Spartans and *Perioikoi*: The Organization and Ideology of the Lakedaimonian Army in the Fourth Century B.C.E.

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In his account of the great battle that took place at Leuktra in 371, Xenophon throws into stark relief one of Sparta’s most persistent problems—the impact on her army of the steady decline over the fifth and early fourth centuries in the number of the *homoioi*, those Spartan citizens who possessed full political rights (a problem known already to the ancients as *oliganthropia*).¹ According to Xenophon, while the Spartans had deployed four of the six major divisions (*morai*) of the Lakedaimonian army at Leuktra—a force amounting to something on the order of 2500 men—only 700 of these were *homoioi* (*Hell.* 6.4.15, 6.4.17).² Yet Xenophon’s evidence leaves a critical question unanswered: who were the other men who were brigaded alongside the *homoioi* in the *morai*?

Historians have recognized two possible answers to this question. First, these soldiers may have been recruited chiefly from among the so-called *hypomeiones*—Spartans who were denied full political rights, most frequently because they were incapable of making the monthly contributions of produce to the common

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² Two comments are necessary. First, the troop complement of an individual *hora* is a matter of some debate, and I revisit it below. Second, Xenophon uses the word *Spartiatai* rather than *homoioi* in his discussion of the battle of Leuktra. This raises a question of terminology, discussed below.

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messes on which full citizen status depended. Second, the morai may have been manned increasingly by perioikoi. These were the free inhabitants of the numerous towns in Lakonia and Messenia which, along with Sparta, constituted the state known as Lakedaimon. Although they enjoyed a degree of local autonomy—their communities continued to be conceptualized on some level as poleis or city-states in their own right—the perioikoi nevertheless remained politically dependent on the Spartans themselves and were unable to hold office in Sparta or to participate in the Spartan assembly. On this view, the Spartans

3 The term hypomeiones is attested only once, by Xenophon (Hell. 3.3.6). While we cannot be absolutely certain that the term refers to Spartans excluded from full citizenship, this is its most likely meaning. Inability to pay mess contributions was certainly one way in which Spartans could acquire this status (Arist. Pol. 1271a26–57); cowardice in battle and failure to pass through the Spartan paideia were possibly others (see Paul Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia [London/New York 2002] 268–270). For the view that they were increasingly recruited to serve in the morai, see J. F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (Warminster 1985) 13–20, 45–46.

reorganized the Lakedaimonian army as their own citizen manpower became constricted in order to exploit perioikic manpower more aggressively: whereas Spartans and perioikoi had fought in separate contingents in the early fifth century, later in the century the Spartans began to incorporate perioikoi into the same units in which the remaining homoioi themselves were brigaded.\(^5\)

While most historians subscribe to the second of these two views, the evidence they typically adduce to support it is more problematic than is sometimes recognized. No ancient source states directly that Spartan and perioikic soldiers were brigaded together in the same units during the late fifth and early fourth centuries,\(^6\) and efforts to demonstrate otherwise must contend monian community possessed a coherent common identity, but also that the perioikic communities enjoyed no foreign policy of their own.


\(^6\) Cf. Lazenby, *Spartan Army* 13–16. Harpocration (s.v. µópoa) preserves a fragment from Aristotle’s pamphlet on the Lakedaimonian constitution (fr. 540 Rose) in which Aristotle states that “there are six so-called morai, and all the Lakedaimonians are divided into the morai.” While this has been used to argue that Spartans and perioikoi alike were brigaded in the morai, the lack of context makes it difficult to determine the precise sense of “Lakedaimonians” in this particular passage (see the discussion on terminology below). Beyond that, Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.20 and 27 are the passages that come the closest to indicating explicitly that Spartans and perioikoi served in the same units, as they imply that Spartans and perioikoi were serving together in twelve units known as lochoi in the 360s. Yet given a strong possibility that the disaster at Leuktra forced the Spartans to reorganize their army in the early 360s (e.g. J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* [Berkeley 1970] 226–227), these passages cannot be taken to indicate that Spartans and perioikoi were brigaded together in earlier periods (pace Toynbee, *JHS* 33...
with terminology that is either ambiguous by nature or employed by ancient authors in senses that are too nebulous to support concrete conclusions. Thucydides’ well-known discussion of the Pylos campaign in 425 serves as a case in point. He concentrates on the fate of a Lakedaimonian garrison stationed by the Spartans on the island of Sphakteria, only to be defeated and captured by the Athenians. The garrison had originally consisted of 420 hoplite infantrymen, who had been selected by lot from all of the divisions (lochoi) of the Lakedaimonian army (4.8.9); of the 292 members who were taken alive, roughly 120 were Spartiates (4.38.5). For most historians, these details serve as evidence that the Spartans had by this point integrated perioikoi directly into their own units: those soldiers who were not Spartiates are assumed to have been perioikoi, and since Thucydides is thought to use lochoi here in a technical sense to refer to standing units of the Spartan army (which may or may not have been identical with the fourth-century morai), the implication of the passage is taken to be that Spartans and perioikoi were by this point brigaded together.7

Yet this conclusion is seriously compromised by Thucydides’ use of two problematic terms, both of which can have both technical and general meanings: Spartiates and lochoi. Ancient authors were capable of using the city-ethnic Spartiates (like any other city-ethnic) either in a narrow or in a broad sense.8

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7 Most of the scholars cited above on the organization of the army believe not only that the Lakedaimonian army had been organized into six morai sometime before the Pylos campaign, but also (with the exception of Lazenby) that perioikoi and homoioi were serving in the same units by this time. For a wholly different view, see Henk Singor, “The Spartan Army at Mantinea and its Organisation in the Fifth Century BC,” in W. Jongman and M. Kleijwegt (eds.), After the Past: Essays in Ancient History in Honour of H. W. Pleket (Leiden 2002) 235–284. For good overviews of the main interpretative problems (including the ambiguity of the term lochos), see Anderson, Military Theory 225–241, and van Wees, Greek Warfare 243–249.

8 That is, city-ethnics can be used to refer either to all of the politai of a given city-state, or more narrowly to members of what Aristotle calls the

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Authors frequently used it in a narrow sense to refer to those Spartans who enjoyed full political rights. This is clearly the sense in which Aristotle employs it in his famous account of the collapse of Spartan manpower. In his effort to explain why it was that the *Spartiatai* had decreased from 10,000 in the fifth century to less than 1000 in the fourth (even though their territory could ostensibly support up to 30,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry), Aristotle clearly places the blame on factors that fragmented landed estates and made it difficult for men to maintain the wealth necessary to preserve their status as full Spartan citizens: in particular, he blames widespread property ownership by women and policies that encouraged Spartans to have large families.\(^9\) Likewise, Xenophon employs the term in this technical sense in his discussion of Spartan casualties at Leuktra. But authors could also use *Spartiatai* in a broader sense to refer to all those who were members of the Spartan *polis* by birth, regardless of whether or not they could claim full political rights: Xenophon applies it in this sense to the mercenary Drakontios, who—since he had been exiled from Sparta as a boy and had therefore never graduated from Sparta’s *paideia*—was presumably not considered one of the *homoioi* (*An.* 4.8.25). Because we cannot be sure in which way Thucydides meant to employ the term in his discussion of the Pylos campaign, it is not necessarily safe to assume that those members of the garrison who were not *homoioi* must have been *perioikoi* rather than *hypomeiones*. Moreover, even if we can re-

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solve this difficulty, Thucydides’ use of the term *lochoi* is equally problematic. Quite apart from the question of whether or not the Lakedaimonian army was organized into the six *morai* of Xenophon’s day as early as 425, it is clear that Thucydides was fully capable of using the term *lochos* in a generic rather than technical sense, for elsewhere he describes an irregular unit consisting of freed helots as one of seven Lakedaimonian *lochoi* stationed on the left of the line at the battle of Mantinea (5.67, 5.68). There is thus no guarantee that he meant to use the term to refer to standing units of the army in his Pylos narrative, and the passage in question is not capable of supporting the view that Spartans and *perioikoi* were serving together in integrated units at this time.

Comparable problems make it equally difficult to mount a straightforward defense of the alternative view, that the Spartans recruited *hypomeiones* into the *morai* as the *homoioi* declined in number. There is no doubt that some *hypomeiones* served in the army. Xenophon offers the best-known evidence in his discussion of Kinadon, who fought in the army (and who perhaps belonged to the elite corps of soldiers known as the *hippeis*) even though he was manifestly not one of the *homoioi* but instead was almost certainly one of the *hypomeiones.* To this we can add anecdotes preserved by later authors about two failed coups at Sparta at the height of the Boiotian and Arkadian invasion of the southern Peloponnese in 370/369. According to Plutarch (Ages. 32.3–6), some 200 soldiers who were most likely *hypomeiones* appear to have played a pivotal role in one of these. Not only does Plutarch depict the conspirators as men accustomed to bearing arms and taking orders from Agesilaos, he also stresses that they were men of an inferior status—*ponéroi*, ‘base’, which has political as well as moral connotations. Additionally, because he contrasts these men not only with the *homoioi* who instigated the other conspiracy but also with *peri-

10 See below for a more detailed discussion of Kinadon, whom Xenophon expressly identifies as “not one of the *homoioi*” (*Hell.* 3.3.5).
oikoi and helots who deserted in large numbers after being conscripted for the defense of the city, it is difficult to find any group other than the hypomeiones to which we can assign them. These passages, however, represent the limit of our direct evidence for the participation of hypomeiones in the army, and they offer no explicit answers to important questions concerning either the numbers of such men who served Sparta in war or the degree to which they were integrated into the morai.

Given the limitations of our evidence, any effort to discuss the composition of the morai must ultimately depend on indirect argumentation. For that reason, it is important that we not only construct an explicit hypothesis about Spartan efforts to meet the manpower needs of the morai, but also frame specific deductions with which we can test that hypothesis, whether by falsifying them or by supporting them on the basis of the extant data. To date, J.F. Lazenby has made the most concerted effort to do precisely this, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly: beginning with the observation that the Spartans would have severely weakened the operational capabilities of their army by incorporating perioikoi into the same units as better-trained Spartans, Lazenby holds that they had a powerful incentive to staff the morai with hypomeiones, who in his view had better access to formal drill than did the perioikoi; he is then able to suggest that the tactical skill consistently displayed on the field by the Spartan army in the fifth and early fourth centuries validates the initial hypothesis. But while his methodological

11 For discussion of the primary sources, and for the view that these men should be identified as hypomeiones, see Efraim David, “Revolutionary Agitation in Sparta after Leuktra,” Athenaeum 58 (1980) 303–307, and D. R. Shipley, A Commentary on Plutarch’s Life of Agesilaus (Oxford 1997) 345–348. For a contrary view, see Michael A. Flower, “Revolutionary Agitation and Social Change in Classical Sparta,” in Flower and M. Toher, Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell (London 1991) 86; Flower argues that Plutarch’s failure to describe the social status of the conspirators in explicit terms indicates that his source(s) simply had no accurate information about their identity.

12 See Lazenby’s comments at e.g. Spartan Army 16–17 and 143.
instincts here are commendable, the results are not as satisfying as they could be. In the first place, the sketchy nature of the evidence for most ancient battles makes it difficult for Lazenby to demonstrate conclusively that the operational abilities of the Lakedaimonian army underwent no major deterioration during the period. More importantly, by treating the problem on a purely operational level, Lazenby’s model gives insufficient attention to the political ramifications of Spartan military organization—a potentially interesting and important issue in its own right given the close connection in classical Greek thought between military service and political privileges.

In what follows, I therefore aim both to defend and to build on Lazenby’s basic hypothesis. I argue that as the homoioi declined in number, Sparta recruited most of the soldiers who served in the morai from among the hypomeiones; while we cannot exclude the possibility that some perioikoi served in the morai, most continued to fight in contingents of their own. Furthermore, I suggest that the Spartans relied on hypomeiones chiefly because they remained committed to a specific ideological argument with which they legitimated not only their own political privileges within the Lakedaimonian state but also the continued political marginalization of the perioikoi; that ideological argument stressed that the Spartans were superior to other soldiers (including the perioikoi) when they fought together in an exclusively Spartan phalanx. I build this argument in two stages. First, I construct the contours of the basic hypothesis by exploiting Xenophon’s comments on the Lakedaimonian army of the fourth century and by showing how they echo important programmatic statements in Herodotus’ earlier work. Next, I formulate and test two specific deductions that flow from this hypothesis. One holds that hypomeiones must have participated in Sparta’s system of public education—the Spartan paideia—if they were to be integrated into the army in a manner consistent with Spartan ideology. The other holds that the Spartans’ commitment to preserving the distinction between Spartan and perioikic units helped to ensure the ongoing accommodation of the perioikoi to their position of political dependence on Sparta.
The organization of the fourth-century morai and Spartan military ideology: a hypothesis

While his comments are often far less direct and explicit than we would like, Xenophon remains our best informant on the organization of the Lakedaimonian army in the fourth century. In what follows, I argue that he offers solid grounds on which we can build a hypothesis about the structure of that army. Specifically, he allows us to hypothesize that the Spartans preferentially recruited hypomeiones into the morai as the homoioi declined in number, while most perioikoi continued to fight in contingents of their own. When read in conjunction with Herodotus, Xenophon also suggests that the Spartans did so in part because they remained committed to specific ideological claims with which they justified their political privileges within the Lakedaimonian state; those claims emphasized that the Spartan nomos, or way of life, made the Spartans superior to other soldiers in one specific context—namely, when they fought together as members of an exclusively Spartan phalanx.

Xenophon’s account of the battle at the Nemea River in 394 offers the first hint that perioikoi continued to fight in contingents of their own during the fourth century. Describing the composition of the allied army assembled by the Spartans, he notes that the Lakedaimonian contingent consisted of some 6000 hoplites (Hell. 4.2.16). As historians have recognized, however, there is a notable tension between this figure and the information Xenophon provides elsewhere on the strength of individual Lakedaimonian morai. The mora defeated at Lechaeum in 391 consisted of about 600 hoplites (4.5.12). And two other passages imply that this was probably the typical combat strength of a mora in the field: there were 16 officers known as enomotarchoi in each mora, and hence probably 16 of the units known as enomotiai (Lac. 11.4); and each enomotia consisted notionally of about 40 men at full muster (Hell. 6.4.12 with 6.4.17). Since five of the six morai were present at the Nemea, Xenophon’s figures imply that roughly half of the Lakedaimonian contingent consisted of soldiers who served in the morai, while the other half consisted of soldiers who were bri-
gaded separately.\textsuperscript{13}

Most scholars have attempted to eliminate this tension by proposing that each \textit{mora} consisted not of 16 \textit{enomotiai} but rather 32, yielding a maximum paper-strength of 1280 infantrymen per \textit{mora}. Yet while this solution resolves the tension between Xenophon’s explicit claim that there were 6000 Lakedaimonian soldiers at the Nemea and his implicit claim that only 3000 of these were brigaded in the \textit{morai}, it remains highly unsatisfactory.\textsuperscript{14} In the first place, it forces us to posit that virtually all of our direct evidence for the strength of individual \textit{morai} is flawed, even though three of the four other ancient testimonia that bear on this problem are in broad agreement with Xenophon’s figures.\textsuperscript{15} More importantly, Xenophon himself offers a more parsimonious solution to the problem by demonstrating that the \textit{morai} were not the only constituent elements of the Lakedaimonian army, for it is quite clear that other Lakedaimonians—whether \textit{Skiritai} (residents of a district in northern Lakonia), \textit{neodamodeis} (helots who had been manumitted for military service), or even \textit{perioikoi}—served frequently.

\textsuperscript{13} One of the six \textit{morai} appears to have been operating as a garrison in Boiotian Orchomenos (\textit{Hell.} 4.3.15) and was therefore probably not at the battle.


\textsuperscript{15} Plutarch preserves the figures given by three other authors in his account of Pelopidas’ victory over two \textit{morai} at Tegyra in 376 or 375 (\textit{Pel.} 17.2); Ephorus’ figure of 500, Kallisthenes’ of 700, and Polybius’ of 900. To this we should add Diodorus’ claim (15.32.1, ultimately attributable to Ephorus) that each of the five \textit{morai} in the army with which Agesilaos invaded Boiotia in 378 consisted of 500 men. Plutarch’s figure is the only obvious outlier; Stylianou, \textit{Commentary} 289–290, suggests that it may reflect the size of a \textit{mora} in the late third or early second century.
in units that operated independently of the *morai*. For that reason, it is best to conclude that the Lakedaimonian contingent at the Nemea consisted of irregular units of this nature in addition to five of the six standing *morai*. Moreover, because roughly 3000 *neodamodeis* had been sent to Asia under Thibron and Agesilaos (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4, 3.4.2), it seems likely that most of the soldiers who fought in support of the *morai* at Nemea were in fact *perioikoi*.

Strictly speaking, this conclusion does not rule out the possibility that *perioikoi* served not just in irregular units that operated independently of the *morai*, but also in the *morai* themselves. We might imagine, for instance, that wealthier *perioikoi* served alongside the Spartans within the *morai*, while the majority continued to support the *morai* in units of their own. That said, in his treatise on the Spartan constitution (composed sometime between 394 and 371), 17 Xenophon does provide grounds for believing that the soldiers who served in the *morai* were predominantly Spartans and not *perioikoi*. The first clue stems from his description of the *morai* as “citizen *morai*” (*politikai* morai: *Lac.* 11.4). While Xenophon elsewhere uses the adjective “citizen” (*politikos*) in military contexts when he wishes to distinguish Lakedaimonian soldiers proper (Spartans, *perioikoi*, and *neodamodeis*) from allies and mercenaries serving alongside them in an army, in this text he deploys nouns and adjectives relating to citizenship only in reference to Sparta and to the Spartans themselves; 18 his phrase *politikai* morai is thus

16 For *perioikoi* fighting in separate contingents, see Ducat, *Kiema* 33 (2008) 36, and Lazenby, *Spartan Army* 16; the clearest instances in Xenophon are *Hell.* 1.3.15, 5.2.24, and 5.3.9. For contingents of *neodamodeis*, see *Hell.* 3.1.4, 3.4.2, and 5.2.24.


18 See Lipka, *Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution* 194, 261. Lipka notes (194)
best read here in a narrow sense as an effort to contrast the Spartans with other members of the Lakedaimonian army, and as an indication that the soldiers who served in the morai were citizens of Sparta proper.

Xenophon further strengthens the impression that the soldiers serving in the morai were predominantly Spartans by hinting at the persistence in the fourth century of a fifth-century ideology which could have remained meaningful only had the Spartans and perioikoi continued to fight in separate contingents. Herodotus preserves the outlines of this ideology in its fifth-century form in a series of conversations he constructs between Xerxes and the exiled Spartan king, Demaratos. In the first of these (7.104.4–5), Demaratos claims that “the Lakedaimonians, when they fight as individuals, are inferior to no one, but en masse they are the best of all men,” chiefly because of the power of their nomos, which “always demands from them the same thing: not to flee from battle even in the face of a multitude of men, but to remain in their formation and conquer or die.” Because the reference to nomos can mean nothing other than the so-called laws of Lykourgos, there is little doubt that Herodotus, though speaking of Lakedaimonians, has the Spartans themselves in mind. This is confirmed in a second conversation in which Herodotus has Demaratos explicitly contrast the military prowess of the Spartans with that of the perioikoi: when Xerxes demands to know if all the Lakedaimonians are as fearsome in war as those he has just defeated at Thermopylai, Demaratos replies (7.234.2), “O King, the number of all the Lakedaimonians is great, and their cities

that while Stobaeus reads the adjective as hoplitikê (of or pertaining to hoplites), both Harpocratesion and the main manuscript in the tradition read politikê. Lipka himself believes that each mora had a Spartan and a perioikic component, and that when Xenophon refers to a politike mora he is referring to a mora in which only the Spartan component had been mustered (261). The idea that each mora consisted of both a Spartan hoplite lochos and a perioikic hoplite lochos has a long pedigree, but there is no ancient evidence to support it: see Anderson, Military Theory 241.

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many; but what you wish to know, I will tell you. There is in Lakedaimon a city, Sparta, of about eight thousand men. All of these are the equals of those who fought here; the other Lakedaimonians [i.e. the perioikoi] are not the equals of these, but they are good men.” The fifth-century ideology expressed here therefore stresses that the Spartans were better soldiers than the perioikoi precisely because their nomos enhanced their ability to fight together in an exclusively Spartan phalanx.

Xenophon’s own references to this ideology are far less explicit than those of Herodotus, but his comments nevertheless suggest that the Spartans continued to deploy it during the fourth century. The most important of these comments is embedded in Xenophon’s discussion of the organization of the Lakedaimonian army (Lac. 11.5–7). After arguing that its basic organizing principle was simple enough that anyone could learn it—essentially each man was charged with following his designated file leader—he notes that “to fight equally well alongside anyone who happens to be at hand once they have been thrown into confusion—that, on the other hand, is not easy for people to learn, except for those raised under the laws of Lykourgos.” Like the ideology visible in the text of Herodotus, the ideology expressed here seems to argue that the Spartans were superior soldiers precisely because of the way in which their nomos (instilled by the system of paideia Xenophon describes in detail earlier in the work) enhanced their collective performance when they fought together in an exclusively Spartan phalanx. Along with Xenophon’s claim that the morai remained “citizen morai,” the claim articulated here therefore strongly implies that the Spartans were still fighting in units of their own in the fourth century and that perioikoi generally fought in support of the morai rather than as members of them.

Finally, the terms in which this ideology was articulated suggest that the Spartans formulated and maintained it in order to achieve a specific political goal—namely, to legitimate their own monopolization of political privileges within the Lakedaimonian state. While recent research has focused on the efforts of the Spartans to bind perioikic communities to themselves on
an ideological level through the cultivation of a common Lakedaimonian identity, the Spartans would have found it no less crucial to justify simultaneously the hierarchical relationships that bound perioikic communities to Sparta in a position of political dependence. Military service offered an obvious axis of differentiation on which to build such an argument, for military service and political privilege were linked so closely in the minds of some classical Greek writers that changes in the military importance of certain social groups could be thought to produce clear changes in a state’s internal political structure. Aristotle, for example, believed that the growing importance of hoplite infantry had produced a decisive shift away from aristocratic constitutions toward more representative political structures (e.g. Pol. 1297b). While scholars are justifiably skeptical that changes in military organization exerted such clear and direct influence on political development, Hans van Wees has nevertheless affirmed that individuals and groups did regularly invoke the nature and quality of the military service they performed for their community in their efforts to articulate their own status within the political hierarchy of any given polis: “almost any group with political ambitions could and would claim a decisive military role for itself.”

Demaratos’ claims in Herodotus about the distinctions between Spartans and perioikoi reflect precisely this sort of rhetoric: because the word I have translated as “equals” in 7.234.2, homoioi, was most probably intended by Herodotus as a direct evocation of the technical term for fully enfranchised Spartan citizens, Demaratos essentially establishes a direct link between the Spartans’ privileged political status in Lakedaimon and the unique advantages that their nomos conferred upon them in war.

While this ideology was entirely apropos in the early fifth-
century, when Spartans and *perioikoi* fought in separate contingents, it would not have fit so naturally into a context in which Spartans and *perioikoi* fought in fully integrated units. Its persistence into the fourth century is therefore striking, for the nature of hoplite warfare ensured that there were other ways in which the Spartans could have articulated their own status had *perioikoi* and Spartans fought in the same units. Within the phalanx, for instance, soldiers who fought in the front rank were naturally exposed to more danger than those in the ranks behind them; for that reason, those who did fight in the front (*promachoi*) could accumulate considerable prestige, with which they could justify claims to enhanced social or political status in their communities.\(^{21}\) At Sparta, things were no different. Not only were the soldiers who fought in the front rank of Lakedaimonian units officers charged with leading the files arrayed behind them (e.g. *Xen. Lac.* 11.5), in Xenophon’s view they were also *kratistoi*—not just “the strongest,” but “the best” (*Lac.* 11.8). One can therefore easily imagine a situation in which Spartans themselves monopolized the most prestigious positions in a phalanx that also included *perioikoi*, and justified their privileges in those terms. For that reason, Xenophon’s insistence on expressing Spartan exceptionality precisely in terms of their ability to fight alongside one another should prompt us to at least consider the alternative hypothesis: that the Spartans not only continued to fight in units which remained recognizably “Spartan,” but did so in part because they distinguished themselves from the *perioikoi*, both in war and in political life, by invoking their *nomos* and the advantages it conferred upon them on the battlefield.

*The hypomeiones and the Spartan paideia*

In addition to serving as the grounds for a specific hypothesis about the fourth-century Lakedaimonian army, Xenophon’s comments also allow us to formulate specific deductions with

which we can test that hypothesis. One of these concerns the degree to which the hypomeiones were integrated not only into the army, but also into the paideia, Sparta’s system of public education. As we have seen, Spartan ideology stressed that the Spartans were superior to others on the battlefield precisely because of the way in which their nomos enhanced their ability to fight together in an exclusively Spartan phalanx. The logic of this claim implies that if the morai did remain more-or-less exclusively Spartan, then the Spartans who served in them — homoioi and hypomeiones alike—ought to have been raised under the auspices of the paideia, the social institution responsible for instilling the values of Sparta’s nomos in her citizens. Evidence capable of either falsifying or confirming this deduction therefore has a direct bearing on the validity of the initial hypothesis. In what follows, I suggest that the material we possess tends to confirm rather than to refute the view that hypomeiones participated in the paideia in significant enough numbers to meet the manpower needs of the morai.

Two lines of argumentation could potentially falsify this deduction outright. In the first place, if we assume that most hypomeiones had acquired their status because they lacked the resources to make the monthly mess contributions necessary for full citizenship, then arguably they also would have lacked the financial means to enrol their sons in the paideia. Yet here it is necessary to note that the costs of enrolling a son in the public aspects of the paideia were considerably smaller than the costs entailed by mess contributions. Precisely how much smaller is unclear: Xenophon suggests that children enrolled in the paideia were expected to make contributions to common meals, but that these contributions were monitored to ensure that they remained insufficient to meet the children’s needs; the deficit was to be made up through theft.22 An adult Spartan’s monthly mess contributions, on the other hand, may have amounted to

22 Lac. 2.5–2.6. For further discussion, see J. Ducat, Spartan Education: Youth and Society in the Classical Period (Swansea 2006) 83–84.
almost twice what was required for his caloric needs.\textsuperscript{23} For these reasons, Ducat overestimates the costs of putting a child through the \textit{paideia}, which in his view “would have cost appreciably more than half of what a grown man’s own syssition cost him.”\textsuperscript{24} The actual direct costs therefore were presumably lower; on this view, the real limiting factor may have been the opportunity costs incurred by household heads who chose to enrol their sons in the \textit{paideia} instead of employing the labor of these children on their own farms. Since there were undoubtedly gradations in wealth among the \textit{hypomeiones}, however, we can conclude that a non-trivial number of them were certainly in a position to fund the participation of their sons in the \textit{paideia} even if they could not themselves make contributions to a syssition. Moreover, as we shall see below, there is also some evidence that at least one social institution at Sparta defrayed the costs of the \textit{paideia} for those who otherwise might not have been able to participate in it.

Next, there is the question of numbers. As we have seen, each infantry \textit{mora} notionally consisted of 640 infantrymen at its full strength, to which we should add perhaps 60 cavalrymen.\textsuperscript{25} On paper, the regular army therefore consisted of 4200 men, although its effective strength at any moment was un-

\textsuperscript{23} For discussions of the costs of adult mess contributions, see T. J. Figueira, “Mess Contributions and Subsistence at Sparta,” \textit{TAPA} 114 (1984) 87–109, and Hodkinson, \textit{Property and Wealth} 190–196. According to Hodkinson, the daily content of an individual’s mess contributions was roughly 6429 calories. We can only guess at nutritional requirements; see L. Foxhall and H. A. Forbes, “\textit{Σιτικὴ τρέπι}: The Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity,” \textit{Chiron} 12 (1982) 48–49, who estimate that daily caloric needs for a male aged 20–39 and weighing roughly 62 kg would range between 2852 for moderate levels of activity and 3822 for exceptional levels of activity.

\textsuperscript{24} Ducat, \textit{Spartan Education} 134.

\textsuperscript{25} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.2.16 states that there were 600 Lakedaimonian cavalrymen at the battle of the Nemea. If we assume that half of these were \textit{periokoi} who served in contingents of their own and that the other half belonged to the five \textit{morai}, we reach a figure of sixty cavalrymen per \textit{mora}.
doubtedly a few hundred below this number. Since *homoioi* who were of military age and fit for service likely numbered not much more than 1200 by the late 370s,26 the Spartans required somewhere on the order of 2400–3000 additional soldiers (i.e. 2 to 2.5 additional troops for each full Spartan citizen of military age) in order to round out the complement of the *morai*. According to the most recent estimates, however, *hypomeiones* did not outnumber the *homoioi* themselves by any significant margin in the fourth century, and were thus not sufficiently numerous to meet the manpower needs of the *morai*.27

These estimates are based not only on the view that *hypomeiones* were subject to the same demographic pressures that generated a precipitous decline in the number of *homoioi*, but also on the view that the Spartans took steps to remove *hypomeiones* from the citizen body by despatching them on colonial expeditions in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. That said, there are reasons to think that neither of these processes exerted as much demographic pressure on the *hypomeiones* as is sometimes thought, and that they may well have been numerous enough to meet most of the manpower needs of the *morai* (provided that they could be mobilized in large numbers).28

26 So Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth* 399.


28 M. H. Hansen suggests that most Greek *poleis* typically mobilized only 40% of their male citizens of military age as hoplite infantrymen: for every 1000 hoplites, an additional 1000 men served as light infantry, and 500 remained unmobilized, whether because of poor health or because of political duties at home: “How to Convert an Army Figure into a Population Figure,” *GRBS* 51 (2011) 241–246. As we shall see below, however, *hypomeiones* were often given financial support by *homoioi* so that they could participate in the *paideia* as *mothakes*; if they received ongoing support from their sponsors after graduating from the *paideia*, they conceivably could have been mobilized as hoplites in much greater numbers than otherwise would have been the case.

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Stephen Hodkinson, for instance, has suggested that hypomeiones no less than homoioi would have aggressively limited the number of legitimate children they produced, partly in order to ensure that their estates would not be fragmented through partible inheritance to the point where their children would have had no hope of regaining full citizen status. This suggestion is based in part on the view that hypomeiones were stigmatized seriously enough, both socially and politically, that they were strongly motivated to escape their condition (or at least to free their children from it). Françoise Ruzé, however, has suggested that hypomeiones were less stigmatized than is sometimes imagined: while they were prohibited from holding magistracies, for instance, they arguably could still participate in the Spartan assembly. On this view, the pressures on members of this particular demographic to restrict the number of their children were not necessarily as intense as they could have been, and it remains possible that they did not limit the size of their families as aggressively as did some of the homoioi.

Likewise, historians have also argued that the Spartan authorities may have selectively despatched hypomeiones on colonial ventures in the late fifth and early fourth centuries in a deliberate attempt to reduce their numbers: they cite the colonization of Herakleia Trachinia in 426 (Thuc. 3.92), the colonization of the Thracian Chersonese in 398 (Xen. Hell. 3.2.8 with 4.8.5), and the decision to allow Dionysios of Syracuse to recruit at least 1000 Lakedaimonians as mercenaries in 398 and 397 (Diod. 14.44.2, 14.58.1). Yet three problems limit the value of this evidence and suggest that these expeditions may not have drawn as extensively from the hypomeiones as

29 Hodkinson, in Sparta: Comparative Approaches 432–442.
is sometimes thought. First, the view that the Spartans selectively despatched *hypomeiones* on these expeditions in order to reduce their numbers assumes that the Spartans saw them as an internal threat as early as 426. Not only is there no evidence that this was the case, our sources (when they suggest motivations at all) stress that the main priority of the Spartans was to strengthen their imperial presence abroad (e.g. Thuc. 3.92.4, Diod. 14.44.2). Second, this view likewise assumes that the Spartans made no regular military use of *hypomeiones* and could therefore readily reallocate them to colonial ventures. Needless to say, this latter assumption conflicts directly with much of the material presented here and should be viewed with skepticism. Finally, our sources do not permit us to determine how many of the Lakedaimonians involved in any of these expeditions were *perioikoi* as opposed to *hypomeiones* or *homoioi* (though for what it is worth, the fact that the Spartans authorized Dionysios to employ as many Lakedaimonian mercenaries as he wished suggests that he may have recruited them primarily from the *perioikoi*). In fact, in the case of the colonial expeditions of 426 and 398 we cannot even determine how many Lakedaimonians were sent (and it is possible that none at all were sent to the Chersonese).\(^{32}\)

Our evidence therefore cannot easily falsify the deduction that *hypomeiones* participated in the *paideia* in numbers that were large enough to meet the manpower demands of the *morai*. More importantly, some aspects of our evidence lend that hypothesis some support. The rhetorical force of Xenophon’s account of Kinadon (*Hell. 3.3.4–11*), for instance, is arguably premised on the view that there was a large population of *hypomeiones* in Sparta who, like Kinadon, had been integrated into the regular army after graduating from the *paideia*. What we know of Kinadon’s own service in the army strongly implies

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\(^{32}\) On the expedition to the Chersonese, see Peter Krentz, *Xenophon, Hellenika II.3.11–IV.2.8* (Warminster 1995) 168. Diodorus gives 4000 as the number of Peloponnesian colonists sent to Herakleia Trachinia (12.59), but we cannot know how many of these were Lakedaimonians.

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that he was a product of the paideia even though he was not one of the homoioi. As several scholars have noted, Xenophon’s account indicates that there was nothing unusual about Kinadon commanding members of the elite company of the hippeis, and Duane Gish has even suggested that he may have belonged to the hippeis himself; in either case, Xenophon implies that he enjoyed a degree of status and prestige in the army that is easier to comprehend had he participated in the paideia as a child. More importantly, Gish has recently argued that Xenophon elaborated on Kinadon’s case precisely because he felt that it complemented a larger argument about Spartan imperialism abroad. In Gish’s view, Xenophon’s text is meant to stress that just as the Spartans imposed a tyrannical regime on their imperial subjects, so too did they exploit some of their own citizens at home; Xenophon develops the argument by stressing that Kinadon was barred from achieving a station in Sparta commensurate with his talents even though he was essentially indistinguishable from the homoioi in terms of ability and merit. As Gish himself implies, this critique would have been most effective if Kinadon was not unique, but in fact represented a much larger constituency of Spartans who were excluded from the ranks of the homoioi even though they possessed the requisite training and virtue—if not the material wealth—to claim a place among them.

Xenophon’s account of the reactions of the Spartan authorities to the conspiracy lends further support to the view that Kinadon was not unique among the hypomeiones. Although Kinadon boasted (Hell. 3.3.6) that his movement would appeal to all those Lakedaimonians who were not homoioi (and, of course, to the helots), what the ephors appear to have feared most was


34 Gish, Polis 26 (2009), esp. 357–359.
the possibility that the conspiracy had spread extensively among the Spartans. Their initial responses seem to have been predicated on the assumption that most of Kinadon’s co-conspirators were based in the city itself: they chose not to arrest Kinadon within Sparta, partly because they did not know how much support he possessed there already, and partly so that his supporters would not immediately flee upon learning of his capture (3.3.10). Additionally, the specific provisions made by the ephors for Kinadon’s arrest signal their concern about the amount of support that Kinadon had already managed to attract within the army: Xenophon stresses that they took great pains to limit the number of Spartans who were aware of their plans, to the extent of hand-picking the six or seven members of the hippeis who were to perform the arrest (3.3.9). And because neither periokoi nor neodamoteis who served in the Lakedaimonian army seem to have resided in Sparta itself, the ephors were probably worried most by the possibility that other hypomeiones shared Kinadon’s specific grievances, and hence his background as a product of the paideia.35

Agesilaos arguably had comparable concerns in mind when he suppressed the conspiracies that broke out during the invasion of Lakedaimon in 370/369. As we have seen, one of the conspiracies involved roughly 200 hypomeiones who were serving

35 Opinions on the extent and severity of disaffection in 399 vary. While some scholars take Kinadon’s conspiracy as an index of dangerous and deeply-rooted tensions (e.g. Efraim David, “The Conspiracy of Cinadon,” Athenaeum 57 [1979]; Cartledge, Agesilaos 178–179, 355, 384), Lazenby (Athenaeum 85 [1997] 444) believes that such tensions were not really in danger of boiling over and that the events of 399 were driven largely by the personality of Kinadon himself. If we follow Françoise Ruzé’s argument (Mélanges 305–310) about the partial integration of hypomeiones into the political institutions of Sparta, then those most likely to be disaffected were those who (like Kinadon) had excelled sufficiently in their military careers to feel that they deserved political honors commensurate with their achievements and to resent their exclusion from the ability to compete for them. That was not necessarily obvious to the ephors in 399, however, and they can be forgiven for believing that the conspiracy was more widespread than it was.
at that time with the army. While our sources offer no direct
evidence on how many hypomeiones in all were under arms, nor
on the precise way in which they were organized, Plutarch’s ac-
count does imply that they were not only numerous but also
highly integrated into the city’s military institutions: although
Agesilaos was urged by others to attack the conspirators when
they seized the Issorium, he opted instead for a subterfuge, be-
cause he feared that a direct assault upon them might spark a
full-scale revolution (neoterismos, Plut. Ages. 32.4). As in the case
of Kinadon’s conspiracy, the chief fear seems to have been that
the overt disaffection of some hypomeiones was merely a symp-
tom of unrest among a much larger body of such men who
were dangerous precisely because they perceived themselves as
equivalent to the homoioi on some level—in upbringing, at least,
if not in material wealth—and so entitled to full political rights.

It is the third-century historian Phylarchos, however, who
offers the most explicit grounds for believing not only that
hypomeiones participated in the paideia as children in spite of its
potential costs, but also that they did so in large numbers.
Noting the existence of men known in Sparta as mothakes, he
offers this definition of their status:

The mothakes are foster-brothers of the Lakedaimonians. Each of
the citizen children, so far as his private means allow, selects
foster-brothers for himself: some select one, some two, others
more. The mothakes are free, though not Lakedaimonian, but
they share in the whole paideia. They say that one of these was
Lysander—the man who, after defeating the Athenians at sea,
became a citizen because of his manly courage.

Two elements of his definition seem relatively clear. In the first
place, the institution he is describing is almost certainly an
institution of the classical period rather than one more con-
temporary with his own day: not only does his effort to describe
it suggest that it is alien to his own audience, his terminology is
also more appropriate to a classical context than to the third

36 FGrHist 81 F 43 = Athen. 271E–F; cf. Aelian VH 12.43.
century (e.g., he calls the Spartan system of education the *paideia* rather than the *agoge*, the more common term in the third century). Second, “citizen children” (by which Phylarchos must surely mean the *homoioi* in spite of his use elsewhere of the more general term Lakedaimonians) were encouraged to use the financial resources at their disposal to subsidize the participation of others in the *paideia*.

The main questions raised by the passage therefore concern the social origins of the *mothakes* themselves and their prevalence in Spartan society during the fourth century. Phylarchos’ own insistence that the *mothakes* were free has prompted many to argue that their parentage must have been subject to challenge of some sort and that they were therefore probably sons of Spartans by helot concubines. Stephen Hodkinson, however, has argued persuasively that they were more likely recruited from among the *hypomeiones*. In his view, the decisive consideration is the claim by our sources that *mothakes* could in some cases become (full?) citizens: the Spartans were protective enough of their citizenship that the *homoioi* would have been unlikely to admit among their number men who were not already Spartan in some sense. If so, then Phylarchos’ comments also strongly suggest that *hypomeiones* participated in the

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39 Hodkinson, in *Schiavi e dipendenti* 58–62. Cf. Ducat, *Spartan Education* 152–153, who suggests that the *mothakes* also included children of *homoioi* who could not pay for their education. It is important to note that Phylarchos and Aelian disagree about the likelihood of social promotion for these men: while the former stresses that Lysander became a citizen because of personal merit, the latter suggests that *mothakes* earned citizenship simply by virtue of passing through the *paideia*. Scholars have proposed various solutions to this contradiction (e.g. Hodkinson 60–62; Ducat 152–153). Because Aelian is a later author whose information is difficult to source, we should perhaps prefer Phylarchos’ account.
paideia in large enough numbers to potentially meet the manpower needs of the regular army. Phylarchos believed that each child of citizen status typically sponsored at least one mothax, and if we add to these those children whose families were able to fund their participation in the paideia even if they could not meet their own mess contributions, then it is not at all implausible to suggest that hypomeiones were being recruited into the morai in the fourth century at a ratio approaching two or 2.5 for every full Spartan citizen.

The perioikoi: disaffection and accommodation

Xenophon’s comments give rise to a second important deduction which can be used to test the hypothesis that the Spartans relied predominantly on hypomeiones rather than on perioikoi to meet the manpower demands of the morai as the homoioi declined in number. As we have seen, Spartan ideology in the fourth century, as in the fifth, presupposed that Spartans and perioikoi fought in separate contingents, for it preserved the claim that the nomos of the Spartans enhanced their battlefield performance when they fought together in an exclusively Spartan phalanx. More importantly, the Spartans used this argument to legitimate not only their own political privileges within the Lakedaimonian polity, but also the ongoing exclusion of the perioikoi from those same privileges. We can therefore deduce that had the Spartans kept their military practices aligned with their ideology—namely, by ensuring that they continued to field contingents that were recognizably “Spartan”—then they should have enjoyed good prospects for securing the on-

40 Cf. Detlef Lotze, “Mothakes,” Historia 11 (1962) 429–432, but note that Lotze believes that the mothakes were drawn from a wider range of social groups, including illegitimate sons of Spartans by helot women. Ogden, Greek Bastardy 221, is inclined to believe that the sponsorship of mothakes was less frequent than Phylarchos implies since in Aelian’s formulation (VH 12.43) it seems to be a practice confined to the rich. As noted above, however, it seems best to prefer Phylarchos’ testimony over Aelian’s and to allow for the possibility that the sponsorship of mothakes was relatively common among the homoioi.
going accommodation of the *perioikoi* to the prevailing political order. As we shall see, while it is easier to test this deduction by attempting to falsify it than by adducing material in its support, our evidence for the attitudes of the *perioikoi* towards the Spartans nevertheless seems more consistent with a model in which Spartans and *perioikoi* continued to serve in separate contingents than it does with one in which most of the soldiers of the *morai* were *perioikoi*.

Our best prospect for falsifying this deduction is found in evidence of disaffection among the *perioikoi* during and immediately after Epameinondas’ invasion of Lakonia and Messenia. As some scholars have suggested, perioikic disaffection in the fourth century may have been triggered by frustration on the part of *perioikoi* who, inasmuch as they had been integrated into the *morai*, felt that they increasingly bore a disproportionate share of the military burdens once borne by the *homoioi*.\(^{41}\) According to our sources, both individual *perioikoi* and entire communities expressed their dissatisfaction with the Spartans: the former by refusing to fight in the Spartan army, the latter by defecting outright to Sparta’s enemies.\(^{42}\)

There can be little doubt that individual perioikic soldiers abandoned the Spartans during the crisis of 370/369, and possibly in large numbers. According to Xenophon, not only did some perioikic soldiers refuse to respond to call-up orders issued by the Spartans (Hell. 6.5.25),\(^ {43}\) others deserted from the

\(^{41}\) See David, *Athenaeum* 57 (1979) 248, who makes this argument in the context of possible perioikic disaffection in the early 390s. Cf. Cartledge, *Agesilaos* 177–178, who implicitly links perioikic disaffection in the 360s to the increasing prominence of perioikic troops in the Lakedaimonian army as the *homoioi* declined in number.

\(^{42}\) For an overview, see David, *Athenaeum* 58 (1980) 300–301, though note that Xenophon may have exaggerated the extent of the discontent for rhetorical purposes (e.g. most recently Flower, in *Georgica* 95).

\(^{43}\) David, *Athenaeum* 58 (1980) 301, sees evidence in this passage for organized resistance on the part of the *perioikoi*, but that interpretation seems to stretch Xenophon’s comments.
ranks once they had been called up (along with a number of helots who had been pressed into service); some of the latter even participated in the attacks on perioikic towns in southern Lakonia during Epameinondas’ march toward Gytheion (6.5.32; cf. Plut. Ages. 32.7). Yet our sources offer grounds for thinking that many of these desertions were triggered not by perioikic disaffection with Spartan authority per se, but rather by specific economic pressures that had been created by the defeat at Leuktra and its immediate aftermath—more specifically, by the way in which the timing of Lakedaimonian military operations in 370/369 interfered with the demands of the agricultural calendar. According to Xenophon (6.5.10–21), Agesilaos had conducted a campaign in Arkadia in the autumn of 370 at the head of a Lakedaimonian army that included a sizeable contingent of perioikoi, whom Xenophon mentions explicitly (6.5.21). Agesilaos did not lead his army home until sometime near the middle of December 370 (“midwinter” according to Xenophon), and since his invasion of Arkadia must have lasted no less than three weeks, his soldiers had missed the traditional window for sowing winter wheat in late November.\footnote{Xenophon describes nine days of the campaign in some detail. To this total, it seems, must be added extra time to accommodate both Agesilaos’ fortification work at Eutaia while he waited for word from Polytropos (6.5.12) and the devastation of the Mantinean chora (6.5.15). Hesiod (Op. 383–395) is the main source for the time of year during which farmers sowed their winter grain crop: farmers should sow after the Pleiades set, in early November.} Moreover, because the Spartans almost immediately found it necessary to muster their forces again when it became clear that the Boiotians, Arkadians, and their allies intended to invade Lakedaimon itself, the soldiers who had served with Agesilaos would have had no opportunity to attempt even a late sowing.\footnote{The Boiotians and Arkadians most likely invaded Lakedaimon in late December of 370 and remained there for some three months. See Stylianou, Commentary 426–429, and Shipley, Commentary 349.}
The timing of Lakedaimonian military operations in 370/369 would have posed few problems for homoioi and for the wealthier of the hypomeiones and perioikoi, all of whom presumably controlled enough servile labour to tend their farms. Arguably, it did not even pose serious problems for poorer hypomeiones, since many of these may have enjoyed the ongoing financial support of the patrons who had sponsored them as mothakes. Many of the perioikoi who served in the Lakedaimonian army, however, were likely to have been farmers of a more modest scale; like the hoplites from allied states who refused to support a Spartan invasion of Attica late in the summer of 428 because it would have interfered with their harvests (Thuc. 3.15.1–2), they could not so easily afford to take time away from their farms during critical points in the agricultural calendar without financial compensation. Because Sparta’s state treasury was notoriously weak at the best of times, however, and because the Spartans were particularly unlikely to be able to offer pay to the perioikic soldiers whom they levied in the period of crisis following Leuktra, many of the soldiers called up for service late in December 370 on the heels of Agesilaos’ Arkadian campaign would have found themselves unable both to answer the summons and to sow their winter crops. For these reasons, evidence for the desertion

46 A possibility suggested by Hodkinson, in Schiavi e dipendenti 61–62.
47 One might cite by way of comparison the new army of the Arkadian League in the early 360s. The core was formed of the so-called eparitoi, professional soldiers maintained at the expense of the state. Xenophon, however, implies at Hell. 7.4.34 that the eparitoi dwindled in number as the public funds used to support them dried up and as the membership shifted in favor of wealthy hoplites who could fund their membership from their own personal resources.
48 E.g. Arist. Pol. 1271b10–17. See Hodkinson, Property and Wealth 187–208, 433–435. The situation was somewhat different when the Spartans campaigned abroad at the head of their allies, for after ca. 382 they were able to levy contributions of money from those allies who declined to serve in person: Xen. Hell. 5.2.21–22, Diod 15.31.1–2, cf. Stylianou, Commentary 284.
of perioikic soldiers likely speaks more to immediate economic concerns than it does to long-term structural disaffection.

In addition to preserving information on the desertion of individual soldiers, our sources also report that the Spartans in the 360s lost control of several communities that had previously been integrated into the Lakedaimonian state, most of which were situated either along the Arkadian frontier or on primary routes of communication between Sparta and northern Lakonia. In 368, for instance, Agesilaos’ son Archidamos attacked the Lakonian community of Karyai, formerly dependent on Sparta, which lay upon the road leading from Sellasia to the Thyreatis (Xen. Hell. 7.1.28). In 365, the Spartans attacked and took Sellasia itself (7.4.12), which they had lost in the first days of the invasion of 370/369. Finally, when Archidamos led an army into Arkadia in 365 in the hope of relieving a Spartan garrison that was besieged at Kromnos, he attempted to lure the Arkadians away from their position by ravaging not only a large part of Arkadia, but also Skiritis (7.4.21); by this point the Spartans had clearly lost control of Skiritis itself, and in his discussion of the communities that contributed to the citizen body of the newly-founded polis of Megalopolis, Pausanias implies that they had also lost control of several nearby communities in Aigytis (Belbina, Leuktron, and Malea).

Yet even though Xenophon claims that many perioikic communities revolted willingly from Sparta (e.g. Ages. 2.24, Hell. 7.2.2), it is only in the case of Karyai that we have strong reasons to believe that this was true: when Archidamos took the town by storm in 368, he executed those inhabitants who survived the initial assault, presumably because the Spartans felt the need to settle a score with them (Hell. 7.1.28). The other

49 On the site of Karyai and its strategic importance, see Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia 5–6, 162; Shipley, in The Polis as an Urban Centre 238–239.
50 Paus. 8.27.3–4. Following Niese, the text is generally emended to include Oion in Skiritis; see Shipley, in The Polis 233–234, and Stylianou, Commentary 473.
51 Because Xenophon seems to differentiate between the inhabitants of
perioikic communities that deserted Sparta, however, arguably did so not because their inhabitants were politically disaffected, but because they found themselves subjected to severe military pressure at the hands of the Boiotians, Arkadians, and their allies. The town of Oion in Skiritis offers a good example. Far from entering into voluntary and open revolt in the initial stages of the invasion, the perioikoi of Oion fought alongside the Spartan commander Išcholaos in his ultimately fatal effort to block the Arkadian advance into Lakonia. But when Išcholaos failed to repel the invaders, their position became precarious. In the first place, the town was apparently unwalled, for the Arkadians who defeated Išcholaos entered the town with relative ease, outflanking him and showering him with missiles from the rooftops (Hell. 6.5.26). More importantly, the main route of communication between Oion and the Lakonian interior ran through Sellasia, and once Sellasia had been captured the inhabitants of Oion would have found themselves isolated and so even more vulnerable to attack. They therefore had little choice but to come to terms with the Arkadians, and we should view with skepticism Pausanias’ claim (8.27.5) that they were wholly willing participants in the foundation of Megalopolis.

The same argument can be made about those communities in Aigytis that defected from Spartan control—Leuktron, Malea, and Belbina. Leuktron in particular seems to have remained loyal to Sparta during the early stages of the invasion: a Lakedaimonian garrison was present in the town to defend the pass (Xen. Hell. 6.5.24), and its inhabitants—like those of

Karyai and the perioikoi more generally at Hell. 6.5.25, scholars have inferred that Karyai either was not perioikic or had defected from Spartan control some time before the invasion of 370/369 (e.g. Shipley, in The Polis as an Urban Centre 238–239; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia 253). But since what Xenophon actually writes is that messengers had “arrived from Karyai” (and not that they were themselves inhabitants of Karyai), there seems to be no need to question the town’s perioikic status.

₃² Oion lay on the road from Tegea to Sparta. On this route see Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia 161–162, and Stylianou, Commentary 430–431.

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Oion—may have fought alongside this garrison against the invaders. All three communities, however, would have been extremely vulnerable once Sparta’s enemies crossed the frontier. Belbina was probably unwalled in 370/369, for Kleomenes III took steps to fortify it in the late third century (Plut. Cleom. 4.2), and it is safe to assume that Malea and Leuktron lacked fortifications as well. More importantly, all three appear to have been cut off from the Lakedaimonian interior relatively early in the course of the invasion: in 369, the Arkadians captured Lakonian Pellene and enslaved its citizens, presumably because they had remained loyal to Sparta (Diod. 15.67.2); in so doing, they severed the main route of communication between Aigytis and Sparta, and if the Arkadians took the step of garrisoning this pivotal settlement, then the towns in Aigytis may have had no choice but to submit to them.53

Even the inhabitants of Sellasia likely abandoned Sparta because of coercion rather than outright disaffection. While Diodorus simply notes that the Boiotians “caused the inhabitants of Sellasia to revolt from the Lakedaimonians” (15.64.1), Xenophon claims instead that the Boiotians sacked the town and set fire to it (Hell. 6.5.27). In these circumstances, the decision of the Sellasians to defect from Sparta can hardly be considered voluntary. Moreover, because the Spartans did not retake Sellasia until four years later (7.4.12), we are perhaps justified in inferring that the Boiotians or Arkadians installed a garrison in what remained of the town. Given the strategic importance of Sellasia, which lay athwart several important routes connecting Arkadia and Sparta, this would hardly be surprising.54

In sum, neither the evidence of desertions by perioikic soldiers nor the evidence for Sparta’s loss of control over perioikic communities directly falsifies the deduction that

53 On the importance of this route, see Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia 161.

Spartans kept their actual military practices aligned with their ideological claims by preserving the “Spartan” character of the morai. Ideally, however, we would like to go further than this by furnishing that deduction with added support. Arguably, our evidence does provide such support, albeit indirectly. It does so in the first place by underlining the fact that many perioikoi likely continued to provide military service when called upon to do so in contingents of their own rather than in the morai. As we have seen, perioikoi were more likely than the Spartans themselves to find their ability to serve on campaign constrained by the needs of the agricultural calendar unless they were compensated for their time. This observation in and of itself provides some grounds for believing that many (if not most) perioikoi served in Lakedaimonian armies in what was essentially an auxiliary role: they could be levied in non-critical periods of the agricultural year in order to support the morai, the soldiers of which were arguably more capable of serving year-round than were the bulk of the perioikoi themselves.

More importantly, if we can read the apparent refusal of perioikic communities to defect from Sparta volitionally in 370/369 as a sign of ongoing enthusiasm for Sparta among the elite of these communities, then this enthusiasm seems difficult to reconcile with the view that the morai in the fourth century had come to be composed predominantly of perioikoi. Members of the perioikic elite could be absorbed into the morai in relatively small numbers easily enough, even though the Spartans continued to articulate their superiority in terms of their exceptional ability to fight together en masse: in such circumstances aristocratic perioikoi could interpret their membership in the morai as a distinction which they could parlay into enhanced status in their local communities.\(^{55}\) Arguably, however, such men would have become disaffected had perioikoi been inte-

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grated into the morai to such an extent that they dramatically outnumbered the Spartans themselves. Unlike hypomeiones, who may have participated in the Spartan assembly, aristocratic periikoi remained excluded from any formal political role in the Lakedaimonian polity whatsoever; in these circumstances, as many of them differed little from the homoioi in terms of wealth and culture, one imagines that they would have developed grievances similar to Kinadon’s had the conditions of their military service likewise become increasingly indistinguishable from those of the Spartans themselves.

In this context, Xenophon’s description of the army Agesipolis led against Olynthos in the spring of 380 becomes particularly significant. In shaping their policy toward Olynthos, the Spartan authorities were clearly interested in projecting force without committing any of the morai to a protracted campaign in the northern Aegean. Thus, the force which they initially despatched in 382 consisted of periikoi, neodamodeis, and Skiritai (Hell. 5.2.24), and Agesipolis’ own army, like the army that had accompanied Agesilaos to Asia in 396, contained no Spartans apart from the thirty who were sent along as members of his command staff (5.3.8). Xenophon, however, does note that many soldiers accompanied Agesipolis as volunteers, and that these included not only trophimoi (foreigners and periikoi who had been granted the privilege of participating in the paideia) and so-called “bastards” (nothoi, likely the sons of Spartans by helot women), but also members of the periikic elite (5.3.9). Because the ephors had intentionally avoided committing any of the morai themselves to the expedition, it is implausible that

56 See now Ducat, in Sparta: The Body Politic 202–203, for a discussion of Spartan success in creating a “community of institutions and culture” within the Lakedaimonian polity.

57 On the nothoi and trophimoi, see Hodkinson, in Schiavi e dipendenti 53–55, 62–65. It remains debatable whether or not Xenophon’s claim that the nothoi “were not unacquainted with the fine things of the city” implies only participation in the paideia or full integration into the military institutions of the state; I incline to the former view.
they would have permitted significant numbers of soldiers who were brigaded in the morai to accompany the expedition as volunteers, and for that reason it seems best to follow Lazenby and conclude that none of these men—including the perioikoi, even when they were also trophimoi—belonged to the regular army.\footnote{Lazenby, \textit{Spartan Army} 16.}

That the Spartans would refrain from enrolling a substantial body of aristocratic perioikoi into the morai underscores how great a distinction it must have been for such men to serve in the same units as the Spartans themselves. While the number of perioikoi who were incorporated into the morai in this way may have increased slightly in the 370s as fewer and fewer Spartans were capable of maintaining full citizen status, they likely never constituted anything greater than a minority of the regular army’s manpower. Instead, most perioikoi who fought in the Lakedaimonian army before the battle of Leuktra did so in units of their own. In that sense, the morai represented the civic contingent of Sparta itself within the larger Lakedaimonian army. The Spartans could continue to justify their pre-eminence in the Lakedaimonian state—along with the subordinate status of the perioikoi—on the basis of the advantages that their nomos conferred upon them collectively in war.\footnote{I owe a profound debt of gratitude to John Hyland, who graciously read several early drafts of this paper and provided invaluable feedback. I also extend my thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments, and to Benjamin Potts and the students of Notre Dame Catholic School, who gave me an opportunity to speak to them about some the arguments developed here.}

\textit{May, 2011}


\textit{Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies} 51 (2011) 401–434