Thucydides reports two charges of extreme gravity against Pausanias in terms which leave no doubt that he considered them proven. Pausanias both medised (1.95.5) and plotted to overthrow the Spartan constitution (1.132.4). He was allowed his liberty so long only because concrete evidence against him was lacking, and the ephors insisted, before taking action, on hearing for themselves the kind of self-incriminating conversation to be detected nowadays with a concealed tape-recorder or bugging-device (1.132–33). These charges have been widely rejected in recent times as derived from a tradition given currency by the political enemies of Pausanias and designed to justify the extreme measures taken against him. Scholars of this persuasion claim that the evidence against Pausanias was rigged or forged; and they conclude either that he entertained no revolutionary or treasonable plans at all, or that such plans as he did entertain were limited in application to the Peloponnese.1

While it may be conceded to the critics of Thucydides that there are genuine difficulties in his account of Pausanias, it is hard to accept their implication that he was sufficiently naive to swallow whole a fabrication of this alleged magnitude, that he did not double-check every part of an account, the very detail of which suggests that the historian attached particular importance to it, whatever his motives for its inclusion in his work. The charges against Pausanias may be empirically surprising, but they are not nonsensical. They should not be rejected unless contradicted by good external evidence, or shown to exhibit serious internal inconsistencies. In the absence of such evidence or such inconsistencies, Thucydides’ account of Pausanias must stand.

Pausanias emerges from Thucydides as vain, ambitious and with a capacity for self-advertisement; but these same characteristics appear, significantly, in two epigrams inscribed for public scrutiny at the personal command of Pausanias. The first, on the Greek victory dedication to Apollo at Delphi, and cut presumably into the marble base of the monument, claimed for Pausanias sole credit both for the victory and the dedication. The second inscription appeared on a bowl dedicated at the Bosporos, and is offensive less in its wording than in its sacrilegious implications. Pausanias had, it is reported, instructed the epigram to be added to a monument which already existed, usurping the credit for its dedication. We can thus say of Thucydides that he is right at least about the character of Pausanias, whatever else he may be wrong about. Pausanias himself is Thucydides' witness.

In his account of the year 478 Thucydides (1.94–95) reports briefly on operations in Cyprus and Byzantium carried out by forces of the Hellenic League under the command of Pausanias. He describes the mounting dissatisfaction, of the Ionian contingents in particular, with the conduct of Pausanias and the sympathetic reception of their complaints by the Athenian commanders. Complaints were made at Sparta (Thucydides does not enlarge on their authorship), and in consequence Pausanias was recalled for examination but acquitted of the major charges against him, which included one of medism. Sparta then sent out Dorkis to assume command of the allied forces, but, with the exception of the Peloponnesian contingent, all had already transferred allegiance to the Athenians. Sparta did not dispute this Athenian assumption of naval leadership.

Thucydides subsequently supplies, in his biographical excursus on Pausanias, a more detailed account of affairs in Byzantium (1.128.4–130). Pausanias secretly released some Persian prisoners of high rank,
and sent them, under the escort of Gongylos of Eretria and with a covering letter, to Xerxes. This letter is quoted by Thucydides with an explanatory note, “as was afterwards discovered.” In it Pausanias announced his ability, with Persian co-operation, to dispose of the whole of Greece to Xerxes. He further requested the hand of the King’s daughter in marriage and the immediate posting to the coast of a reliable Persian officer through whom to conduct future negotiations. Xerxes responded quickly. Artabazos was appointed to take over the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia; and the letter carried by Artabazos for delivery to Pausanias is also quoted. In it Xerxes assured Pausanias of his registration as a royal benefactor and promised unlimited financial and military resources for the implementation of Pausanias’ plans; but, significantly, the proposed marriage was not mentioned. On receipt of this rescript Pausanias embarked on the course of outrageous conduct which resulted in the allied protests and his recall to Sparta.

Although Thucydides (1.128.5) insists that the sequence of events just outlined belongs to Pausanias’ first occupation of Byzantium, there are compelling reasons for concluding that this was not the case. The period available to Pausanias from the occupation of Byzantium to his recall cannot have been longer than six months, and this is conspicuously too short for the exchange of correspondence. Pausanias would have had time at most to open the transaction by writing to Xerxes: he cannot possibly have received Xerxes’ reply before his recall. But the decision to communicate with Xerxes requires a motive, and it is difficult to supply one. Pausanias may certainly have suspected that Sparta might eventually withdraw from operations...

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4 Gongylos was rewarded with a fief comprising Gambrion, Palaigambrion, Myrina and Gryneion, which his descendants still held in 399 (Xen. Hell. 3.1.6; An. 7.8.8). On the history of this family see T. Homolle, “Inscriptions de Délos: le roi Nabis,” BCH 20 (1896) 508–10; L. Pareti, “Per la storia di alcune dinastie greche nell’Asia Minore,” AttiTor 46 (1910–11) 618–20. On the date of the award of the fief see Berve, op.cit. (supra n.1) I.182–83.

5 Hdt. 5.32 cites a different tradition, in which it was the daughter of Megabates whom Pausanias wooed in his aspiration to become tyrant of Greece, but the historian indicates that he personally reserved judgement on both the proposed marriage and the political programme. The passage is well analysed by Lanzani, op.cit. (supra n.2) 240–41.

6 Some lurid anecdotes about Pausanias’ conduct in Byzantium are preserved by Plutarch (Arist. 23, Cim. 6).

overseas, and his private anxieties about this possibility must have been considerable, since his personal position was deeply affected. This is relevant and understandable, but it cannot, in the year 478, have been an immediate consideration. Anxieties about a possible loss of power and prestige at some time in the indefinite future cannot have been so acute as to impel Pausanias to jeopardise the supreme military command which he already held by compromising himself irretrievably with the Persians in negotiations which carried no guarantee of success. The negotiations themselves may be historical, but they do not belong to Pausanias’ first occupation of Byzantium.

If Pausanias did not medise in 478, why did the Spartans recall him? There was, it is true, outside pressure for his recall, but the Spartans must have known, or suspected, that much of this pressure was being generated by the Athenians, who had a vested interest in securing Pausanias’ removal from office, to the extent even of systematically misrepresenting his conduct. Why in such circumstances were the adverse reports on Pausanias taken so seriously in Sparta? It has been suggested, from the immediacy with which Sparta acquiesced in the Athenian naval take-over in 477, that the Spartan authorities were already anxious to withdraw from operations overseas and therefore welcomed the complaints against Pausanias as a suitable pretext for so doing. On this theory Pausanias was in effect framed, the victim of a coalition of interests favourable to a change of naval leadership. The weakness of this theory is its failure to face the fact that Dorkis was sent out to succeed Pausanias, which proves that the Spartans were not unanimous in wishing to withdraw at once from overseas commitments. The conservatives at Sparta may indeed have welcomed the recall of Pausanias, but the proposal to summon him for examination is less likely to have originated from their ranks than from those of the opposite persuasion, who advocated the maintenance of Spartan control of allied operations and who feared, what in fact transpired, that the personal unpopularity of Pausanias, whatever its explanation or justification, would result in the loss of control to the Athenians.10

8 By Lanzani, op.cit. (supra n.2) 247-54. Wolski, op.cit. (supra n.1) inclines to the same view, see esp. 84-85 and 90-92.
9 There is little point in lengthy speculation, but it is evident that Pausanias had rendered himself vulnerable through offensive or imprudent conduct in Byzantium, and that his critics did not lack for concrete instances of his maladministration.
10 This consideration is well brought out by Reuther, op.cit. (supra n.1) 36-38.
On his acquittal at Sparta, and according to Thucydides without official sanction, Pausanias obtained a trireme from Hermione and returned to Byzantium. His announced intention in so returning "τῶ μὲν λόγῳ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πόλεων Thucydides contrasts with his real intention τῶ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πρὸς δασφύνια πράγματα πράσσειν." But this is not the whole story. Thucydides (1.131.1) subsequently reveals that the herald sent to serve Pausanias notice of his second recall carried the skytalē, which clearly indicates that his absence abroad had after all to do with state business, that he had returned to Byzantium, not as a private individual, but with some official function to discharge. Thucydides tells us unambiguously what Pausanias intended to do in Byzantium. He also tells us, albeit in somewhat cryptic terms, what Pausanias publicly said that he intended to do. He does not tell us what the Spartan authorities had instructed him to do. Pausanias’ brief was secret and remained so. Perhaps the most plausible conjecture is that his instructions were to impede Athens without compromising relations at state level, to damage Athenian interests without open provocation.

Thucydides (1.131.1) preserves no information about Pausanias’ second occupation of Byzantium other than his expulsion by the Athenians. The apparent ease with which he was able to re-establish himself suggests that he may have enjoyed considerable local support, but there is no evidence that any military force of substance was available to him. It is natural to suppose that the Athenians

11 Thucydides twice insists upon this absence of official sanction: δημοκρίτω μὲν οὐκέτι ἐξετέμφη, ἵππα δὲ αὐτὸς τριήρη λαβὼν Ἐρμονίδα ἀνέθη Λακεδαιμονίων . . . (1.128.3), and καὶ ἤπειδη τῇ Ἐρμονίδῃ ὑπὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἐκπλείεισον κελευσάντων αὐτῶν . . . (1.131.1).

12 Thuc. 1.128.3. The precise meaning of the former phrase is difficult to determine. While the preposition ἐπί clearly connotes purpose, the purpose itself is not made explicit. “To observe the progress of the war” seems the interpretation best suited to the context. The use of the adjective Ἑλληνικός to qualify this war is also odd.

13 Despite Lippold, op.cit. (supra n.1) 326 n.27.

14 This is the view of Wolski, op.cit. (supra n.1) 88-89. The improbable theory of U. Kahrstedt, “Sparta und Persien in der Pentekontaetie,” Hermes 56 (1921) 320ff, that Pausanias had been empowered to negotiate a secret peace between Sparta and Persia was properly rejected by W. Judeich, “Griechische Politik und persische Politik im V. Jahrhundert,” Hermes 58 (1923) 1ff.

15 This inference was rightly drawn by Lanzani, op.cit. (supra n.2) 259.

16 For a different view, justly criticised by Reuther, op.cit. (supra n.1) 45-48, see M. Duncker, Abhandlungen aus der griechischen Geschichte (Leipzig 1887) 69-71; G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte III.1 (Gotha 1893-1904) 89-90. They rely heavily on the doubtful inference from Plut. Cim. 9 that Pausanias recovered, and had to be expelled from, Sestos as well as Byzant-
would move quickly to dislodge him from such a key base, and there is in fact evidence, albeit less than conclusive, that they did so. It is true that Justin (9.1.3) states that Byzantium was in the hands of Pausanias for seven years, but none of the scholars who have defended this statement on the assumption that it derives from an authoritative local source has offered a convincing explanation for the Athenian delay in expelling Pausanias, and it may be concluded with confidence that Justin is in error. After his expulsion Pausanias crossed to Kolonai in the Troad, where his intrigues with Persia are reported to have continued and from which the ephors recalled him to face investigation for the second time.

Thucydides (1.128.3) says that Pausanias’ personal object in returning to Byzantium was to resume the negotiations with Persia into which he had entered the previous year with a view to making himself ruler of Greece. If the arguments advanced above are cogent, there were no previous negotiations to resume, and Thucydides’ diagnosis of Pausanias’ intentions is only partially accurate. It was to initiate negotiations with Persia that Pausanias returned to Byzantium. His motives are readily understood: the loss of his supreme command, personal humiliation in Sparta, a political future now devoid of promise short of some radical change of circumstance. Pausanias had certainly nothing to lose in making contact with Persia, and such
contact, to be effective, needed to be made quickly in the hope of concealing from Xerxes and his advisers the effect of recent events on his authority, influence and credentials. He had nothing to lose, but what precisely did he hope to gain? Discussion must begin with the correspondence quoted by Thucydides, the authenticity of which is seriously disputed.²¹

There are a number of points to be noted about the two letters. First, by his use of the pronoun ἡμῖν (1.128.6, 129.3) Thucydides clearly implies that he is quoting their actual contents. Second, the language of Xerxes' rescript has at least the appearance of authenticity, since it employs in translation formulaic peculiar to the Persian chancellery.²² Third, the letter of Pausanias, although vague as to the means to attain it, proposed an explicit and unambiguous end: the subjugation to Xerxes of Sparta and the rest of Greece.²³ Finally, Xerxes' reply committed him to nothing positive beyond the appointment of Artabazos. The King gave, it is true, assurances of military and financial support, but these were paper assurances, any implementation of which would depend on the feasibility of Pausanias' plans, if and when he came to divulge them in detail. Pausanias' request for the hand of the King's daughter was simply ignored in Xerxes' rescript.²⁴

The only convincing argument against the authenticity of the correspondence is Thucydides' admission that it was discovered "later."²⁵


²³ Vogt, op. cit. (supra n.21) 170, and in his later article "Zu Pausanias und Caracalla," Historia 18 (1969) 301, rightly observes that the most striking feature of Pausanias' letter is its explicitness about the object to be pursued. As the opening move in the game, the letter did not need to elaborate further in order to achieve its immediate purpose of establishing a working relationship with Persia. Lanzani, op. cit. (supra n.2) 244–45, misses the point in her criticism of the letter on the ground of its imprecision about the mechanics of Pausanias' proposal to convert Greece into a Persian satrapy.

²⁴ Beloch, op. cit. (supra n.1) II.2.155–56, argues that the spuriousness of Pausanias' letter is proved by its inclusion of this marriage proposal; but this argument is clearly unsound. Persian custom may have made it impossible for Pausanias' request to be granted, but it does not follow that the request was an impossible one to make. Pausanias may have been ignorant of the oriental traditions which made his suit a hopeless one; but equally he may have proposed the marriage in full knowledge that it was without precedent.
(1.128.6). When, where and by whom it was discovered are matters for conjecture, but, since it was apparently not available to the ephors in their collection of evidence against Pausanias, it must have come to light after his death. In such circumstances the suspicion that those who claimed to have discovered the letters had in fact forged them is a perfectly reasonable one. In other words, it is not so much the letters in themselves which give rise to unease, but the mysterious circumstances in which they are reported to have come to light. Far less convincing is the argument that the private portfolio of Pausanias, if discovered, could have contained at most only the Persian rescript, and that the letter at least of Pausanias must be spurious, whatever the merits of the rescript. This argument rests on the gratuitous assumption that Greek statesmen did not retain copies of what they had written to others. Obviously we are not to imagine Pausanias, or any contemporary, surrounded by filing cabinets and classified information, but equally obviously he must have needed some form of documentary organisation, however primitive, both for reference and for the establishment or confirmation of credentials. Indeed, were it unheard of for a statesman to preserve copies of his letters to others, the alleged forger could not plausibly have claimed to have discovered Pausanias' letter at all. The genuineness of the correspondence cannot be conclusively demonstrated, but the evidence against it is entirely circumstantial. On the other hand, the language and style of the rescript establish a strong presumption in favour of its authenticity; and the inclusion in Pausanias' letter of the marriage proposal, ignored in the rescript, suggests that it too is much more likely to be genuine than a free composition or an inferential reconstruction from the terms of the rescript.

The personal ambitions of Pausanias cannot be deduced from his letter to Xerxes, since the proposal which it contains, even if sincere, is visionary and utopian, obviously proffered as a stimulant to Persian co-operation in attaining, at least initially, some more limited object. Pausanias evidently thought, or hoped, that Persia could help him: but how, and to achieve what? Thucydides, I think, supplies the answer to the second question in his statement that Pausanias planned, with helot assistance, to overthrow the Spartan constitution (1.132.4). It is true that he mentions this plan only in his account of Pausanias' affairs after the second recall from Kolonai, but this surely is only an accidental feature of his narrative and does not permit the
inference that the proposed revolution in Sparta was a late change of plan taken up by Pausanias only because his recall rendered abortive whatever projects he had been nursing at Byzantium and Kolonai. My premise is that Pausanias adopted his revolutionary plans from the moment he lost command of the allied forces, that his Persian intrigues were concurrent with and designed to assist these revolutionary plans, the success of which might be jeopardized by the intervention on Sparta’s behalf of another Greek power. The only Greek power with the resources and inclination to come to Sparta’s aid, if threatened, would be Athens under the influence of Cimon, always provided that her forces were not committed elsewhere, as they would be if Persia could be induced to launch an offensive in Asia Minor and the Aegean. This, I think, was the immediate object of Pausanias in opening negotiations with Xerxes. His “medism” was a form of insurance policy against the possibility of outside interference with his revolutionary programme.

Persia was evidently prepared to negotiate, since Pausanias’ interests coincided with her own. Her immediate curiosity is proved by the appointment of Artabazos, its continuation by the fact that correspondence between Pausanias and Artabazos continued even after the regent had been recalled from Kolonai. The content of this correspondence is unknown, the progress of Persia’s military planning obscure; but one inference can be made with confidence, that Xerxes would insist on a concrete return from Pausanias for the Persian outlay in men, money and equipment demanded by major operations against Athens and the Confederacy of Delos. The conditions stipulated by Xerxes are likely to have included a guarantee by Pausanias

25 This unsound inference is drawn by Reuther, op.cit. (supra n.1) 40-41.
26 Those who reject the commerce with Persia as unhistorical naturally suggest other motives for Pausanias’ return to Byzantium. Of these suggestions much the most convincing is that argued at length by Hanske, op.cit. (supra n.1) 30ff, and Reuther, op.cit. (supra n.1) 40ff, namely that Pausanias sought to reestablish his position in Sparta by provoking Athens into a declaration of war. Byzantium offered great scope for provocative action, and the declaration of war, Pausanias hoped, would both discredit his political enemies in Sparta and involve his own appointment to take charge of operations.
27 Artabazos had been a significant figure in the later stages of the Persian campaign in Greece and had made use of Greek agents for operations in Chalkidike (Hdt. 8.127-28). He thus possessed credentials appropriate to this special posting.
28 Thuc. 1.132.5. One wonders whether any of this later correspondence was found in the archive which yielded the two documents quoted by Thucydides, and, if so, whether it was suppressed by the Spartan authorities because it implicated others in Sparta and did not share with the documents quoted the characteristic of compromising Pausanias alone.
that his revolutionary government in Sparta would recognise the Persian title to the whole of Asia and possibly parts of Europe also, and a further guarantee that the revolutionary government would take all steps necessary to ensure that these titular claims were respected by other Greek powers. The successful imposition of such conditions, although substantially less than what Pausanias had promised in his introductory letter, would represent a major triumph for Xerxes after the failure of his recent invasion of Greece. Whether Pausanias, had his revolution succeeded, would have proved equally successful in getting an agreement containing such conditions endorsed by his supporters, whether indeed he would have attempted to honour it at all, is another matter.

Thucydides would, I think, have won readier acceptance of his account of Pausanias' dealings with Persia if he had omitted or shortened his report on events in Sparta after Pausanias' recall from Kolonai (1.131.2–134). This report has two particularly striking features. It represents the ephors as cautious, even dilatory, in taking action against Pausanias, unwilling to accept as conclusive any evidence short of the spoken words of the regent himself testifying to his own guilt. The report also contains a great deal of circumstantial detail, some of it calculated to test to the full the credulity of the reader.29 These features have prompted the theory that what Thucydides has given us is an "official" version of the final stages of Pausanias' career given deliberate currency by the Spartan authorities to conceal the true facts, and that Thucydides' account of Pausanias' earlier career is therefore suspect as open to contamination by this same tradition. What really happened, according to one version of this theory,30 was as follows. The ephors, after the recall of Pausanias from Kolonai, quickly learned of his revolutionary plans, but were anxious to proceed in a manner which would give the minimum publicity to the existence of these plans. They therefore decided not to prosecute on this count but invented instead the more dramatic, but less politically explosive, charge of "medism," for which they proceeded to arrange the required evidence. In this way they were able to avoid the danger of a helot rising which might have resulted from a public prosecution of Pausanias on a revolutionary charge.

29 In particular, perhaps, the story of the Argilian messenger.
30 The version cited is that of Reuther, op.cit. (supra n.1) 56ff.
If this theory is right, Thucydides is of course wrong, for the Persian intrigues are fundamental to his whole account of Pausanias. It is possible, indeed, that Thucydides is wrong, but those who reject his account must not at the same time ask us to accept an alternative version of their own. If Thucydides is wrong about Pausanias, nobody else can be right. If we reject Thucydides, we must be prepared to accept ignorance.

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