A Citizen as a Slave of the State? Oligarchic Perceptions of Democracy in Xenophon

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One of the criticisms leveled at the Athenian democratic constitution, though not so prominent in comparison with other criticisms, was that it imposed burdensome obligations to its wealthy citizens. The most important among these obligations were the liturgies—the choregia and the trierarchia—and the eisphora. The attitude of the wealthy

1 For example, the ‘theoreticians’ against democracy (mainly Plato and Aristotle) do not deal with this issue in detail. The Old Oligarch alludes to it, when he mentions that under the democracy the wealthy citizens become poor and the poor wealthy ([Xen.] Ath.Pol. 1.13). See for this criticism A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1957) 54–57; cf. E. Harris, “Was all Criticism of Athenian Democracy Necessarily Anti-Democratic?” in U. Bultrighini (ed.), Democrazia e anti-democrazia nel mondo greco (Alessandria 2005) 11–24, according to whom criticism of democracy often pointed to real flaws, entailed certain reforms, and does not necessarily imply an antidemocratic stand; the specific criticism which is the topic of my paper (about the financial administration) is not included in Harris’ study. Nevertheless, there is no conclusive evidence that reforms of democracy were due to its critics. Criticism might have contributed to these reforms, but it seems more probable that democrats decided reforms after observing the failure of some practices.

2 The trierarchia and the eisphora were related to the city’s preparation for war: in the first, wealthy citizens were asked to undertake the preparation and maintenance of a trireme, while the eisphora was a tax for war which was imposed for the first time in 428 B.C. (Thuc. 3.19.1). The choregia had a longer history, the beginning of which coincided with the Cleisthenic reforms of the end of sixth century (508/7): wealthy citizens had to undertake the financing and the training of a chorus for one of the city’s festivals. For
towards these obligations was ambivalent: on the one hand, these services constituted a source of prestige and glory and confirmed their high status (especially the choregia, which had a strong public and performative aspect). On the other, they also aroused complaints, since they fostered the impression that the city exploited its wealthy citizens financially. These complaints were institutionalized in ancient Athens: Attic oratory provides rich evidence about the procedure of the antidosis, by which a wealthy citizen could avoid a liturgy by indicating a wealthier one, and hence more suitable, to undertake it.3

In this study I address some passages of Xenophon which show how wealthy Athenians were disposed towards their obligations to the democratic city and which have attracted less scholarly attention.4

The first two passages occur in Xenophon’s Symposion.5 This

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4 J. Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens (Princeton 1998), does not include these passages among criticisms of democracy (he does not examine Xenophon at all). Wilson, Athenian Institution 184–187, and Liddel, Civic Obligation 262–272, do not comment on all of them. R. Seager, “Xenophon and Athenian Democratic Ideology,” CQ 51 (2001) 385–397, and Christ, The Bad Citizen 184–190, take some of them into consideration, but do not examine them systematically and in combination. The commentaries on Xenophon deal with these passages, but do not explore their ideological implications: see for the Symposion A. J. Bowen, Xenophon: Symposion (Warminster 1998); B. Huss, Xenophons Symposion. Ein Kommentar (Stuttgart 1999). L.-A. Dorion, Xénophon. Mémoires (Paris 2000–2011) II 127, is the only scholar, to my knowledge, who observes the connection between all the passages treated in this paper and focuses on their philosophical implications.

5 The dates of Xenophon’s works are very controversial. Hence, I treat these passages according to their importance for my argument and not in their (even hypothetical) chronological order: the Symposion is dated between

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work was probably written in the 390s; its dramatic date can be firmly placed in the period of the Peloponnesian War. In the first passage, Charmides, a wealthy Athenian citizen, explains why, in his opinion, being poor secures a more peaceful life than being rich. More provocatively, he claims that by being poor, he resembles a tyrant, because he is absolutely free, whereas before he was clearly a slave:

“Your turn, Charmides,” said Callias, “to say why you take pride in poverty.” “Well,” he said, “there is agreement as follows, that it is better to be brave than fearful, to be free than a slave, to receive attentions than give them, and to be trusted by one’s country than distrusted. Now when I was a rich man in this town, first of all I was fearful that people might break into my house and take my property and do me some personal hurt. Second, I used to cultivate the sycophants, knowing that I was more likely to be hurt by them than vice versa. You see, I was always being required by the city to spend money and I couldn’t get away from the place (καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ προσετάττετο μὴν ἀεὶ τί μοι διαπερνύν ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἀποδημήσας δὲ σώφαμοι εἶχαν), whereas now, however, when I am deprived of my foreign estates and I can’t farm my Attic properties and my household goods have been sold, I lie full length and sleep sweetly, and I’ve become trusted by the city, and I don’t get threats any more—I do that to others—and I can come and go like a free man (οὐκέτι δὲ ἀπειλοῦμαι, ἀλλ’ ἢδη ἀπειλῶ ἄλλοις, ὡς ἐλευθέρω τε ἔζεστι μοι καὶ ἀποδημένην καὶ ἕπιδημεν). I am now like a

384–378 and the Memorabilia probably after 393, but here the controversy is greater (see Dorion, Xénophon, Mémorables I CCXL–CCLII). However, as Dorion rightly notes, given Xenophon’s unity of thought, the search for the exact date of composition of his works is unproductive.

6 The date is debated, the main question being whether it precedes or follows Plato’s Symposium. See the introductions in the commentaries (n.4 above). On the contrary, its dramatic date can be established, 422 B.C.; see Bowen, Xénophon, Symposium 9.

7 Cf. Dem. 10.70 for a similar distinction between the peaceful life of an idíotes and the precarious one of the politician.

8 Xén. Symp. 4.31–32, transl. Bowen (adapted).
tyrant, when once I was plainly a slave” (καὶ εἰμὶ νῦν μὲν τυράννος ἐοικῶς, τότε δὲ σαφῶς δούλος ἦν). 

In the second passage, Callias, another wealthy citizen and host of the banquet, remarks that the city treats its wealthy citizens as slaves and praises Socrates’ inner wealth, that of his soul (4.43–45): 

“It is worth realizing how wealth of this sort [that is wealth of the soul] produces the people who are truly free (ἄξιον δ’ ἐννοῆσαι ὡς καὶ ἐλευθερίους ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος παρέχεται). Here is Socrates, for instance, my source of this wealth: he never tried to serve me by score or weight, but just kept giving me as much as I could carry away; and now here is me, envious of no one. Instead, I display my generosity to all my friends and I share the wealth in my soul with any who want it. As for the most luxurious of my possessions, that’s the leisure you see me forever enjoying: I can gaze at what’s worth gazing at, and I can listen to what’s worth listening to, and (the thing that I rate highest) I can spend all day at my leisure with Socrates. He too fails to be impressed by the people who can claim most gold; he spends all his time with the people he likes (οἳ ἄν αὐτῷ ἀρέσκωσι, ἀνάγκην οὖσαν).” That was how Antisthenes spoke. “By Hera,” said Callias, “I particularly envy you your wealth because the city doesn’t impose upon you and treat you as its slave (νὴ τὴν Ἡραν, ἔφη, τὰ τὲ ἄλλα ζηλῶ σε τοῦ πλούτου καὶ ὅτι σοῦ ἡ πόλις σοι ἐπιτάττουσα ὡς δούλω χρῆται), nor do people get angry if you don’t make them loans.” 

The third passage comes from the second book of the Memorabilia, from the intriguing dialogue between Socrates and Aristippus about virtue and leadership. This dialogue raises many issues (historical, philosophical, and literary), but my

9 The choice of these persons is not accidental. For their wealth see J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford 1971) s.vv. 

focus will be on Aristippus’ assertion that he refrains from belonging to the category of those who exercise leadership because these people are treated by the city as domestic slaves, and that he prefers instead to abstain from political life altogether (Mem. 2.1.8–10, transl. J. R. Smith):

“and I do not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers (καὶ οὐδεμιῶς γε τάττω ἐμαυτόν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων τάξιν). For considering how hard a matter it is to provide for one’s own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That anyone should sacrifice a large part of his own wishes and make himself accountable as head of the state for the least failure to carry out all the wishes of the community is surely the height of folly. For states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants. I expect my men to provide me with necessaries in abundance, but not to touch any of them; and states hold it to be the business of the ruler to supply them with all manner of good things, and to abstain from all of them himself (καὶ γὰρ ἄξιον σιν αἱ πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχονσιν ὠσπερ ἐγὼ τοῖς οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, εἴγο τε γὰρ ἄξιον τοὺς θεράποτας ἐμοί μὲν ἀφθονον τα ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτῶς δὲ μηδενὸς τούτων ἀπεκελθεῖν, αἱ τε πόλεις οὐντα χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ός πλείστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν, αὐτῶς δὲ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι). And so, should anyone want to bring plenty of trouble on himself and others, I would educate him as you propose and number him with ‘those fitted to be rulers’: but myself I classify with those who wish for a life of the greatest ease and pleasure that can be had (ἐμαυτὸν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένων ἣ ῥάστα τε καὶ ἰδίστα βιοτέυειν).”

Cf. 2.1.13–14, “I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land (ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τοι, ἐφε, ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, σοῦ δ’ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτόν κυτακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἶμι)”.

These passages\(^{11}\) deserve, in my opinion, closer scrutiny for

\(^{11}\) Relevant to these are also two passages of the Oeconomicus which could
the following reasons. First, because of the equation between a citizen and slave of the city: complaints by the wealthy about their obligations towards the city are attested in other sources as well, but they are not expressed in these terms. During the classical period the term ‘slavery’ was used polemically, so Xenophon’s terminology seems deliberately marked and thus raises several issues: Why is the metaphor of slavery used in this context? What are its ideological implications? How could free people *par excellence*, such as the wealthy Athenian aristocrats, conceive themselves as slaves? Did this reflect a historical reality or is Xenophon’s presentation exaggerated? Second, because of the alternatives which accompany these complaints: Aristippus privileges apolitical life, and Charmides seems to put forth a similar option when he says that now he will be free to serve as a background for the topic of this paper. In the first, Socrates, echoing Charmides, deprecates the rich Critobulus for the obligations the city imposes to him (2.6–7). In the second (7.2–3), Ischomachus, a wealthy aristocrat, comments ironically on his *kalokagathia*, precisely because of his obligations towards his city. See S. Pomeroy, *Xenophon. Oeconomicus. A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford 1994) ad loc. Cf. *Cyr.* 8.35–48, where Pheraulas, newly rich, complains along the same lines about his new life.

12 See Christ, *The Bad Citizen* 151–155, for evidence about arguments for exemption from liturgies, mainly from the orators. Plato (*Resp.* 563d, Leg. 698a–b) raises the issue of slavery for the democratic citizens, but with regard to the law. And Aristotle problematizes the issue raised by Aristippus, when he states that living according to the constitution (*politeia*) should not be considered slavery (*Pol.* 1310a30).

13 So for example the characterization of the Athenian allies as slaves; see K. A. Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece* (Chicago 2004) 128–132.

14 Aristippus is a philosopher, the main advocate of hedonism, so this dialogue has been widely interpreted from a purely philosophical angle. Nevertheless, Xenophon’s philosophical works should not be examined independently of his other works. They have strong political connotations and are in line with his overall thought. I have pursued this argument first in M. Tamiolaki, *Liberté et esclavage chez les historiens grecs classiques* (Paris 2010) 371–394, but I intend to return to this topic in more detail on another occasion. For the present study, it would not be far-fetched, I think, to examine Aristippus’ assertions in combination with Charmides’ and Callias’.
to stay in Athens or to leave it. Both of them thus present as alternatives a life out of the context of the Athenian democracy. This again prompts questions about how wealthy Athenians conceived of their position under this constitution: did they feel out of place?\(^\text{15}\) Would they prefer to live elsewhere? Finally, it is noteworthy that these criticisms do not appear in the historical writings of Xenophon, but in his Socratic works. More importantly, the context is similar: with the exception of Aristippus’ statements, these statements are uttered in a context of praise of Socrates’ poverty. Xenophon’s choice of this genre (the Socratic dialogue) calls for an explanation: either he intended to link these criticisms specifically to Socrates in an effort to praise his frugal way of life or he deliberately chose a new genre to express more openly these criticisms of democracy.\(^\text{16}\)

I explore these issues in what follows. The study is in three parts: first, a (sketchy) description of the relationship between rich and poor people in the Athenian democracy which can serve as a background for the study of Xenophon’s passages;\(^\text{17}\) second, I analyze the ideological implications of these passages. Third, I turn to Xenophon as an author and examine the passages in the context of his political thought.

\(^\text{15}\) Cf. [Xen.] Ath.Pol. 1.20, who implies that opponents of democracy should rather live outside of Athens.

\(^\text{16}\) Cf. J. Ober, “How to Criticize Democracy in Late Fifth and Fourth-Century Athens,” in *The Athenian Revolution* (Princeton 1996) 156, who speaks of the “new genres in which criticism could adequately be expressed” and mentions Ps-Xenophon’s pamphlet. It may not be accidental that Xenophon too was also constantly experimenting with genres. It should be noted that in these Xenophontic passages, the democratic community is not explicitly mentioned. Yet these criticisms should be considered, in my opinion, as criticisms of democracy, since in Athens there was no great experience of another regime.

\(^\text{17}\) I should clarify here that I do not mean to imply that every wealthy Athenian was necessarily an aristocrat. But concerning the wealthy people who appear in Xenophon’s works, taking into consideration the ideas they express, as well as Xenophon’s oligarchical preferences, it is reasonable to assume that they are indeed both wealthy and aristocrats.
1. Rich and poor citizens in the Athenian democracy

In a famous passage of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, the answer of the young Euthydemus to Socrates’ question “What is the demos?” is “the poorer classes” (τοὺς πένητας τῶν πολιτῶν). The background of this answer is Socrates’ previous assertion that knowing what democracy is is equivalent to knowing what the demos is. Although the focus on the lower classes represents rather an oligarchic perspective on the Athenian democracy, these statements reflect a tension which was inherent in this regime: since the demos was made up chiefly of the lower classes, the immediate implication was that democracy cared more for the interests of this class. In fact, under the democracy, both rich and poor alike had grounds for discontent: the rich, because the government did not give priority to the interests of their class, and the poor, simply because they were poor. In order to resolve this tension, Athenian democratic ideology insisted on the fact that democracy was concerned with all the citizens, regardless of their status. A characteristic example of this democratic discourse is Pericles’ famous statement in the Funeral Oration about equality before the law (Thuc. 2.37.1, transl. Jowett):

18 The distinction rich/poor may seem too schematic (as there must certainly have been gradations in poverty and wealth, as well as intermediate stages; see J. K. Davies, Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens [New York 1981] 9–14), but this is how the Athenians viewed men: see Christ, The Bad Citizen 185 (cf. Arist. Pol. 1291a33–34). For the size of the Athenian population and the proportions of rich and poor in the fourth century see M. H. Hansen, Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century B.C. (Herning 1985); cf. Davies 15–37 for the size of the liturgical class.


20 Poor people would perhaps be displeased under any regime, but an oligarchic regime would probably not care about mitigating this feeling.

21 Cf. J. Ober, in The Athenian Revolution 149, for the role of ideology: “Ideology mediated between the reality of social inequality and the goal of political equality, and thereby arbitrator class tensions that elsewhere in Greece led to protracted and destructive civil wars.”
But while the law secures equal justice to all alike (πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον) in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognized.

In general, whenever democracy was praised, the class issue (that is, whether one class was treated more favorably than the other) tended to be concealed: passages in the ancient authors that praise the basic acquisitions of democracy—equality before the law, equality of speech, freedom in everyday life—do not differentiate between the rich and the poor. It seems then that the Athenians were well aware of this tension and tried to keep a balance between the two classes of the population.

In the course of the fifth century this balance was further improved in at least two additional ways: first, by the promotion of an ideological assimilation between the rich and the poor. This assimilation was certainly in the interest of the poor and aimed at facilitating their coexistence with the rich. Two important factors contributed to this assimilation. The first concerned the benefits deriving from Athenian citizenship: all the Athenians, regardless of their status, enjoyed the privileges of citizenship and, more importantly, viewed themselves against other groups which did not belong to this category: metics, slaves, and women. The second factor was the growth of the


Athenian empire. In an interesting passage of Thucydides, Pericles claims that all the Athenians take pride in the Athenian empire, that is why they should try to maintain it:24 the Athenian empire, as has been noted, thus contributed to an effacement of the distinctions between the rich and the poor.

The second way whereby a balance between rich and poor became possible was by enhancing the prestige and social status of the wealthy citizens: this was achieved, among other ways, through the liturgies, which could indeed represent some burden for the wealthy citizens, but it was precisely the prestige that these services assigned to the people who undertook them that countered the negative feeling about a burdensome task that they might reasonably arouse. This prestige was a privilege mainly of the upper class,25 and it is obvious that democracy exploited the aristocratic ethos in order to reduce (if not avoid) possible complaints of the upper class against the democratic constitution.26

The situation altered during and after the Peloponnesian War. An accumulation of experiences and radical events challenged the balance between the rich and the poor:27 rich people lost their properties and poor people became poorer. It is remarkable that although Pericles states (in an idealized manner) in the Funeral Oration that both poor and rich people willingly sacrificed themselves for the city (Thuc. 2.42.4), Thucydides states in his narrative a bit later that the Athenians fined Pericles, precisely on economic grounds (loss of their

26 Cf. Christ, The Bad Citizen 171, for the appeal to philotimia, and Liddel, Civic Obligation 266–268, for the choregoi as euergetai.
27 To avoid misunderstandings, I do not mean to propose that ancient Greek democracy worked perfectly before the Peloponnesian War and degenerated afterwards, but rather that the war was a crucial event that challenged some basic functions of this regime.
properties etc.). Furthermore, it was during that period that the city increased the financial obligations of the wealthy citizens: the eisphora was initiated in 428, a few years after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the trierarchia became more demanding. Moreover, the democratic constitution, especially after the disaster in Sicily, was seriously contested: not only oligarchical governments emerged as a reaction to the Athenian disaster, but also on a theoretical level, democracy was criticized. Finally, in the years during and after the Peloponnesian War, another important event is attested, the (first?) massive enfranchisements of slaves: slaves who participated in the battle of Arginusae and in the restoration of democracy under the leadership of Thrasybulus were probably freed. This aspect of Athenian life is not adequately documented in our sources, but it certainly affected the Athenian

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28 Thuc. 2.65.2: οἱ δὲ δημοσίες μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπείθοντο καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἐπέμπον ής τε τὸν πόλεμον μᾶλλον ὄρμηντο, ίδια δὲ τοῖς παθήσασιν ἐλπύοντο, ὁ μὲν δὴμος ὁτι ἄπτ᾽ ἠλεσσόνος ὑπόμονος ἑστάρησκοι καὶ τούτον, οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτῆματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελεσὶ κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκτές.

29 It is also interesting that Thucydides makes Cleon, the Athenian demagogue par excellence, maintain that it is difficult to exercise leadership under the democracy (3.37.1 ff.). Although we cannot be sure whether the historical Cleon expressed this view, this statement reflects the problems that post-Periclean democracy had to face.


31 This topic is vast and complex; see P. Hunt, Slaves, Warfare and Ideology in the Greek Historians (Cambridge 1998), who maintains that historians de-
mentality, since it contributed to a certain blurring of the boundaries between the free and the slaves.\footnote{Although enfranchisement did not entail Athenian citizenship: the enfranchised slave usually acquired a status similar to that of a metic. See R. Zelnick-Abramovitz, *Not Wholly Free: the Concept of Manumission and the Status of Manumitted Slaves in the Ancient Greek World* (Leiden 2005) 307–334.}

These developments challenged the grounds for solidarity between the rich and the poor: the loss of the properties of the wealthy, in combination with the increase of their obligations towards the city, gave further justification to their complaints about both democracy in general and the poor in particular.\footnote{For the changes in the population of the wealthy Athenian citizens and their reduced participation in politics in the fourth century see the illuminating chapter of C. Taylor, “A New Political World,” in R. Osborne (ed.), *Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution: Art, Literature, Philosophy and Politics, 430–380 B.C.* (Cambridge 2007) 72–90.}

The poor, on the other hand, also lost their grounds for ideological assimilation with the wealthy: since the empire was lost, an important unifying element between the two classes was lost as well. Moreover, the common conceptualization of poor and rich against slaves was also threatened: the enfranchisements of slaves may have contributed to this, but it must also be relevant that in texts of the fourth century the poor are mentioned on a par with slaves\footnote{S ee for example Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.48 (transl. J. Marincola in R. B. Strassler [ed.], *The Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenika* [London 2011]: “But I always do battle with extremists, Kritias, whether they are men who think that a good democracy must allow slaves and those so poor they would betray the state for a drachma to share in government (ἐκείνοις μὲν ἄει ποτὲ πολεμῶ τοῖς οὐ πρόσθεν οἰομένοις καλὴν ἂν δημοκρατίαν εἶναι, πρὶν ἄν καὶ οἱ δοῦλοι καὶ οἱ ὑπόντας δραχμῆς οὐ ὑποδόμου τὴν πόλιν ὑφόρης μετέχουν," with Tamiolaki, *Liberté et esclavage* 268–270. Cf. [Xen.] *Ath.Pol.* 1.10–12 for an assimilation of metics and slaves; it is also interesting that the Old Oligarch presents slaves as having appropriated the democratic principles of freedom of speech, freedom in everyday life, etc.)} (presumably because of their—allegedly common—miserable condition).

\footnote{Cf. also my treatment in Tamiolaki, *Liberté et esclavage* 82–98, 137–154, 190–201, 264–287, which takes into consideration the historians’ narratological priorities as well.}
2. *A citizen as a slave of the state: ideological implications*

It is against this background that I will analyze the passages of Xenophon mentioned above. Although Xenophon was not a supporter of democracy and although he lived many years in exile, his works are an important source for the function and problems of the Athenian democracy in the classical period.\(^{36}\) Concerning the topic of this study, more specifically, Xenophon’s passages certainly reflect the reform of the *eisphora* which is dated around 378.\(^{37}\) This reform aimed at reducing the difficulties in collecting the *eisphora* by the establishment of standing *symmoriai* and the introduction of tax collectors (the *proeispherontes*). Not least, for this reason, I will argue tentatively, in this part of my paper, that the equation between a citizen and a slave of the city and the consequences resulting from it (choice of apolitical life, of living away from Athens, etc.), might not constitute simply an idiosyncratic invention of Xenophon for the sake of his Socratic dialogues, but had serious ideological implications and could reflect more widespread views about democracy. My analysis will be largely based on the approach, mainly advanced by Josiah Ober, according to which Athenian writers “appropriate preexisting vocabulary for discussing problems, but they often deploy this vocabulary in self-consciously innovative ways.”\(^{38}\)

Let us examine first the implications of the equation between a citizen and a slave of the state. One of the most prominent ideals of democracy was individual freedom. According to a famous passage in Aristotle (*Pol.*, 1417a40–b17), this freedom included living as one likes (τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις), as opposed to the life of the slave which was determined by

\(^{36}\) An example of this is the condemnation of the generals after the battle of Arginusae. See recently B. J. Dobski, “Athenian Democracy Refounded: Xenophon’s Political History in the *Hellenica*,” *Polis* 26 (2009) 316–338 (with further references).


\(^{38}\) Ober, in *The Athenian Revolution* 146.
the master. Individual freedom was not totally separable from collective freedom (of the polis or of the democracy), and this is why our sources tend to underline it usually in conjunction with collective freedom (and/or democracy). Herodotus, in a famous passage about the overthrow of tyranny in Athens, establishes a connection between the fall of tyranny, democracy, and individual freedom. Pericles, too, in the Funeral Oration, praises the freedom of the Athenians in their everyday life under the democracy (Thuc. 2.37.1). Individual freedom, no matter its limits and ambiguities, was an essential ideal of democracy. Freedom concerned all citizens (regardless of their political preferences or status). As a response to this, and in order to further differentiate themselves from the mass, aristocrats coined a new term in the late fifth century, eleutherios, which referred to the (superior) freedom of the aristocrat and


40 See especially Raaflaub, The Discovery of Freedom 1–5, 44–53.

41 Hdt. 5.78: Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν νυν ἥξηντο. δὴλοι δὲ οὐ κατ᾽ ἐν μοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταξῆ ἢ ἱσηγορὶ ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφιξισι περιουκέντων ἦσαν τά πολέμια ἁμείνονες, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. δὴλοι ὁν ταύτα ὧτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἑθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευ-θερωθέντων δὲ εὐτός ἐκαστὸς ἑωτοῦ προεθυμεύετο κατεργάζεσθαι.


43 See again Hansen, in Démocratie athénienne 339, who strongly defends this view: “I find it incomprehensible that scholars can deny that the Athenian democrats cherished individual freedom ‘as an ideal’. Whether they lived up to their ideal is a different question.”
was linked with his leisure (schole).\textsuperscript{44}

Given this framework, it would be tempting to interpret the equation between a (wealthy) citizen and a slave of the state as a means of an even more radical challenge of the traditional equation between (democratic) freedom and citizenship: since aristocrats were contemptuous of democratic freedom, then why would they fear being compared (metaphorically) with slaves? After all, this did not really challenge the superior kind of freedom they represented.\textsuperscript{45} But this equation could have another ideological function as well: it placed aristocrats in a comparable (though not similar) position with the poor, who could also be assimilated with slaves—albeit for different reasons: because of their miserable situation. In this way, wealthy aristocrats could express their grievances against democracy without provoking the indignation of the poor.

A second element that is worth analyzing in Xenophon’s passages is the implication about an infringement upon individual freedom. Xenophon’s characters convey the impression that they do not live as they wish under the democracy (thus the expressions ἐλευθέρῳ τε ἔξεστί μοι and οἳ ἀν αὐτῷ ἀρέσκωσι, ἀνάγκην οὖσαν). These statements deserve special attention, because the principle of “living as one wishes” is considered, as we noted above, one of the basic traits of democratic freedom.\textsuperscript{46} However, this principle is highly controversial, since its arbitrary application can lead to excesses

\textsuperscript{44} A nice example of this is illustrated by Xenophon’s Ischomachus, the wealthy aristocrat whom Socrates meets at the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (Xen. Oec. 7.1). For the concept of eleutherios see K. A. Raafflaub, “Democracy, Oligarchy and the Concept of the ‘Free Citizen’ in Late Fifth-Century Athens,” Political Theory 11 (1983) 517–544.

\textsuperscript{45} The radical aspect of this equation becomes more apparent if one considers Pericles’ exhortations to the Athenians about their obligation to sacrifice themselves for the democratic city (Thuc. 2.61.2, 2.63.1 ff.).

\textsuperscript{46} In the terms of I. Berlin (“Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty. Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty [Oxford 2002] 178) this is the type of positive freedom: “The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.”
(lawlessness, anarchy); it is thus commented upon negatively by the main theoretical opponents of democracy, Plato and Aristotle, who see in democracy an inherent tendency to license. It is interesting in this perspective that in Xenophon’s passages we have an oligarchic (re-)appropriation and redefinition of this principle: aristocrats employ this principle, but redirect its meaning towards new connotations. “Living as one wishes” is now viewed as a positive, though unattainable, desideratum for the wealthy aristocrats. Is this an ideological distortion of the oligarchic criticism of democracy? Or is it, perhaps more probably, another means of bridging the ideological gap between the rich and the poor and more broadly between aristocrats and democrats?

Charmides’ assertion that his poverty allows him to live like a tyrant, whereas before he was a slave, is also linked with the principle of “living as one wishes.” Leaving aside the strong ironical connotations of this statement, the implication here concerns the absolute freedom that tyranny represents and the complete absence of restrictions. Tyranny was an ambivalent term in the classical period: it could have neutral or even positive overtones, but it was clearly loaded with negative connotations in the course of the fifth century, since it was conceived as a constant political threat to the democrats:


48 Note also Charmides’ statement “I lie full length and sleep sweetly,” which can be interpreted as an ironic comment on the pleasure under the democracy advocated by the Athenian democratic discourse (cf. Thuc. 2.38). It should be noted, however, that, this aristocratic re-appropriation of the “living as one wishes” principle is also far from uncontroversial.

49 Charmides was in fact one of the Thirty tyrants. See See Huss, Xenophons Symposion 263–264.


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be characterized as a tyrant was thus equivalent to being anti-democrat. In this perspective, the tyrant’s absolute ‘freedom’ was not considered something positive, but rather the ultimate evil. If we take then into account the ideological history of the term, it is obvious that Charmides again makes an innovative claim here: he employs a term which is viewed negatively by the democrats and invests it with a new positive meaning.

Finally, we can examine the alternatives presented by Xenophon’s characters: Charmides is vague about this, but he implies a life outside of Athens, while Aristippus overtly praises apolitical life. Here we can observe again an aristocratic appropriation of another concept frequently employed by the democrats, that of apragmosyne. According to the democratic ideology, the ideal Athenian citizen was meant to participate actively in the affairs of the state: in the Funeral Oration Pericles characterizes the apragmon as useless. But this is not the whole story: the apragmones in classical Athens were also often the enemies of democracy and empire. This is illustrated by Pericles’ statement in his third speech (Thuc. 2.63.3):

The men of whom I was speaking, if they could find followers, would soon ruin a city, and if they were to go and found a state of their own, would equally ruin that. For inaction is secure only when arrayed by the side of activity (τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγµον οὐ σώζε-
ται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένου; nor is it expedient or safe for a sovereign, but only for a subject state, to be a servant.

So, to return to Xenophon, this statement reflects a change that democracy underwent during the fourth century: the reduced participation of wealthy citizens in politics. The Xenophontic passages here examined reveal that this change was also ideologically invested. By appealing to apragmosyne in a context of criticism of democracy, aristocrats again give this concept a new meaning: they use a concept that democrats had used against them, in order to promote a positive (in their opinion) alternative.55

3. The case of Xenophon

In the preceding analysis I studied Xenophon’s passages in the broader context of the relationship between rich and poor citizens in the Athenian democracy and presented some of their ideological implications. I will now turn to Xenophon. There is much scholarly controversy about how Xenophon viewed Athenian democracy. He certainly admired Sparta and its constitution, but the extent to which he was inimical to democracy is difficult to define.56 The passages examined in this study allow for two observations.

First, the view expressed by Aristippus, according to which people who exercise leadership in the city resemble domestic slaves, because they do not enjoy good things, is radical even in the context of Xenophon’s thought. A constant thread of his

54 See Taylor, in Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution 83–84.

55 Most probably, this is not a real alternative and results from disillusionment (mainly with democracy: after all, the Sicilian disaster was also viewed as a failure of the Athenian polypragmosyne).

56 See for instance Seager, CQ 51 (2001) 385–397, and V. Gray, “Le Socrate de Xénophon et la démocratie,” Eph 2 (2004) 141–176. Cf. also R. Kroeker, “Xenophon as a Critic of the Athenian Democracy,” History of Political Thought 30 (2009) 197–228, a nuanced presentation of Xenophon’s political views which shows that he was not entirely hostile towards democracy and Athens in general. But the evidence is not enough to support the conclusion that Xenophon was openly favorable towards democracy.
thought is that the ideal leader (be it a ruler or a general or a master of the household like Ischomachus) takes care of his subordinates and secures their prosperity.\textsuperscript{57} Although these relationships are hierarchical and asymmetrical and thus not devoid of ambiguity,\textsuperscript{58} the ultimate goal of the leader should be the resolution of tensions and the well-being of the governing and governed alike. The fact that Xenophon does not apply his theory to democracy is, in my opinion, telling: it suggests that indeed all kinds of archontes can take care of their archomenoi, except the democratic leaders. Xenophon’s marked terminology thus indicates that his ideal cannot fit with democracy.

My second and final point concerns genre: it is interesting, as noted earlier, that most of these judgments about the system of financial administration under democracy appear in a Socratic context: either Socrates himself praises (his) poverty, or his pupils, following their master, have recourse to the same argument, which they further develop.\textsuperscript{59} What could this choice of genre suggest? These views are expressed in the course of a Socratic dialogue, often in a humorous and satirical context, which allows for exaggeration. Consequently, it might seem more appropriate for Xenophon, who was also an aristocrat, to present them in such a (less ‘risky’\textsuperscript{60}) context. I think, however, that this presentation had also a deeper function related to Xenophon’s proclaimed aim in his Socratic works, the defense

\textsuperscript{57} See now on this topic V. Gray, \textit{Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes. Reading the Reflections} (Oxford 2011).

\textsuperscript{58} See in detail M. Tamiolaki, \textit{Liberté et esclavage} 289–369, where I analyze the ambiguities related to the concept of voluntary submission in Xenophon.

\textsuperscript{59} The case of Aristippus is somewhat exceptional, but again Aristippus responds to an issue which was first raised by Socrates.

\textsuperscript{60} Here I may give the impression of slipping towards Straussian thinking (see especially for the Socratic works, L. Strauss, \textit{Xenophon’s Socrates} [Ithaca 1972]), but this should not be pressed too far. I think, like many scholars who currently study Xenophon, that Xenophon is subtle, subtler than we assumed him to be in the past, but I do not endorse Straussian views about Xenophon’s possible ‘hidden messages’.
of Socrates. Socrates was condemned by the democracy and
democracy was, as stated in the Memorabilia, the rule of the
poor. By commenting on Socrates’ poverty in a context of
complaint by the wealthy Athenians about the consequences of
wealth, Xenophon presented his master in closer intellectual
proximity to the wealthy aristocrats than with the mob of
Athens, who condemned him to death.

Now, whether Xenophon’s presentation is idiosyncratic or
instead depicts accurately the perceptions of the oligarchs of his
time is an acute question which we will probably never be able
to answer with certainty. However, the accumulation of politi-
cal terminology in Xenophon’s philosophical works allows us to
assume that these works, despite their peculiarity and pro-
claimed Socrates-centered purpose, reflected, though filtered,
significant political realities: the tensions that were inherent in
the democracy and the intellectual and ideological responses
that this constitution prompted in its opponents (Xenophon
himself included).61

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