forced the city’s dung-collectors to dump their loads well beyond its walls, and removed the bodies of the dead homeless. They enforced, finally, the nomoi which the Athenians occasionally passed against the elite’s conspicuous consumption (e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.90).

Fulfilling these demanding duties would have required every member of this board to work on a full-time basis.

There is direct evidence of poor citizens also serving as agora-
nomoi (Dem. 24.112), as treasurers of Athena ([Arist.] Ath.Pol. 47.1), and as basileus ([Dem.] 39.72). What we know of the duties of these three offices indicates that they were no less time-consuming. In addition authors of fourth-century Athens and its inscriptions detail the duties of the other 83

53 Rhodes, Commentary 573–574.
54 Transl. P. J. Rhodes.
55 For this consumption on the part of the elite see Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 4–5, 130–133.
56 For the duties of the agoraonomoi see Ar. Ach. 724, 968; [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 51.1; Dem. 57.31, 34; Rhodes, Commentary 575–576. For the treasurers of Athena see [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 47.1, 60.3; Gabrielsen, Remuneration 145 n.114; Hansen, ClMed 32 (1980) 121; Rhodes, Commentary 575–576. For the basileus see [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 57; Rhodes, Commentary 636–650.
magistracies. On the basis of what they say about the duties of each position it is possible to estimate roughly whether it required a full-time, half-time, or quarter-time commitment. Table 1 gives the results of this estimating. It lists the arkhontes in the order in which they are discussed in the Constitution of the Athenians and, after that, in Hansen’s analysis of the ones which Aristotle’s pupil failed to mention. This table shows how more than a third of Athenian magistracies were full-time. As it was very common for poor citizens to be magistrates (e.g. Dem. Exordia 55; Lys. 24.9, 13; 27.4–5), many of them would have filled these more demanding roles. In doing so they had to neglect completely other daytime obligations. What the members of this social class had in common was a lack of skholē, leisure. Wealth relieved the wealthy of the need of working and hence gave them such skholē (e.g. Ar. Plut. 281, Vesp. 552–557; Men. Dys. 293–295). By contrast, the poor had to work for a living (e.g. Ar. Pax 632, Vesp. 611, Plut. 281; Lys. 24.16). This was reflected in social terminology, as penēs, the word used most often for a poor man, is cognate with penomai, whose primary meaning was to work. Poor Athenians thus could not have taken up full-time magistracies unless they were compensated for lost earnings. Because nomoi stopped magistrates from securing it on their own initiative, this compensation could only come as misthos from the state. In Aristotle’s words “receiving misthos” made sure that poor citizens were “able to have skholē” for political participation (Pol. 1293a1–10).

57 Here Rhodes, Commentary, is indispensable.
59 For this participation of the poor see Gabrielsen, Remuneration 111–119.
60 Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 4, 8–9, 57–58.

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 54 (2014) 1–16
Table 1: The Numbers and Time-Commitments of Athenian Magistrates in the 330s

| 10 | sōphronistai | F/T   | 1 | polemarkhos | F/T   |
|  1 | kaismēēs    | F/T   |  6 | themothetai  | F/T   |
|  1 | tamias stratēkōn | F/T | 10 | atholothetai | Q/T   |
|  1 | hoi epi to theorikos | F/T | 10 | stratēgoi | F/T   |
|  1 | ho tôn kρēnōn epimelētēs | F/T |  10 | taxiarhōn | F/T   |
|  1 | tamias tēs Akhēnas | F/T |  2 | hipparchōn | F/T   |
|  1 | pōlētai     | F/T   | 10 | phularchōn | F/T   |
|  10 | apodektai  | Q/T   |  1 | hipparchōs eis Lēmnon | F/T   |
|  10 | katalogēs  | Q/T   |  1 | tamias tēs Pεraiou | F/T   |
|  1 | tamias tois adenatais | F/T |  1 | tamias tēs tou Ammōnou | F/T   |
|  10 | hierōn epikrestais | H/T |  5 | amphiaktoun eis Dēlon | Q/T   |
|  10 | astunomoi  | F/T.  |  1 | anagrapheus | F/T   |
|  10 | agoranomoi | F/T   |  1 | antigrapheus | F/T   |
|  10 | metronomoi | F/T.  | 10 | boōnai | H/T   |
| 53 | sitophulakes | F/T   |  1 | grammateus epi ta | Q/T   |
|   |             |       |    | fōphismata | Q/T   |
| 10 | epimelētai tou emporiou | F/T | 10 | epimelētai tôn neōrōn | F/T   |
| 11 | hoi endeka | F/T   | 10 | epimelētai tou | Q/T   |
|  5 | eisagōges  | H/T   | 10 | Epistatai Braurōnothen | Q/T   |
| 40 | hoi tetarakhonta | H/T |  7 | Epistatai Eleusinothen | F/T   |
|  5 | hordopoiai | F/T   | 10 | Epidystatai | F/T   |
|  10 | logistai   | H/T   | 10 | argarokoipos | H/T   |
| 10 | sunegoroi tois logistais | H/T | 10 | Epistatai to Asklēpieion | Q/T   |
|  1 | grammateus kata prutaneian | F/T |  1 | hieromnēmon | F/T   |
|  1 | grammateus epi tous nomous | F/T | 10 | hieropoioi eis | Q/T   |
| 1  | grammateus tou dēmou | F/T |  10 | Panathēnēnai | Q/T   |
| 10 | hieropoioi epi ta ekthesmata | H/T |  9 | nomophulakes | Q/T   |
| 10 | hieropoioi kat’ misaton | F/T | 10 | pràktores | H/T   |
|  1 | arkhēn eis Salamina | H/T |  2 | tamias toin theoin | F/T   |
|  1 | demarkhōs eis Peraiōn | F/T |  1 | tamias eis ta neōria | F/T   |
|  1 | grammateus tois themothetais | F/T |  1 | tamias kremastōn | H/T   |
|  1 | arkhēn epinomos | F/T |  1 | tamias triēropoikōn | F/T   |
| 10 | epimelētai eis Dōnysia | Q/T |  1 | tamias tēs boulēs | F/T   |
|  4 | epimelētai mustēriōn | H/T |  1 | tamias tou dēmou | H/T   |
|  1 | basileus   | F/T   | 200 | 20 other boards of religious supervisors | Q/T   |

F/T = Full Time, H/T = Half Time and Q/T = Quarter Time

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Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 54 (2014) 1–16
3. Evidence for the payment of fourth-century magistrates

Three treatises of Isocrates evidence the continuation of the democracy’s payment of its archontes into the fourth century. His Areopagiticus and Panathenaicus date to the mid-century. In them he argued that the Athenians should replace the form of the democracy to which theirs had degenerated with the form which—he claimed—it had originally taken (e.g. 7.15–19, 15.145–152).

In support of what was in fact an argument for the disempowerment of the démos Isocrates contrasted this ancestral constitution’s magistrates with those of his day (7.22–27, 15.145–147). Every one of them, he wrote, was elected and, instead of receiving misthos, often had to spend his own money (7.22, 24–25; 15.145). Consequently they served out of a sense of duty (7.24). Because these arkhai were the same as the liturgies which wealthy citizens of the classical period performed (12.145), most Athenians of the past avoided them (7.25, 12.146). By contrast, fourth-century archontes were appointed by lot and paid (7.22–24, 15.145–146). For Isocrates their only motive was personal gain (7.25). Indeed he characterised them as thoroughly money-grubbing: they knew “more accurately the prosodoi, incomes, from the magistracies than from their own businesses” (7.24), and when they took up their positions their first act was to see whether their predecessors had overlooked any lemma or payment to which they had been entitled (25). With money to be made there was now intense competition for arkhai (7.24–25, 15.145). Isocrates confirms that this pay came only from the state; for he wrote of how the first

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63 Gabrielsen, Remuneration 88–108.
65 For this argument see Ober, Political Dissent 277–282.
66 For the classical elite’s responsibility for liturgies see Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 6–7, 99.
67 Fourth-century writers quite frequently used lemma as a synonym of misthos for political participation, e.g. Arist. Pol. 1318b15–16; Dem. 3.34; Isoc. 8.130, 15.152.
magistrates, in contrast to contemporary ones, did not “keep house out of public funds” and abstained completely from “the money of the polis” (7.24–25).

In these treatises Isocrates was obviously giving expression to the negative view of what motivated hundreds of poor Athenians to serve as arkhontes every year. He was able to do so, as he was writing only for elite readers. They generally had criticisms of the contemporary democracy and expected the intellectuals whom they read to address them. Consequently Isocrates was free to articulate their criticisms and to advocate strongly for constitutional changes. Nonetheless other aspects of his depiction of magistrates are corroborated by his contemporaries. In a law-court speech Lysias for one noted how magistrates were paid out of public funds (21.19; cf. 19.56–57). Certainly fourth-century writers give the impression that Athenians competed fiercely for arkhai. In most cases they were referring to the 100 or so of them which were filled by election. But there apparently was competition too for the other magistracies: a lottery was normally required to appoint them (e.g. Dem. 39.102; Lys. 6.4, 31.33), which indicates that the volunteers who had offered themselves for offices exceeded the number of positions available.

This testimony of Isocrates is bolstered by what we do not see in the fourth-century speeches. Without misthos Athenian magistracies would—as Isocrates suggested—have resembled liturgies, because they would have been a burden on those who held them. Wealthy defendants invariably sought to win over juries by cataloguing the liturgies and other agatha or public benefactions which they had undertaken for the city (e.g. Lys.

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68 It clearly is a view which dates back to the previous century: e.g. [Xen.] Ath.Pol.1.13.
70 Ober, Political Dissent 249, 254–255.
71 For examples see Hansen, CLMed 32 (1980) 120 n.36.
73 Gabrielsen, Remuneration 119–146.
Some even admitted that they had only performed such benefactions in order to secure the *kharias*, gratitude, of any future jury (e.g. 18.23, 20.31, 25.11–13). Thus if *arkhai* were unsalaried and so akin to liturgies, we should find speakers regularly discussing them in court. But this is exactly what we do not find: elite litigants simply did not list magistracies among their public benefactions.

In his *Antidosis* Isocrates actually made a virtue of his lack of experience as a magistrate. In the mid-350s he was challenged to an *antidosis* or exchange of properties. A citizen who had been assigned a trierarchy believed that Isocrates was better qualified to carry it out because of his apparently greater wealth. Consequently he used the *antidosis*-procedure to challenge him either to take over this liturgy or to exchange properties with him. Isocrates refused to do either and so it fell to a jury to work out who should bear the liturgy. This case, which Isocrates lost (12.5–6, 144–145), showed him clearly how many Athenians had a negative view of both his métier as a teacher of public speaking and also his relationship to their democracy more generally (4–5). Isocrates claimed that this third treatise was his attempt to rehabilitate his public image (7–10). In it he portrayed himself as a benefactor by asserting repeatedly that he preferred to perform *agatha* rather than to hold paid positions (e.g. 150–151). At 145, for example, he wrote how he had refrained from “the *arkhai* and the profits which are there and all other *koina* or public prerogatives.” Yet this did not stop him from performing liturgies. Isocrates confirmed again that the state paid magistrates when, at 152, he explained why he had always avoided “the *lēmmata*, payments, from the city.” Because he was claiming that he had never accepted political pay in his life, this treatise, which he wrote in

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75 Ober, *Political Dissent* 256.

his eighties, actually serves as evidence of the remuneration of Athenian magistrates throughout the fourth century.

Hansen’s lifetime of work has deepened enormously our knowledge of Athenian democracy. But on the remuneration of magistrates we should not follow him. Fourth-century Athens paid its magistrates just as it did its jurors, councillors, and assemblygoers. There is thus one less reason to believe that the restored democracy was more conservative than its fifth-century predecessor.77

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