The Date of the Callias Decrees

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Over the years, many attempts have been made, with different results, to date the Callias Decrees. Today the consensus is that they best suit the year 434/3, though 422/1 has been advocated strenuously, in 1931, by Wade-Gery and recently by Harold Mattingly. In the orthodox view, therefore, these decrees are assigned to a time shortly before Athens concluded her defensive alliance with Corcyra.

Inevitably, since the decrees contain important financial information, notably the fact of a payment of 3,000 talents to Athena (Face A, line 3), they have come to occupy a centrally important rôle in modern reconstructions of Athenian financial history and even of the climate of political opinion in Athens just prior to the outbreak of the Archidamian War. In the process of building on the information contained in the decrees, however, it is easy to forget how tentative the usual dating is, with the result that it and the inferences it has fueled have become mutually supporting, as if one or the other is certain. Far from being certain, the credentials of the generally accepted date derive authority from arguments of a special type: the year has been selected as being less problematical than other candidates also plausible; the crucial support for this dating is the conviction that other years should be disallowed for one reason or another, leaving 434/3 by
process of elimination. That method of choice, however, is inappropriate in a debate where one candidate, Beloch’s 418, for example, can be dismissed because of an inference we insist on making (as we shall see), whereas another such as 434 can survive because of an inference made to smooth an outright difficulty, apparently out of the prior conviction that 434 is the proper year. But since that conviction derives from negative arguments against the claims of other years, we come full circle.

And so, although Ferguson, for example, could write of Wade-Gery’s reasons for adopting the date 422/1 that “They strengthen rather than weaken my conviction that 434 B.C. is alone possible,” my own conviction is that the debate has centered so exclusively, since the work of Eduard Meyer and Walther Kolbe, on the possible weaknesses of the other candidates that attention has been diverted from a fundamental objection to the ruling date and, what is worse, from the actual tenor of the decrees themselves.

I

Simply put, 434/3 is too early for what its proponents understand, and necessarily so, as the reason behind the enactment of these decrees. In taking the Callias Decrees to establish the treasury of the Other Gods on the Acropolis in the Opisthodomos for the first time in 434/3, some historical justification of the action is needed: the amalgamation into one horde of the treasures of temples scattered about Attica implies a sharp break from normally tenacious custom. Advocates of that date have provided one: they infer that it was a protective measure in response to the coming of the War of 431. According to Meiggs and Lewis, “Decree A of Kallias shows that the decision had

6 Meritt, *AJP* 55 (1934) 263, Ferguson, *et al.*, were content to cite W. Kolbe, *Thukydides im Lichte der Urkunden* (Stuttgart 1930) 50–91, for proof of the contention that 434/3 is, in fact, the proper date for these inscriptions. The most important part of that monograph, however, is its refutation of Beloch’s view, chiefly on the basis of *IG V* 370.7–11, which indicates that in 420 B.C. the college of treasurers of the Other Gods was already in existence. The rest of the essay presents hypothetical calculations intended to make feasible the idea that 3,000 talents could actually have been accumulated for payment to Athena in 434/3. Kolbe’s arguments will convince only those who already share his belief.


7 The 3,000 talents paid to Athena in Face A, line 3.

8 *Op. cit.* (supra n.4) addendum.

9 Ed. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte* II (Halle 1899) 88ff; Kolbe, *op. cit.* (supra n.5).

10 GHI p.158.
already been taken to concentrate the treasures of the temples of the rural demes and the lower city for security on the Acropolis (A 18–22). Such a drastic step would not have been taken had not the Assembly been persuaded that there was a serious risk of war.” According to the editors of ATL,1 “the instructions to collect the treasures of the temples of Attica into the Akropolis of Athens, and the general tone of economy, probably imply that Athens was facing the likelihood of war and making provision against a possible invasion.”12

This must be sound. It is remote that anything short of the actual threat of invasion could have induced the Athenians to collect together these treasures and move them from their ancestral homes. The key words, therefore, in the passage quoted from Meiggs and Lewis, are “for security,” and in that of the editors of ATL, “a possible invasion.” The need for security against an impending invasion—one in which, evidently, it was believed that these shrines would be vulnerable—must ultimately explain this drastic and extraordinary disestablishment. For such a move would hardly have been a matter of administrative convenience, desirable in itself and easily tolerated. Any gain in financial ease was trivial compared to the dislocation effected and the violence done to long-established custom. Special stress alone will explain a resolve by Boule and Demos which must have jarred on the local patriotism of the people who had revered and had made donation to particular shrines, as well as of the priests and treasurers themselves. Whatever the relation between the shrines and the treasures (the votive offerings) they preserved, the removal of the treasures to Athens deprived the shrines of prestige. We must assume, therefore, as proponents of this date, 434/3, allege, that the threat of war—not indefinable or vaguely feared—was the catalyst of this unusual reorganization.

It is here that the ruling hypothesis breaks down. The motivation of the decrees and the date allotted them are incompatible. The next (and critical) sentence in ATL, for instance, is as follows: “It was only a few months later that the crisis over Kerkyra arose, virtually offering

11 ATL III.320.
12 Compare Ferguson, op.cit. (supra n.4) 165: “It may be taken as certain that already in 434 B.C. Pericles regarded the outbreak of a decisive war with the Peloponnesian League as imminent.”
13 See pp. 189–90 infra.
14 See Ferguson, op.cit. (supra n.4) 165.
a choice between peace and war; Athens, by accepting Kerkyra's alliance, chose war.” That sentence speaks eloquently, if unintentionally, of the difficulty implicit. Let us grant that the Athenian decision to form a defensive alliance “virtually” amounted to a course that would lead to war. But how can a measure allegedly the result of fear of invasion have been enacted in a time previous to the Corcyrean appeal when it was that very occasion that offered “a choice between peace and war”?

To accept the orthodox view is to ignore Thucydides. There is no indication from the historian that the Corcyrean episode led the Athenians to expect a Spartan invasion. When the Athenians chose to ally with Corcyra, they did so in the belief that war would come in any case: ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὃς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς (1.44.2). But we are not to understand that remark of Thucydides as meaning outright preparedness for a major conflict instantly requiring protective measures against it. And even if we did, such an attitude cannot be projected backwards in time to the period before the Corcyrean appeal. The Athenian response to it was neither automatic nor predictable (1.44.1), and after it, they tried hard to avoid widening the conflict. The alliance was strictly defensive (1.44); Lacedaemonius, as one of the three strategoi sent off to Corcyra, might be trusted to follow rigorously the emphatic instructions of the Demos (1.45). The Athenians would take what they could get—an enviable ally who might otherwise become a dangerous enemy (1.44.2)—and, certainly, the risk of war was “serious.” But it was serious in a sense different from what we have been meaning by the term. If war was inevitable, invasion was not imminent. Until Sparta made her demands several years later, which on denial led to her mobilization of the Peloponnesian League, the danger of war did not imply the necessity of gird-

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It may be noted that this is a retrospective judgement of Thucydides, who considered the crisis a “cause” of the War. It stands to reason that the Athenians did not at the time recognize it as such. Indeed, they thought differently, supposing that war could be avoided. Hence their care in formulating a strictly defensive alliance so as not to abrogate the peace of 446/5. See further infra.

On the general situation and the choice of Lacedaemonius see G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* III.2 (Gotha 1904) 780ff. Kagan, *op.cit. (supra n.3) misconceives the matter in supposing that Lacedaemonius was “taking the lead in executing the policy of Pericles.” Pericles undoubtedly favored alliance with Corcyra. But though the people accepted it (hardly enthusiastically: 1.44.1), they were determined not to see a general war develop from it. Lacedaemonius’ appointment, in this context, hardly suggests the execution of Periclean policy. Instead it suggests the desire to keep scrupulously to a defensive treaty.
ing against an invasion of Attica. Until that could be predicted, the Athenians did not dislocate their temple treasures in order to secure them.

The explanation put forward in favor of 434/3 consequently stultifies Thucydides' entire exposition by retrojecting a psychology resulting from his "causes" to the time before they developed, and makes empty rhetoric of his description of the chain of events leading to the war. The speech of the Corinthians presupposes a set of possibilities already precluded by this alleged action of the Athenians: they have already evacuated their temple treasures in preparation for a Spartan invasion. The Congress at Sparta, where the hard decision to wage war was reached, becomes not the decisive act Thucydides represents it as being but a formality. Unless we are prepared to believe that Thucydides misunderstood or distorted the course of events and their significance, we cannot retroject a war-psychology and series of decisions based on it to a time prior to the events inciting them.

Moreover, Thucydides' general conception of the train of events leading to the ultimate confrontation, which is incompatible with so early a date as 434/3 for the establishment of the treasury of the Other Gods on the Acropolis (if its cause was removal for the sake of safety), is corroborated by some of the specific statements he made about the Athenians' activity and psychology in 431. His account of the great migration of the inhabitants of Attica into Athens in 431 contains a reference to the unwillingness of the people to desert their houses and their shrines (2.16.2).\(^\text{17}\) The natural assumption is that the treasures these shrines contained had not already been consigned to Athens three years before.\(^\text{18}\) That assumption is confirmed by the fact that Pericles did not persuade the people to migrate into the city until that very year (2.14.1).

If the treasures were removed from their shrines in order to guarantee their safety, surely that was because the decision had already been made to leave Attica undefended. This was not the first war of the century with Sparta, or the first invasion of Attica. But it was the first time the Athenians decided not to protect their countryside. That

\(^{17}\) οὐ ρᾶδις πανοικεῖας τὰς μεταναστασίες ἔποιοντο in 2.16.1 does not, of course, refer to mere convenience, as the following phrase proves. That the Athenians were difficult to persuade is easy to believe. But how can we then assume that they had faced and resolved the question in 434?

\(^{18}\) Cf. Wade-Gery, op.cit. (supra n.2) 67.
explains why they moved their treasures. Only barbarians had pillaged shrines in the course of conquest. There would not be the slightest reason for the Athenians to suppose that their opponents would transgress the usages of war in unheralded and impious fashion. That the Athenians feared for the safety of their treasures probably has less to do with any specific fear of Spartan impiety than with a general and rational apprehension arising from the simple fact that no one would at need be on hand to ensure their protection when once the Athenians were behind the walls of Athens. Let us remember also that reasonable as such a decision would be after it was resolved to leave Attica undefended, before that time it would imply on the Athenians' part a resignation incompatible with willingness to risk war. Until the people were persuaded to renounce their homes and land, certainly they will have counted on being able to defend them successfully should war come. Otherwise, why risk war? It might be different if this action was a normal expedient, a protective measure customarily adopted in times of crisis. Since that is obviously not the case, the crucial element, the special circumstance, which must explain the concentration of temple treasures on the Acropolis was therefore the decision temporarily to renounce Attica in order to win the war decisively and speedily.

Other arguments might be adduced in support of the contention made here, but they are more circumstantial and should not be necessary. The standard explanation for the enactment of these decrees (if they be dated to 434) may be ruled out unless we are prepared to reject Thucydides' evidence and general likelihood and use the Callias Decrees themselves, as if they were dated, to "prove" that the Athenians were readying themselves for invasion in 434. In that case, the temptation to replace it with some other hypothetical motivation should be resisted. For although it may be possible to

19 See A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides II (Oxford 1956) at Thuc. 2.13.5, for the recognition (against Kolbe) that Thucydides implies that the treasures were uncollected until the migration. Secondly, Pericles' sketch of Athenian finances in that passage tells of the gradual diminution of the grand sum of 9,700 talents to 6,000, and that is incompatible with any payment to Athena of 3,000 talents in 434. I shall discuss this question elsewhere, but it may be stated here that a decision intending the creation of a fund of 3,000 talents by installment payments must have contemplated making such a fund 'special' or 'reserve'. Some justification for it there needed to be. Yet it is not a reserve, since Pericles (2.13.3), in speaking of the money on the Acropolis in 431, advocated the creation of a 'reserve' of 1,000 talents from Athena's treasury. What has happened to the 3,000 talents?
excogitate one, the gain would be illusory. The nod was given to 434/3 because it was known that the treasury of the Other Gods was already located on the Acropolis in 429 (IG I² 310) and because it was possible to infer from Face A lines 13–18 that the selection process for the treasurers of the Other Gods, as a collective, was being fixed for the first time by these decrees.

But what served to justify this dating in historical terms was that 434 seemed close enough in proximity to 431 to make cogent the assumption that the reorganization followed in response to anticipated invasion. That assumption, needless to say, remains necessary to explain the drastic action of the Athenians whenever we date the Callias Decrees. The likelihood that the Athenians originally concentrated their treasures on the Acropolis to preserve them from despoilment is not diminished because 434 happens to be too early by several years. If the argument served to justify the orthodox date, it was because the argument is sound (though not the date). It retains its force and cannot be cancelled away by the substitution of some other possible explanation for the move (with which, then, it would still compete). When we consider that one of the few unambiguous references in the decrees is to the 3,000 talents paid Athena (A, line 3), something which on its face is impossible in 434, it should be apparent that the main inducement to save the orthodox date would not be its suitability but rather an unwillingness to sacrifice the interesting if hazardous inferences it has generated.

II

The preceding discussion has turned entirely on the question of whether or not the establishment of the treasury of the Other Gods can plausibly be dated to 434 in view of the purpose the Athenians must have had for initiating the change. The implication is, of course, that these decrees provide "instructions to collect the treasures of the temples of Attica into the Akropolis of Athens"—as if this were the focal point of the decrees rather than an assumption at best compatible with it.20 Thus arguments proposed to justify the orthodox dating

20 These lines did not necessitate the inference in the opinions of Boeckh, Beloch, Wade-Gery and Mattingly, all reasonable men. Furthermore, the inference is scarcely aided by the reference in line 18 Face A to "the present treasurers."—Except when otherwise stated, references are to Decree A. Decree B is too mutilated to be of value and the restorations have naturally been influenced by the assumed date.
presume that the purpose standing behind the decree was safety of the treasures, the decree itself providing administrative details implementing that decision. Undoubtedly, emphasis on one facet of the decree is a consequence of the dominance in discussion of arguments as to date. Yet if we consider Face A without preconception, the conclusion may follow that we have been guilty of the kind of reasoning exemplified by the scholiast to *Iliad* 3.313. The reason behind the reconstitution of the treasury of the Other Gods is implied in the decree itself, and it is a different reason from what we might expect from a perusal of the literature on the subject.

The relevant portion (for present purposes) of Decree A may be translated as follows. “Resolved to pay back to the Gods the money that is owed them, since the 3,000 talents for Athena, of our own currency, which were voted on, have been brought up to the Acropolis. (Resolved) that it be paid back from the funds which were voted for the purpose of repayment to the Gods—both what is presently in the hands of the Hellenotamiae and the rest of the fund, and also the ten per cent tax, when it is farmed out. Let the thirty Logistae now in office calculate what is owed to the Gods precisely, and let the Boule solely determine when they shall meet together. Let the Prytanes pay back the money together with the Boule and let them cancel claims when they pay it back, after having inquired for both the register and the ledgers and wherever else there are accounts. Let the priests and overseers produce these records, and anyone else who knows of them. (Resolved) to elect treasurers for this money by lot, when the other magistracies are filled, just as the treasurers of Athena. And let these fulfill their office as treasurers of the monies of the Gods on the Acropolis in the Opisthodomos as divine law sanctions, and let them join in opening, closing and sealing the doors of the Opisthodomos with the treasurers of Athena. Let them take the treasure from the present treasurers and the superintendents and the overseers of the shrines, who now have the management of it, and count it up and weigh it in the presence of the Boule etc.” (lines 2–20).

The precondition of the decree, the reason for its enactment: a decision to pay back money owed to the Other Gods, since 3,000 talents have been paid to Athena. The connection of the clauses of
Decree A makes it clear that a prior financial decision, and that alone, explains this decree. That does not exclude 434 from consideration. But it does bring into focus the decree as a whole and, consequently, the relevant questions to direct to it. Unless we construe this decree as logically irrational, Callias obviously used the occasion of the repayment to the Other Gods to constitute, reconstitute or regularize the board of treasurers. He did not, in other words, decree the establishment of a board of treasurers and, while he was at it, repay monies owed them. If, then, we read the decree as a self-consistent document, the assertion that it “shows that the decision had already been taken to concentrate the treasures of the temples of the rural demes and the lower city for security on the Acropolis,” or that it provides “instructions to collect the treasures,” is as misleading as the motivation is superfluous. The decree shows that the decision had been made to repay money to a treasury and to have a new board of treasurers in control of it. Above all, it shows that this decision was a consequence of payment to Athena of 3,000 talents.

A different picture from the traditional one therefore emerges. Because the Athenians had paid Athena that stupendous sum they decided to pay their debt to the Other Gods. And it was that decision, apparently, which led them to consider how they would administer the treasury, now that it would be repaid, and the details follow in the decree. It may be stated, consequently, that the decree itself precludes the idea that the treasurers mentioned in it find their explanation in the concentration of these treasures on the Acropolis: the reason follows from purely financial considerations. In this light, the basic premise of those explaining it in the usual fashion dissolves away. If we separate what can plausibly be deduced from the terms of the decree from what are inferences invoked to justify a specific date for it, it becomes possible to set the decree into its likely historical context without prejudging it. Instead of postulating installment payments of 3,000 talents to Athena (as if they were logically extrinsic to the decree motivated by that repayment), we may ask when it was likely that the Athenians had that sum to pay to Athena as well as 1,200 or 200 talents to pay to the Other Gods, and, furthermore, when such obligations would be likely to have accrued. 434/3 does not suggest

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22 Both figures are capable of being restored. The former has been rejected because it is incompatible with the orthodox date.
itself. The most likely alternative would appear to be the date first suggested by Boeckh and advocated by Beloch—418 B.C.\textsuperscript{23}

The belief that the purpose of the decrees was to establish a college of treasurers already known to be in existence in 420\textsuperscript{24} (if not 429) made it easy to refute Beloch's contention that they belong in 418. That argument, however, loses its force when it is recognized that the purpose of the decree was to repay money. Since this entailed the reference to the new treasurers, we need suppose no more, initially, than that clearing accounts with the Gods led the Athenians also to consider the larger matter of the status of the treasury and the treasurers. And if that idea is consistent with the assumption that the treasury is by this decree being established on the Acropolis for the first time, it is equally consistent with the assumption that the decision was made to keep it there.\textsuperscript{25}

We know that the Athenians made the decision to fix the treasury into permanency on the Acropolis—even if that meant merely continuing the status quo.\textsuperscript{26} Additionally, we may surmise that a question

\textsuperscript{23} Beloch, op.cit. (supra n.6) 344ff. Much as I owe to Mattingly for his excellent discussion of the problem (op.cit. [supra n.2] 35ff), I cannot follow him in his advocacy of 422/1 (in preference to 418/17) because I cannot convince myself that the Athenians would have "decided to close the account with Athena and the 'other gods'" (p.45) while war was still in progress, even if (which I doubt) 4,200 or 3,200 talents were available at the time. And if Mnesitheos was Hellenotamias in 422/1 (ATL II, List 33; disputed by Mattingly, p.47), that year (but not 418/17) is excluded. Similarly, IG I\textsuperscript{5} 76 has been set in 422/1 by P. Guillon, BCH 86 (1962) 467ff, on solid grounds. As Mattingly noted (p.53), though Kekropis was Prytany, the secretary was Timoteles and not Mnesitheos. For these reasons and others (see infra), I find 418/17 as much preferable to 422/1 as 422/1 to 434/3.

\textsuperscript{24} IG I\textsuperscript{5} 370.7–11.

\textsuperscript{25} It is not required that "the present treasurers" of line 18 be understood as local officials. And though Ed. Meyer, op.cit. (supra n.9) 91, asserted that the Callias Decrees "specifically state that the treasurers of the Other Gods were formerly not united," it is an inference (again) from lines 9–13, as unjustified as Wade-Gery's own belief (op.cit. [supra n.2] 68) that the debt in question cannot be the one recorded by the Logistae in IG I\textsuperscript{5} 324 since "The Logistae take account of no such vouchers whatsoever." But the decree does not suggest that the Logistae used these 'vouchers' to establish the debt and had first to collect them together from a variety of sources. What seems to be at issue is a different process: the obliteration of the physical evidence of a debt on its cancellation. This was presumably a standard procedure (certainly a sensible one) adopted in order to safeguard against the raising of later claims for repayment. It suggests nothing about the provenience of the creditors or the size of the debt.

\textsuperscript{26} That a regular college, such as that set up by Callias' proposal, already preceded it is comprehensible. Some organization there needed to be when the treasures came to Athens. When the Athenians decided to keep the treasury on the Acropolis, it would have been proper to stipulate the rules governing the board even if those rules had already been in effect.
of this kind would inevitably have arisen when accounts were cleared with the treasury. Finally, the Peace of Nicias gave the Athenians the wealth to repay their debts. Inevitably, some decision would need to be made in view of the fact that the Athenians could contemplate living again in peace throughout the countryside. We are not to suppose that when the Athenians collected together the treasures of their various shrines, on removing themselves from Attica, the arrangement was regarded as anything more than temporary. The forces of local tradition, the inevitable conservatism attaching to venerable things, the fact that this dislocation owed its origin to a special tactic in what naturally was regarded as a speedy war, gave it a make-shift status. Even as it was, the Athenians had been reluctant to transfer themselves to Athens; no systematizing of this aspect of it could then have been contemplated. But after ten years, habituation to the long-altered situation and a more urban psychology will have set in. When the Athenians realized the capacity to pay their debts and were willing to do so because of peace-time affluence and the prospect of more of it, the question will naturally have arisen: what to do with the temple treasures of the Other Gods now that they are solvent again. Shall they be dispersed to their original homes or be kept together on the Acropolis? The decision was made, in the context of that repayment, to keep them together for perpetuity.27

This hypothesis at least takes its departure from what actually is in the decree—the decision to repay a debt to the Other Gods—and is consistent with the baldly stated details it contains. Face A does not imply, it is true, that the arrangement is a mere continuation of what had passed before. Yet it does imply that the arrangement is simply the result of an infusion of new money, which excludes the assumption that it is a consequence of the concentration of these treasures on the Acropolis for the first time. The only other alternative seems absurd: that the Athenians decided to collect together and place on the Acropolis the treasures of the Other Gods because they were in a position to repay monies owed them, Athena already having been given 3,000 talents. Perhaps, therefore, the reference to the new board of treasurers is deliberately indirect, thereby masking a decision which might very well have had an ugly nuance about it. What might be condoned, after all, as a temporary measure in special

27 The tone of the decree is unmistakably that appropriate to legislation intending a permanent arrangement.
circumstances would in normal times appear to be an inappropriate secularization. For in essence the State has become custodian of these funds.

On balance, certainly, such a date as 418 is more in keeping with the decrees than 434. The reference to 3,000 talents, perfectly explicable in 418, is problematical in 434. If we leave aside theories devoted to dating the decree to 434, mention of that payment to Athena implies the payment of a debt: the decree alludes to that payment as the precondition of what is unquestionably the resolution of a debt. And even (for the sake of argument) if it were not, how, on the ruling hypothesis, does such a payment—incontestably the precondition of the decree—jibe with the assumption that the treasury was established because of the imminency of war? The ruling hypothesis invents an explanation of the 3,000 talents without ancient support and ignores the fact that its mention in the decree is intimately related to its purpose. Far less special explanation is required in dating the Callias Decrees to 418, a date which extrinsic considerations (which admittedly count less heavily) tend also to support. For the requirement of δέκατη (12–19 Callias Decree A) first makes its appearance in the accounts of 418/17. Probability is strong that the δέκατη was levied during the Archidamian War (and not before it). Mnestheos was Hellenotamias in 422/1 and so more plausibly secretary four years thereafter than twelve years before. Callias, Hipponicus’ son, as διαδόχος “would be specially qualified to recommend a measure that encroached heavily on local religious sentiment and ancestral custom.” However, the most important thing is that these decrees can be accommodated to 418 without necessitating the distortion of the historical tradition and without requiring the invention of a theory about Athenian finance in danger of imperceptibly becoming a tradition in its own right.

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June, 1970

28 See Mattingly, op.cit. (supra n.2) 40, on IG I² 302.15.
29 See Mattingly, op.cit. 45f, and, against him, GHI p.161. The fact that Alcibiades imposed a δεκατευτήριον at Chrysopolis in 410 (Xen. Hell. 1.1.22; Polyb. 4.44.4) does not necessarily imply that a δεκατη had not been levied before that time. And though it might be “barely explicable in peace-time” (GHI p.161), it is easily conceivable that it was levied during the Archidamian War and thereafter continued and renewed by Alcibiades in 410.
30 ATL II, List 33. Mattingly (p.47) would reassign this Quota List to 418/17.
31 Mattingly p.48.