The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Tripartite Psychology

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The Peripatetic author of the Magna Moralia begins his account of moral virtue with a doxography in which he criticizes Pythagoras for referring virtue to number, and Socrates for identifying the virtues with ἐπιστήμαι and ignoring the alogical part of the soul, thus doing away with πάθος and ἔθος (1182a10–30). He then attributes to Plato bipartition of the soul, of which he approves (1182a26), and proceeds to criticize him for confusing investigation of moral virtue with that of the good. The passage begins as follows: μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ Πλάτων διείλετο τὴν ψυχήν εἰς τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀλογον ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν ἐκάστῳ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὰς προσηκούσας (1182a24f). This attribution of Aristotelian bipartition to Plato is especially puzzling because the terms ἀλογόν and λόγον ἔχον are used nowhere in the dialogues to refer to parts of the soul: they first appear in the fragments of Aristotle’s Protrepticus (frs.B23f, B59–70).


The fragments of Aristotle’s Protrepticus are cited from I. Düring’s edition (Göteborg 1961); those of Xenocrates from M. Isardi Parente, Xenocrate-Ermodore, Frammenti (Naples 1982); of Theophrastus from W. W. Fortenbaugh, Quellen zur Ethik Theophrastus (Amsterdam 1984); of Posidonius from the collection of L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd (Cambridge 1972); and of Plutarch from F. H. Sandbach’s Loeb Moralia XV (London 1969). Peripatetic writers are cited, where possible, from the relevant volumes of F. Wehrli’s Die Schule des Aristoteles (Basel 1944 and later), and the Divisiones Aristotelae from H. Mutschmann’s edition (Leipzig 1906), which must be studied in conjunction with the important additional textual evidence adduced by P. Moraux, AntCl 46 (1977) 100–27. Arius Didymus’ epitome of Stoic and Peripatetic ethics, preserved in Stob. Ecl. 2.7, is cited according to the numeration of C. Wachsmuth’s edition (Berlin 1884); Galen’s De Placiis Hippocratis et Platonis according to P. De Lacy, CMG V 4.1.2 (Berlin 1978); and Ps.-Andronicus’ Περὶ παθῶν according to A. Gilbert-Thirty’s edition (Leiden 1977). For the sake of convenience the Διδασκαλικὸς τῶν Πλάτων δογμάτων is cited according to the numeration of C. Hermann’s Platonis Dialogi VI (Leipzig 1892), although I have also consulted the improved text of P. Louis, Albinos, Epitome (Paris 1945), on which see H. Cherniss, AJP 70 (1949) 76–80; a new text by J. Whittaker will appear in the Collection Budé.

2. It is evident from the Protrepticus that the division into ἀλογόν and λόγον ἔχον was well established in the Academy during Plato’s lifetime, since the terminus post quem of
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One might suppose that these bipartite terms simply correspond to the author’s criticism of Socrates for doing away with τὸ ἀλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς (1182a21); but in this very passage the author also uses the term λογιστικῶν in its tripartite sense to refer generally to the rational part of the soul (a19), and elsewhere freely employs tripartite terminology. Clearly, the author’s ability to represent tripartition is not properly at issue here (cf. 1185a21).

The author’s attribution of bipartition of the soul to Plato has often been invoked to support various reconstructions of the genesis and development of this doctrine in the early Academy, particularly by those who postulate a ‘development’ in Plato’s thinking, from the tripartite psychology of the Republic to the alleged bipartition of the Laws, and who therefore welcome the early and seemingly unambiguous testimony of 1182a24f. The importance accorded this evidence this work is 353 (taking it as a reply to Isocrates’ Antidosis: cf. B. Einarson, TAPA 67 [1936] 272–77, and Düring [supra n.1] 19–24, 33–35). A number of bipartite divisions, drawing upon Plato’s tripartition and differing from one another in significant ways, date from this period: the anonymous version of bipartition preserved in the Topics (298f infra); that of Xenocrates (n.5 infra); that advanced in such έξωτερικοί λόγοι as the Protrepticus and De justitia; and later, that of Aristotle’s writings on πολιτική, which explicitly draw upon these έξωτερικοί λόγοι (Eth.Nic. 1102a26–1103a3, 1138b8–13, 1138b35–1139a17, 1143b14–17, 1144a1–13, 1166a1–b29; Eth.Eud. 1219b26–1220a14, 1221b27–34, 1246a26–b36; Pol. 1254a38–b10, 1260a5–17, 1287a10–33, 1333a17–30, 1334b7–28). (The bipartition attributed to τίνες at De An. 411b5–7 might represent yet another version.)

In his commentary on Iamblichus’ Protrepticus 34.5–36.26 (Pistelli), from which Düring prints frr.B23–30, D. J. Allan, ArchGP 57 (1975) 246–68, denies the attribution of this passage to Aristotle and assigns it instead to Posidonius’ Protrepticus. His arguments are not persuasive, however, for he fails to identify a single distinctively Posidonian doctrine or phrase (in any event, we know almost nothing about the Protrepticus [frr.1–3]) and does not adequately explain the compositional disjunction between 34.5–22 and what follows; moreover, there is no reason to apply this thesis to 34.5–22 (= frr.B23–24), which even Allan admits must be based upon an early work of Aristotle (cf. frr.B59–70, B11–21), and which has close parallels in the treatises he overlooks (cf. e.g. Pol. 1333a16–25, 1334b14–29). Thus while the details of the moral psychology of the Protrepticus are unrecoverable, it was clearly one in a series of Academic writings that advanced bipartition, as is evident from Aristotle’s own testimony at Eth.Nic. 1102a28, where he introduces his division into ἀλογον and λόγον ἔχων by referring to the έξωτερικοί λόγοι, on which see P. Moraux, Le Dialogue “Sur la Justice” (Paris 1957) 15–22, 41–47; I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition (Göteborg 1957) 426–43; and F. Dirlmeier, Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast (Heidelberg 1969) 51–58.


4 Commentators who have used this passage uncritically include F. A. Trendelenburg, Aristotelis De Anima (Berlin 1877) 441; R. Heinze, Xenocrates (Leipzig 1892)
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is hardly surprising in view of the difficulties surrounding the Academic debate on soul-division. Not only is the evidence fragmentary, but interpretation of the relevant Platonic texts is complex: even in the canonical exposition of tripartition in Republic 4 there are suggestions, which are rejected, of a version of bipartition (see 299f infra); and in the passage of the Laws (9.863b) that would determine whether the soul-division of that dialogue is to be construed as bipartite or tripartite, it is left undetermined whether ἐμός is a πάθος or a μέρος of the soul. Yet it must be insisted that the use of 1182a24f as historical evidence is uncritical and involves serious misunderstanding. The most detailed discussion, Dirlmeier’s note ad loc., is content to assimilate the division into αλογον and λογον εχον to Platonic tripartition, and thus fails to account for either the historical background or the philosophical motivation for 1182a24f. Similar lack of attention to the doctrinal differences between the bipartition attributed to Plato at 1182a24f and Platonic passages that suggest bipartition of various kinds has led other commentators to assimilate the division αλογον/ λογον εχον to the ὑπτων/θειον dichotomy of the Timaeus (42e–44d, 69b–72d; cf. Poli. 309c), even though both


The evidence does not sustain Heinze’s claim (supra n.4) 140–43 that Xenocrates transformed Platonic tripartition into the division into αλογον and λογον εχον, and that he is the target of Aristotle’s criticism at 432a24–b6. Theodoretus attributes a division into αὐθητικον and λογικον to Xenocrates (fr.206), but since Aristotle says of the αὐθητικον that δ οὐ δέ αλογον αὐτε ὡς λογον εχον θει θει ἀν τῆς ῥάσεως (432a31), his criticism here can hardly be directed against the division recorded in fr.206, quite apart from the possibility of doxographical confusion (cf. Dox.Graec. 615.8–9). Damascius states that Xenocrates and Speusippus considered the soul immortal μεχρι της αλογιας (fr.211), but this statement does not even clearly presuppose a division of the soul (cf. L. Taran, Speusippus of Athens [Leiden 1981] 371–74). One can hardly assume, as, for example, does J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle (London 1900) 63–65, that Aristotle simply took over bipartition from Xenocrates, whatever rôle the latter may have played in its development.

The case for tripartition of the soul in the Laws and the inclusion of θυμος as a separate soul-part is argued by T. J. Saunders, Erasmos 60 (1962) 37–55; W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (London 1975) 23–25; has advanced the view that “an implicit or unformulated bipartite psychology” is employed, owing its impetus to the Academic investigation of emotion. The moral psychology of the Laws neither differs in its terminology from tripartition nor unambiguously advances bipartition, and therefore does not require discussion here.

Supra n.1: 163–65 and 278f.
the context of 1182a24f and the principles of Aristotelian bipartition plainly rule out this interpretation.8

Clearly a different approach is necessary. My purpose here is to demonstrate, by examination of the author’s psychological doctrine and its antecedents, that his attribution of the division ἀλογον/λόγον ἔχον to Plato is based upon an interpretation of tripartition in the terms of Aristotle’s doctrine of ὅρεξις, resulting in a fundamental but most influential misrepresentation of Plato’s psychology that obliterated the differences between Platonic tripartition and Aristotelian bipartition. The most important of these differences concerns the rôle assigned to the soul’s desiderative elements. Although Aristotle takes over Plato’s division of these elements into θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, and βουλήσεις, he groups them together into a single μέρος, which he designates ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ ὀλως ὁρετικόν (Eth.Nic. 1102b30), whereas each tripartite soul-part has its own ἐπιθυμία. Bipartition and tripartition therefore presuppose fundamentally different relations between the πάθη and λόγος.9 But the author of the Magna Moralia (or his source: see Appendix), by imposing the Aristotelian analysis

8 Although 1182a24f is often compared to the Timaeus, its psychology is an antecedent of Aristotle’s scala naturae, not of his bipartite division (cf. Solmsen [supra n.4] 148–64); and the criticism of Platonic moral psychology that follows 1182a24f has nothing to do with the Timaeus; cf. nn.35–36 infra.

9 In tripartition each of the soul-parts has its own ἐπιθυμία (Resp. 580d, 583a), and hence represents an independent form of motivation, whereas in bipartition all three species of ὅρεξις are grouped together in the ὁρετικόν, which, while alogical in itself, is open to the persuasion of λόγος (e.g. Eth.Nic. 1102b28–1103a3; Pol. 1334b7–28); for the evidence, cf. Fortenbaugh (supra n.6) 31–39. This difference entails an important revision in the assignment of βουλήσεις. Plato does not explicitly attribute βουλήσεις to the λογικόν, and in fact associates it with ἐπιθυμία (cf. Laws 9.863b6–9, 10.904b8–c4); but some Academic psychologists who systematized Platonic tripartition locate πᾶσα βουλήσεις ἐν τῷ λογικόν (Top. 126a14). Aristotle objects that it is ἀτοπον to divide the ὁρετικόν (De An. 432b6–7; cf. Vander Waerdt [supra n.3]) and, in contrast, assigns βουλήσεις together with θυμός and ἐπιθυμία to the ὁρετικόν (cf. Eth.Nic. 1102b30; Pol. 1334b22–23; Rh. 1369a1–4; De Mot. An. 700b22; De An. 411a28, 414b2, 433a23–28). By reorganizing the desiderative elements of tripartition, Aristotle lays the foundation for an entirely different conception of moral action. The λογικόν no longer possesses an independent form of motivation, but becomes the seat of δεινότης, the morally neutral δύναμις of the soul that secures the means to the end set by ethical virtue, and which, when fused with ethical virtue, is identical with φρονήσεις (1144a23–37).

A point of terminology: Plato usually calls the parts of the soul ἐδη or ἑδεα, whereas the Peripatetics usually call them μέρη or μόρα. Post-Platonic writers generally use the term θυμοειδής to refer to Plato’s θυμοειδής. This terminological shift clearly occurred in the Academy, for Aristotle consistently uses -ικος formations (Top. 129a12; De An. 432a25, 433b4), which appear as well in a variety of Peripatetic texts: e.g. Mag.Mor. 1185a21, Arius 117.17, Aëtius Dox.Graec. 390.4, and Div.Ar. XII 15a5, 17b6. In the Platonic Definitions, both -ικος (415e11) and -ειδες (413a7) formations appear, suggesting that this terminological usage was not firmly fixed.
of ὄρεξις upon tripartition, inevitably rejects the special status Plato assigned to the θυμοειδές, and in a bipartite dichotomy opposes the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές to the λογιστικόν. This interpretation leads the author to represent the tripartite psychology of the Republic as a division into ἀλογον and λόγον ἐχον (1182a24–25) without even explaining (as e.g. Aëtius does, Dox. Graec. 389.10–390.4) the analysis of tripartition upon which this attribution is based.

Our investigation will enable us to clarify a variety of issues. While the author’s attribution of bipartition to Plato provides no historical evidence for the Academic debate on soul-division, it does show that the issues and terms of that debate had already been obscured by the first or second generation of the Peripatetic school through interpretation of earlier thought in the terms of Aristotelian doctrine.10 Again, although the psychological doctrine of the Magna Moralia has never been thoroughly investigated, it well illustrates how Aristotelian thought was transformed and modified in the discussions of the early Peripatos, and how the author vacillates between independent philosophical speculation and strict fidelity to the tradition in discussing problems whose original import and terms he no longer understands.11 The author’s transformation of Aristotelian doctrine is of considerable importance for the subsequent history of Peripatetic ethics, over which the Magna Moralia exercised a wide influence.12 Indeed, the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition sketched in the preceding paragraph dominated virtually all subsequent discussion of soul-division in later antiquity, and in the sequel to this article we

10 W. Jaeger, “Über Ursprung und Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideals,” Sitz. Berl 1928, 402–12, and Walzer (supra n.1; cf. J. L. Stocks, Gnomon 7 [1931] 145–51) have shown that the Magna Moralia is the work of a Peripatetic of Theophrastus’ generation. I am not persuaded by the more recent attempt of J. M. Cooper, AJP 94 (1973) 327–49, following Dirlmeier, to claim it as the report of a stage in the development of Aristotle’s moral philosophy earlier than the Eth. Eud. or Eth. Nic. This thesis is surely mistaken, and Cooper’s arguments are sufficiently refuted by C. Rowe, AJP 96 (1975) 160–72. A. Kenny’s hypothesis that the Magna Moralia “is a student’s published notes of the course which we have in its authentic form as the Eth. Eud.” (The Aristotelian Ethics [Oxford 1978] 220) ignores the substantial doctrinal differences between these two works (some of them to be explored here) that make this hypothesis unlikely. In my view the Magna Moralia is the work of an early Peripatetic who generally bases his exposition upon the Eudemian Ethics (see Kenny’s table, p.11) but who readily introduces material from the Nicomachean Ethics (cf. D. J. Allan, JHS 77 [1957] 7–11, and Gnomon 38 [1966] 142–44), and who often defends the framework of Aristotelian doctrine even when he does not understand its philosophical motivation (see 292f infra). The author’s attempt to assimilate tripartition to bipartition is clearly a post-Aristotelian development.

11 Similarly, Jaeger (supra n.10) 412.

12 See Dirlmeier’s survey (supra n.1) 99–110; on Arius’ use of the Magna Moralia cf. n.32 infra.
document the influence of this doctrine and trace the complex history of its transmission.¹³

Our first task, however, is to set forth the evidence and clarify the philosophical motivation for the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition, together with an examination of the psychological doctrine of the Magna Moralia. The following discussion comprises two sections: in the first we assemble the evidence for the author’s interpretation of tripartition; in the second we consider its historical antecedents and philosophical motivation.

I

The author of the Magna Moralia generally patterns his moral psychology on Aristotle’s, accepting bipartition (1185b4–13) and the further subdivision of the ἀλογον into the θρεπτικόν or φυτικόν (Eth.Nic. 1102a32–b12, 1144a9–10; Eth.Eud. 1219b21–24, 37–40) and the ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ ὅλως ὅρεκτικόν (Eth.Nic. 1102b13–1103a3; Eth.Eud. 1219b27–1220a12), as well as the subdivision of the λόγον ἐχον into the λογιστικόν or βουλευτικόν and the ἐποστημονικόν (1139a3–15). Although he adheres to this framework, the author’s understanding of Aristotle’s moral psychology is strongly influenced by debate current in the Peripatos. Consequently, he often preserves Aristotelian doctrine and terminology in a context alien to the original, or formulates problems under discussion in the Peripatos in an Aristotelian guise. This kind of doctrinal synthesis goes hand-in-hand with interpretation of earlier thinkers through the lens of Aristotelian doctrine. Thus, in investigating the author’s understanding of tripartition we need to consider both his modifications of Aristotelian doctrine on soul-division and his Aristotelian interpretation of Platonic psychology.

We may begin with the author’s conflation of the bipartite and tripartite terms for the rational faculty. He uses the term λογιστικόν in its tripartite sense to refer generally to the rational faculty, rather than in its bipartite sense with reference to the faculty of φρόνησις, the lower subdivision of the λόγον ἐχον. Thus, for example, the author argues that man acts according to ὅρθος λόγος, ὅταν τὸ ἀλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικόν ἐνεργεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν (1208a9–11).¹⁴ At the outset, it appears that the author

here follows Aristotle in maintaining that the standard of ὅρθος λόγος is φρόνησις (cf. Eth.Nic. 1103b31–34, 1106b36–1107a2, 1138b18–25, 1144b21–30), in which case he would naturally use λογιστικόν to refer to the lower subdivision of the λόγον ἔχουν (1139a7–15); but his subsequent explanation makes clear that he rather regards it as a general term for the rational faculty in the manner of tripartition, for he coordinates the ἀλογον and λογιστικόν with τὸ χείρον and τὸ βέλτιον (1208a12–18) and with the πάθη and νοῦς (1208a19–21). The context shows these terms to be equivalent: in each case man acts according to ὅρθος λόγος when his alogical part does not prevent the rational part from fulfilling its ἐργον.\footnote{This parallelism is marked by the repetition of the verb of prevention: κωλύη (1208a10), κωλύειν (a16), κωλύσει (a19). Note also the author’s use of λογιστικόν and διανοητικόν as equivalent terms at 1182a18–20.} One consequence of this use of λογιστικόν in its tripartite sense is that the author modifies Aristotle’s subdivision of the λόγον ἔχουν. Although he locates σοφία in the ἐπιστημονικόν, he refers to φρόνησις not with λογιστικόν, but with a variety of terms: βουλευτικόν, βουλευτικόν καὶ προαρτικόν, and προαρτικόν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς (1196b13–34; cf. 1197b3–11).\footnote{Cf. Arius’ subdivision: τὸ δὲ λογικὸ τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ ἀέων καὶ τὰ θεῖα θεωρητικόν ἐπιστημονικόν καλεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ τὰ ἁθηρία ταῖς πρακτικῖς βουλευτικῖς (117.12–15); later, following the Mag.Mor., he refers to φρόνησις as a ἔξες βουλευτική (145.20); cf. Dirlimeier (supra n.1) 340.} Aristotle himself uses βουλευτικόν in this way (Pol. 1260a13, Eth.Eud. 1126b25, Mem. 453a13, De An. 433b3, 434a12), and the author’s usage accords with Aristotelian doctrine (cf. Eth.Nic. 1139a13–15).\footnote{As Professor Cherniss well explains (per litteras): “In 1139a11–15 the reason for asserting that τὸ λογιστικόν is a part of τὸ λόγον ἔχουν is explicitly said to be the fact that λογίζεσθαι and βουλεύεσθαι are the same thing. This justification is a criticism of the Academic use of τὸ λογιστικόν to designate the rational part of the soul as a whole. The Academics themselves ascribe βουλεύεσθαι and λογίζεσθαι as well as διανοεῖσθαι and all such activities to τὸ λογιστικόν (e.g. Diog. Laert. III.90 = Div.Ar. 12, p. 15a5–10 [Mutschmann], not in Rose), and Plato himself said that in the tripartite soul τὸ λογιστικόν is analogous to τὸ βουλευτικόν in the tripartite state (Republic 440E10–441A3). In that case according to 1139a11–15 τὸ λογιστικόν, being βουλευτικόν, cannot be the whole of the rational soul but must be only a part of it, the deliberative distinguished from the scientific or contemplative part (τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν) even as Aristotle in De Anima 433b3–4 distinguishes among the δυνάμεις of the soul the βουλευτικόν from the νοητικόν and both from the ὀρεκτικόν… [MM 1196b13–17] in substituting βουλευτικόν for λογιστικόν merely makes explicit what according to EN 1139a13–15 it [the subdivision of the rational faculty] really means.”} At the same time, his use of λογιστικόν as a general term for the rational faculty—unexampled in Aristotle—shows that he has conflated tripartition with the bipartite doctrine and terminology he generally follows. In tripartition the λογιστικόν is used to refer generally to the rational faculty; but in bipartition it is used only
for the lower part of the λόγον ἔχων, and hence the author was faced with somehow reconciling this difference. His resolution was evidently not an easy one, for he employs four apparently equivalent terms, both bipartite and tripartite, to refer to the rational faculty. When he uses λογιστικῶν as a general term for the rational faculty in opposition to the ἀλογον (1182a18–22, 1208a9–10), or equates the λογιστικῶν with the λόγον ἔχων in representing tripartition in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition (1182a24–25), it is clear that the fundamental differences between Platonic and Aristotelian soul-division are no longer understood.

Two factors are involved in the author’s conflation of these two conceptions of the rational faculty. The first is his revision of Aristotle’s doctrine on the relation between the πάθη and λόγος, and his corresponding revision in the rôle of φρονήσεις in providing the standard for right action. To understand this aspect of the author’s doctrine on soul-division we need to recall the dispute between Theophrastus and Dicaearchus over the relative rank of the theoretical and practical lives—a controversy that brought about decisive modification of Aristotle’s moral philosophy in the early Peripatos. The author alludes directly to this dispute in his discussion of whether φρόνησις rules over all the soul’s parts ὦστερ δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπορεῖται (1198b9) in a passage (b8–20) that constitutes a citation from Theophrastus; and

18 Aristotle never uses λογιστικῶν and λόγον ἔχων as synonyms. He uses λογιστικῶν to refer to the faculty of φρόνησις (Eth.Nic. 1139a12); and otherwise to the rational faculty of the Academic version of bipartition, twice in the De Anima (432a24, 432b6), and twelve times in the Topics (cf. 298f infra); Phys. 210a30 is an echo of Academic bipartition, for in Aristotle’s moral psychology ἐπιστήμη would be associated with the ἐπιστημονικῶν (cf. Eth.Nic. 1139a6–12). Professor Cherniss explains the ambiguous phrase τὸ λογιστικῶν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς (De An. 432b26) as follows (per litteras): “The καί here is explicative so that τὸ λογιστικῶν might be explained here as ‘what is called νοῦς’ by people (scil. Platonists); but Aristotle immediately proceeds to consider νοῦς in its two parts, ‘contemplative’ and ‘practical’, and even to use it to cover φαντασία ὡς νόησιν τιμα. In short he may here be using λογιστικῶν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς purposely to cover all possible theories of intellection in his attempt to prove that in no sense can this be the cause of locomotion.”

19 λογιστικῶν (1182a20, 1185a21, 1208a10); διανοητικῶν (1182a18); τὸ βέλτιον (1196a27, a30, 1208a13); λόγον ἔχων occurs eight times.

20 This dispute is mentioned several times by Cicero: nunc prorsus hoc statui ut, quo-niam tanta controversia est Dicaearcho, familiaris tuo, cum Theophrasto, amico meo, ut ille tuis τῶν πρακτικῶν μιν longe omnibus anteponat, hic autem τῶν θεωρητικῶν, utrique a me mos gestus esse videatur (Att. 2.16, cf. 2.2.2, 2.12, 13.30; Fin. 5.4.11). On the controversy see Jaeger (supra n.10) 412–21 and O. Regenbogen, RE Suppl. 7 (1940) 1481, 1489–91 s.v. “Theophrastos”; and, on Cicero’s use of Dicaearchus, S. E. Smethurst, TAPA 83 (1952) 224–32.

21 See G. Heylbut, ArchGP 1 (1888) 194–99, and W. Jaeger, Hermes 64 (1929) 274–78; Dirlmeier’s objections (supra n.1: 354–56) to Jaeger are not cogent and are rejected in the most recent discussion, Fortenbaugh (supra n.1) 182–84 on L19.
he illustrates in many ways the weakening of the connexion between πολιτική and the theoretical life, so fundamental for Aristotle, that resulted from this debate.22 Such revision of the relation between πολιτική and the theoretical life inevitably entails revision of the relation between practical and theoretical reason.23 The author's account of virtue does not culminate in σοφία (as in Eth.Nic. 1141a9-22, 1177a12-1178a8); in fact, he even finds it necessary to argue that it is a virtue at all (1197b3-11; cf. 1198a22-32) and to apologize for introducing it in an investigation of πολιτική (1197b28-36). This assumption of the autonomy of virtue from the theoretical life leads the author to treat as identical standards for ὁρθὸς λόγος a variety of terms that, as originally formulated by Plato and Aristotle, denoted different operations of the rational faculty and presupposed different relations between the πάθη and λόγος. The author’s conflation of bipartite and tripartite doctrine on the rational faculty is one consequence of the early Peripatetic debate over the relation between practical and theoretical reasoning.

The second and more general factor involved in the author’s conflation of bipartition and tripartition is his interpretation of the latter in the terms of Aristotle’s doctrine of ὁρμή; consequently, he simply equates the λογιστικόν and λόγον ἔχον without attention to the different conceptions of the relation between the πάθη and λόγος presupposed by each. Before taking up this aspect of the author’s interpretation, however, it will be helpful to observe the way in which he subsumes the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμικόν into a bipartite dichotomy in opposition to the λογιστικόν.

The author departs significantly from Aristotle by replacing the ὁρεκτικόν with a faculty of ὁρμή.24 As a result, he does not employ...
either the bipartite or tripartite terms for appetite, and we therefore find no explicit evidence, as in the doxographers, that he collapsed the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν into a single ἄλογον—a point that would assist our argument that he viewed tripartition in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition. One passage, however, does betray the author’s familiarity with tripartition; this, together with evidence from Arius Didymus, will clarify the situation.

In introducing the ἀρετή, which is “apparently” (ὡς δοκεῖ, 1185a15) a part of the soul, the author finds it necessary to explain his choice of terminology: τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τούτων μὲν τῶν μορίων οὐθὲν αἷτιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ τρέφεσθαι, ἵνα τὸ λογιστικὸν ἢ τὸ θυμικὸν ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἀλλὰ δὲ τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ὥστε οὐθὲν ἔχομεν οἰκεῖον ἄλογον ὄνομα ἐπιθεῖναι ἢ ἀρετικον (1185a20–23). The apologetic way in which he introduces the ἀρετή (μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέλλον λέγεσθαι οὐτέ λίαν δύσευς ἂν οἰκεῖον εἶναι τούτων οὐτε μακράν ἀπέχουν, 1185a13–15) suggests that it does not entirely conform to the principles of his own psychology; and indeed his subsequent denial that it possesses its own ἀρετή (on the grounds that οὐκ έσκεν δὲ εἶναι ὀρμή ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τούτῳ, 1185a29) shows that he has adapted Aristotle’s framework to his own theory of ὀρμή. Aristotle’s moral psychology turns upon a bipartite dichotomy between ὀρεξὶς and λόγος in which the ἀρετή is not a distinguishing mark of the human soul (cf. Eth.Eud. 1219b26–1220a3); accordingly, he is most often concerned with the faculties of desire and of practical and theoretical reasoning. But Aristotle can extend his division ‘downward’ to encompass such a soul-function as the ἀρετή, which does not contribute to human excellence but which man nonetheless possesses as a living animal; and, to incorporate his moral psychology into the framework of his scala naturae, he introduces it as his fourth soul-part, although usually only to dismiss it as irrelevant to ethics. Our author plainly does not understand why Aristotle included the ἀρετή as a separate soul-part; nevertheless, because he takes over Aristotle’s four-part division, he is faced with explaining its inclusion. His ὡς δοκεῖ shows that in defending its relevance he is

ψυχῆς once and τῆς ψυχῆς τι μέρος four times because he does not have a general term for this faculty. On ὀρμή in the Magna Moralia see Walzer (supra n.1) 164–70, and P. L. Donini, L’Etica dei Magna Moralia (Turin 1965) 179–207.

25 The ἀρετή is not peculiar to man and therefore has no share in human excellence (Eth.Nic. 1102a32–b12; Eth.Eud. 1219b21–22, 37–40); Aristotle’s inclusion of it as a soul-part enables him to relate bipartition to the scala naturae of his scientific psychology, and thus to contrast man with other forms of life (1097b24–1098a18, cf. Plut. Mor. 442b).
following received doctrine, and it is in this context that his enumeration of the tripartite soul-parts should be seen. In claiming that none of these parts accounts for growth and nutrition, the author follows Aristotle’s revision of tripartition. Yet the very fact that he is willing to think in terms of tripartition shows that, while bipartition had become canonical, he and his audience were still sufficiently familiar with tripartition to use it as a foil to justify the inclusion of an Aristotelian soul-part that did not contribute to his own moral psychology. Clearly, bipartition did not entirely eclipse tripartition in the early Peripatos, and the author’s acquaintance with the θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν compels us to ask whether he considered them separate

26 In the Timaeus the ἐπιθυμητικόν, planted midway between the midriff and the navel, is said to be tied up at a sort of manger for the feeding of the σώμα without which no mortal stock could exist, and so, as elsewhere in Plato, it is connected with nutrition, plant life, and bodily desires of various kinds (70D7–E6; cf. 72E3–73A8, 77A2–C7; Phdr. 247E4–6; Resp. 436A10–B1, 437D2–4, 439A1–D8, 580E3–4), as well as with a host of diseases of the soul including δυσκόλεια, δυσθήμα, and δυσμάθεια (86B1–87B8). The ἐπιθυμητικόν thus incorporates both nutritive functions that Aristotle would assign to the ὀρετικόν, and emotions he would assign to the ὀρετικόν: it does not distinguish nutritive and emotive functions—both influenced by and independent of bodily drives—as Aristotle does; cf. Solmsen (supra n.4) 156f. In claiming that none of the tripartite soul-parts accounts for nutrition, the author interprets tripartition in Aristotelian terms. Yet his reasons for denying ὀρετή to the ὀρετικόν show that, although he adopts Aristotle’s four-part division, he has completely departed from its principles. The ὀρετικόν does not, for Aristotle, contribute to ἐνίκημα because of its status within the scala naturae; for the author, it is because this faculty lacks ὀρῇ and hence the capacity for ἐνίκημα (1185a27–35).

27 Apart from the Magna Moralia and Arius, the most important sources for Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division are the doxographical tradition, derived from Peripatetic sources no longer extant (cf. supra n.13), and the Ps.-Plutarchan De libidine et aegritudine (on authorship and date see Sandbach’s remarks with references to earlier work, RevPhil 43 [1969] 211–16). Clearly, Theophrastus conceived the relation between the πάθη and λόγοι along fundamentally Aristotelian lines, whatever his original contributions to the Peripatetic investigation of πάθος (as Fortenbaugh recognizes: see his “Arius, Theophrastus and the Eudemian Ethics,” in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus [London 1983] 203–23). In several fragments Theophrastus refers to θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, and λόγος (L1–L4, L88, L117); but there is no explicit evidence concerning his soul-division. De libid. 6 reports that Diodorus assigned some of the πάθη to the ἀλογον, others to the λογικον (cf. Zeller [supra n.4] II.2 933 n.4). The later Peripatetics engaged in extended controversy with the Stoics over the status of the πάθη, and accepted a theory of αὐθρήσις that caused them to assimilate the ἄγομοντος to Aristotle’s bipartite division (cf. Dox.Graec. 394.21–25). We are best informed about Stratō (fr.107–31), who localized all αὐθρήσις in the ἄγομοντος, but it is unclear how he connected his physiological theories with bipartition (cf. fr.74, Dox.Graec. 416.10–13). A separate Peripatetic tradition is represented by the Divisiones Aristotelaeae, the De virtutibus et vitis, and the Περὶ πάθων attributed to Andronicus, which coordinate their treatment of the Aristotelian virtues and vices around Plato’s tripartite division (cf. Div.Ar. 12–13 pp.15–17; VV. 1249a31–1250a2; De aff. 241.21–33). On the latter two works and their place in the tradition of Peripatetic moral psychology, see Gilbert-Thirry (supra n.1) 1–34.
soul-parts or, like the later doxographers, subdivisions of a single ἀλογον. The evidence from the author's own text is inconclusive, although only shortly after enumerating the tripartite soul-parts he sets forth his own division into ἀλογον and λόγον ἐχον (1185b4–13), without indicating any incompatibility between it and tripartition—a fact easily explained if he interpreted tripartition in the terms of bipartition, and hence recognized no fundamental difference between them.

More decisive, however, is evidence from Arius Didymus that shows how the Peripatetics incorporated tripartition into Aristotle’s bipartite framework. 28 Arius begins by describing the λογικον as κριτικον, and the ἀλογον as ὀρμητικον (117.12); the latter term would well describe the faculty of ὀρμη in the Magna Moralia, but it appears to have originated under Stoic influence, and does not occur before Arius. 29 Arius then subdivides the ἀλογον as follows: καὶ

28 On Arius’ sources see, most recently, P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen I (Berlin 1973); whether or not Arius knew Aristotle’s writings directly, the handbooks of Peripatetic doctrine he may have used are likely themselves to have been derivative compilations, and hence Arius may be expected to preserve earlier doctrine fairly closely even when he is not directly acquainted with the ultimate source.

29 Arius’ use of κριτικον and ὀρμητικον is elaborately paralleled by Numenius, fr.18 (in É. des Places, Numenius [Paris 1973]); cf. P. Merlan, Philologus 106 (1962) 141f. The doxographical usage of ὀρμητικον does not permit us to establish its early history with any confidence. It is applied to Aristotle (Dox.Graec. 438.12–14, 457.2), to Plato (Didasc. 178.32–37, Timaeus Locrus 102E; cf. A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus [Oxford 1928] 661–63), and (paired with the ἐπιθυμητικον and λογικον) to the Stoics and Epicureans (Dox.Graec. 438.15–20). Its appearance in Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem (Mor. 1122A–D) shows that it played an important rôle in the debates of the Hellenistic schools, and hence it is hardly surprising that the doxography is unclear. The usage of ὀρμητικον as a Stoic soul-part is not well attested (Dox.Graec. 438.15–20), and orthodox Stoics employed an eight-part division with five ἀισθητήρια, the ὕπνοι, the σπερματικον, and the ἡγεμονικον (the evidence is collected in SVF II 823–33; note also SVF I 143, II 836, 879; cf. A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy [London 1974] 170–78). The Stoics denied the alogical emotions of the soul a status separate from the rational faculty (SVF II 379, III 459–64; Gal., De plac. 190.12–13, 334.1–3; cf. A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity [Berkeley 1982] 61–64), and hence Arius’ description of the ἀλογον as ὀρμητικον contravenes Stoic doctrine and appears to represent a Peripatetic adaptation of the Stoic theory of ὀρμη. The status of ὀρμη in the Stoic soul-division is brought out clearly by Plut. Mor. 441C–D (cf. 449c); “impulse in excess” is in fact the accepted Stoic definition of πάθος (cf. SVF I 205–207; III 377–78, 391, 462, 479). According to Stoic doctrine, each of the soul’s μέρη has its own δύναμεις (SVF II 826), and ὀρμη was considered a δύναμις λογική (Dox.Graec. 410.28, SVF III 463; cf. Arius 86.17–87.13 [= SVF III 169]). The Stoic theory of ὀρμη is set out in detail in Galen’s polemic against Chrysippus in De Placitis Hippocrates et Platonis IV; Chrysippus’ definition of ὀρεξις (ὁρίζεται γονιν αὐτήν ὀρμη λογική ἐπί τι <το><το> ὀνον χρή γήδον<το>ς> [238.35f]) suggests how easily ὀρεξις and ὀρμη might have been harmonized by one for whom, after all, in Arius’ own words, ἀλογον δὲ λέγεσθαι ψυχῆς μέρος οὐ καθαρὰς ἀλογουν, ἀλλὰ τὸ οἴνον τε πειθεσθαι λόγῳ, ὡποίον ἐστι το παθητικον (117.7–9, cf. Eth.Nic. 1102b13–1103a3). Thus while the use of ὀρμητικον as a soul-part contradicts Stoic doctrine, the term was easily employed by Arius, whose understanding of Aristotle’s ὀρεκτικον (Eth.Nic. 1102b30) was influenced by Stoic ὀρμη.
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τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ μὲν ὀρεκτικὸν τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιθυμητικοῦ· τὸ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πλησίους οἰον ἀμυντικὸν θυμικὸν (117.16–18). Wachsmuth rightly comments “hanc divisionem animae notum est Platonicam esse” (ad loc.); for the subdivision one would expect if the author were following Aristotle is that into θετικοῦ and ὀρεκτικοῦ (Eth. Nic. 1102a33–1103a3). Arius is clearly familiar with this and other Aristotelian doctrine on soul-division, perhaps through an intermediate source; but the Peripatetic doctrine he here reports has joined together the two lower Platonic soul-parts into an ἀλόγον, even though he characterizes the θυμικὸν in a way that departs from its primary Platonic sense. This passage shows how Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic doctrine on soul-division was harmonized in the Peripatos; and since all the elements present in Arius are present also in the Magna Moralia, comparison of these two texts sheds light on the history of this process of harmonization in the Peripatetic school. As one would expect, the doctrine preserved in Arius seems to be more fossilized than that in the Magna Moralia: his use of the single term

30 Arius sometimes bases himself directly on an Aristotelian text (e.g. 139.19–140.6 with Eth. Eud. 1220b21–33; cf. Kenny [supra n.10] 200), and incorporates verbatim extracts from the Magna Moralia; but it is usually difficult to judge whether his references to Aristotelian doctrine derive from the original or from intermediate sources (see supra n.28, and n.32 infra). Arius’ definition of πάθος as τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος τῆς ζυχῆς εἰθυμεύον ὑπακούειν τῷ λογικῷ (38.9–10), which clearly recalls Eth.Nic. 1102b30–1103a3, suggests that he could have represented the ὀρεκτικὸν in terms closer to Aristotle’s; but, as in the Magna Moralia, the influence of the Stoic doctrine of ὑπαξία causes him to depart from Aristotle’s doctrine on soul-division.

31 Aristotle’s definition of ὑπαξία as an ὀρέξεις ἀντιλυπήσεως in the De anima (403a31; cf. Top. 156a31–b4, 127b31–33) was widely quoted in antiquity and probably stands behind Arius’ usage here; it is translated by Seneca (De ira 1.3) as ait iam esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi, and is reflected in Plutarch’s ὡς ἐπιθυμών τινά τῶν θυμῶν δύνα καὶ ὀρέξεις ἀντιλυπήσεως (Mor. 442b; cf. Ps.–Plut. De libid. 1). Arius describes the θυμικὸν in terms of the πάθος, which is regularly called ὑπαξία in Aristotle (e.g. Eth.Nic. 1126a13–b10), but which Plato (Resp. 440a5, c2) and the Academics (Top. 113a33–b3, 126a10) locate in the θυμοειδές.

32 The soul-divisions of Arius and of the Magna Moralia are closely related; although not all Arius’ doctrine derives from the Magna Moralia, one passage is directly excerpted, and Arius elsewhere draws upon closely-related Peripatetic sources. Arius’ catalogue of ὀρέξει των ἀλόγου καὶ ὀρέξει τοῦ ἀλόγου (137.19–23), apart from his addition of καλοκαγαθία, corresponds verbatim to the enumeration in Mag. Mor. 1185b4–13; and both in turn are paralleled by the shorter lists in Eth.Nic. 1103a3–10 and Eth. Eud. 1220a5–12 (cf. Walzer [supra n.1] 184). Dirlmeier (supra n.1) 206f has shown that Mag. Mor. 1185b4–13 is excerpted from a Peripatetic catalogue (cf. Rh. 1362b24) recording doctrine derived from Plato but not integrated into the structure of the Magna Moralia as a whole (ἀγχύνοια, εὐμάθεια, and μυθηματικαὶ do not recur). On Arius’ incorporation of passages from the Magna Moralia see H. von Arnim, Arius Didymus’ Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik (SitzWien 204.3 [1926]), who wrongly argued that Arius derived his knowledge of the Magna Moralia through Theophrastus (cf. Dirlmeier [supra n.1] 206f); Allan, JHS (supra n.10); 7–11; D. J. Furley, “A Note on Arius and Magna Moralia 1.1–2,” in Fortenbaugh (supra n.27) 160–64.
The terminology of 117.11–18 has been coloured by Stoicism but parallels doctrine in the *Magna Moralia*; cf. supra n.32.

34 For the doxographical tradition cf. supra n.13.

35 The context of 1182a24–25 precludes arguing that this passage records esoteric doctrine and that late in his life Plato adopted Aristotle’s bipartite division. According to the author’s criticisms, Plato would then have failed to understand the principles of the bipartite division for which he abandoned tripartition: that, although he assigned the virtues to soul-parts, he failed to recognize that the ethical and intellectual virtues correspond to the alogical and logical parts of the soul. But Plato would hardly have adopted bipartition without accepting its underlying principles. The suggestion (cf. Dirlmeier [supra n.1] 166) that this passage may be referred to Plato’s *Περὶ τοῦ ἄγαθον* is wholly unwarranted: in our earliest testimonium, Aristoxenus (*Harm.el.* 2.30–31) plainly quotes Aristotle as saying that most of those who heard this lecture were disappointed because it did not deal with what was considered the human good, and none of our other evidence (collected most recently by K. Gaiser, *Phronesis* 25 [1980] 5–37) suggests that this work dealt with moral psychology.
The author's subsequent remarks (1182a26–30) appear to incorporate stock Peripatetic criticism of Platonic moral psychology, and may simply repeat earlier doxography (see Appendix); but the only work of Plato to which 1182a24–30 can refer is the Republic.\(^{36}\) In representing tripartition as a division into ἄλογον and λόγον ἐχόν, therefore, the author uses a kind of short-hand to refer to the psychology of the Republic.\(^{37}\) It is impossible to know whether it was the author or an earlier Peripatetic who first interpreted the psychology of the Republic in this way. But even if the author's interpretation derives from earlier doxography, his terminology and conception of soul-division fully accord with it.\(^{38}\) Such harmonization of Platonic tripartition and Aristotelian bipartition must have been commonly accepted in the early Peripatos.

II

Thus far we have considered the evidence for the author's interpretation of tripartition, leaving aside its Platonic and Academic ante-

\(^{36}\) The author's criticism of Plato for mixing discussion of τὰ δύνατα and ἄληθεια with that of ἀρετὴ recalls the μιξὶς of Philb. 61β–67β, esp. 64ε–65α, and may reproduce Peripatetic criticism of that work; but it is most unlikely that direct criticism of the Philebus is intended here. According to the author, Plato rightly divided the soul and assigned the corresponding virtues (μέχρι μὲν ὧν τούτον καλῶς), but then fell into error (μετὰ μὲντοῦτον οὐκέτι ὀρθῶς). Only the Republic couples the psychological doctrine and investigation of τὸ ἀγαθὸν to which the author here objects, and it presents them in the order corresponding to the author's criticism. If this interpretation is correct, τὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν κατέμενεν ἕις τὴν πραγματείαν τὴν ὑπὲρ τάγαθον refers to the exposition of τὸ ἀγαθὸν in the Republic. If the author is reproducing stock Peripatetic criticism, as is likely, doctrine from and criticism of several sources may here be conflated.

\(^{37}\) The author's criticism of Socrates also derives from interpreting tripartition from the perspective of bipartition: the author naturally expects to find moral virtue associated with the ἄλογον; finding that Socrates' moral psychology rests on different principles, he criticizes him accordingly. The author's objections to Socrates' identification of the virtues with ἐπιστήμη (1182α15–23; cf. 1183β8–18) are a stock Peripatetic criticism (cf. Eth.Nic. 1144β17–30; Eth.Eud. 1216β3–25, 1246β33–36). Aristotle himself does not explicitly connect this criticism with bipartition, but the author (in 1182α17–23) is clearly justified in doing so: Socrates' identification of virtue with ἐπιστήμη prevents him from discovering the ἄλογον in its own right, and the author is historically correct in tracing Socrates' disregard for πάθος and ἵθος to his disregard for the alogical part of the soul; see Fortenbaugh (supra n.6) 63–65.

\(^{38}\) Note that the author takes Plato's soul-division as the antecedent for his own bipartition and does not recognize any incompatibility between the two soul-divisions: he approves of Plato's division into ἄλογον and λόγον ἐχόν (1182α26); and later, in introducing his own bipartite division, he says ὡς φαιμέν (1185b4), which can only refer to his earlier attribution of bipartition to Plato.
cedents. Let us now turn to the historical background and philosophical motivation of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition.

Plato's tripartite psychology was interpreted in various ways by members of the Academy during his own lifetime. It is impossible now to reconstruct the details of the Academic debate on soul-division or the transformation of tripartition into bipartition through Aristotle's reorganization of the desiderative elements of tripartition. For our present purpose it will suffice to indicate the contrast between the canonical expositions of Platonic tripartition and Aristotelian bipartition, since the author of the Magna Moralia simply interpreted the former in terms of the latter. But evidence of a different Academic interpretation of tripartition may be found in the psychological examples of the Topics. This evidence must be interpreted with caution, for many of Aristotle's examples are anonymous Academic δόξαι, recorded solely for dialectical purposes (cf. 101a30–34); one cannot therefore assume that isolated passages on the same subject record a related body of doctrine, much less that these δόξαι represent Aristotle's own doctrines.39 Indeed, mutually exclusive definitions of the ψυχή are often advanced in the Topics, or a definition advanced in one passage is rejected elsewhere, or rejected on different grounds.40 But while the passages on soul-division may not record a consistent body of doctrine, one passage provides a clear antecedent of the author's interpretation of tripartition:

\[\text{σάρκιν τοῦ πολύ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστως καθάπερ τὸ λογιστικόν ἱδὼν πρὸς ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ θυμικόν τὸ τὸ μὲν προστάτευι τὸ δ’ ὑπηρετεῖν’ ὅπερ γὰρ τὸ λογιστικόν πάντως προστάτει, ἀλλ’ ἐνὶ-οτε καὶ προστάτεται, ὡς τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ θυμικόν δεὶ προσ-τάτεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστάτει ποτὲ, ὅταν ἡ μοχθηρὰ η ὑποτήθν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (129a10–16).}\]

Not only does the syntax here make use of the subordination of servant to master in opposing the λογιστικόν to the other two parts, but 128b37–39 distinguishes ἀρετή from ἐπιστήμη because the former comes into being in several faculties, the latter only in the λογιστικόν. Now, it is not clear what conception of the rôle of the desiderative elements in the soul underlies this opposition. We cannot


40 Consider the definition of soul as οὐσία ἐπιστήμης δεκτική (151b1–2; cf. 140a35–38), or Xenocrates' definition of soul as ἄρμος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ κακῶν (140b2–7; cf. 120b3–5, 123a11–14, 23–26; De An. 404b30, 408b32–409a10, 409b4–18), on which see Cherniss (supra n.39) 10–19.
prove from 129a12–16 that the anonymous Academics simply rejected the Platonic status of the θυμοειδές, as the author of the Μάγνα Μοραλία did, although the grouping of the ἐπιθυμητικῶν and θυμικῶν in opposition to the λογιστικῶν reverses Plato’s grouping (Resp. 440b2, e4–6, 442a4–6; cf. n.44 infra) and may suggest that the θυμοειδές is no longer viewed as the natural ally of the λογιστικῶν. Perhaps 129a12–16 may be associated with the systematic assignment of the desiderative elements to each of the tripartite parts at 126a9–14, where βούλησις and αἰσχύνη are located in the λογιστικῶν (cf. Resp. 571c9, 606c3–6). In that case, the version of bipartition advanced at 129a12–16, since it involves a division of the desiderative elements among the soul-parts, would have a basis different from that of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition, which presupposes Aristotle’s doctrine of ὀρέξες.

In any event, there can be no doubt, from Socrates’ arguments against Glaucon’s tentative assignment of the θυμοειδές to the ἐπιθυμητικῶν (Resp. 439e1–5), that the conception of tripartition as a bipartite dichotomy necessarily misrepresents Plato’s moral psychology. In establishing that the soul’s conflicting desires require it to be divided into parts, Socrates argues that the phenomenon of thirst, when someone is simultaneously thirsty and reluctant to drink, requires at least two parts, τοῦ μὲν ὁ λογίζεται λογιστικῶν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ὁ ἔραξε τε καὶ πεινᾷ καὶ δυσφή καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστον τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῶν (439d5–8). This dichotomy indeed suggests a bipartite division, and Socrates’ use of ἀλόγιστον to designate the faculty containing the ἐπιθυμία (439d7) is a clear antecedent to Aristotle’s ἀλογον. But Socrates goes on to ask whether τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ὁ θυμούμεθα is a third soul-part or has the same nature (ὀμοφωνές) as either of the other two (439e2–4). When Glaucon tentatively associates it with the ἐπιθυμητικῶν, Socrates objects with the story of Leontius, arguing that θυμὸς is the natural ally of λόγος (ἐπίκουρον δὲ τῷ λογιστικῷ

41 If the psychological examples in the Topics are related, it is possible that the four cardinal virtues are coordinated with the bipartite version of tripartition at 128b37–39 and 129a12–16, as in tripartition; only φρόνησις and σωφροσύνη are explicitly assigned to the λογιστικῶν and ἐπιθυμητικῶν respectively (138b1–5, 136b11–14; cf. 134a34, 145a29–32); but the phrase καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρτιῶν ὁπῶς ἐκάστης λαμβανομένης (136b13) suggests that the other virtues are to be assigned to soul-parts in the same way, and elsewhere the four cardinal virtues are enumerated (108a1–3, 150a2–15).

42 Cf. Resp. 441c2, 604d9; Leg. 863b4; Theophr. fr. L.117; Def. 415e7. The Platonic antecedents to the division of the soul in Eth.Nic. 1.13 are discussed by Dirlmeier, Nikomachische Ethik (Berlin 1956) 293.
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φύσει, 441α2–3), that in the divided soul it sets its arms on the side of the λογιστικῶν (440α5–ε6), and that it is a third part separate from the other two (440ε8–441β1). The θυμοειδὲς always allies itself with the λογιστικῶν against the ἐπιθυμητικῶν, like two parties engaged in stasis (δυοὶ στασιαζόντων, 440β2), and never makes common cause with the ἐπιθυμία against the commands of λόγος (440β4–c5); its natural function is to enforce the deliberations of the λογιστικῶν and to ensure that, in point of ruling and being ruled, the ἐπιθυμητικῶν, like the other two parts, acts justly in accordance with the principle, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.44

Clearly, this conception of the θυμοειδὲς as the natural ally of the λογιστικῶν, with its own ἐπιθυμία providing a source of motivation independent of that of the other two parts, precludes grouping it with the ἐπιθυμητικῶν and reducing tripartition to a bipartite dichotomy. The Peripatetics who represented the tripartite psychology of the Republic as a division into ἄλογον and λόγον ἔχον interpreted it in terms of Aristotle’s doctrine of ὀρέξεις. Although Aristotle does consider it more disgraceful to yield to ἐπιθυμία than to θυμὸς, because the latter is at least responsive to λόγος, he nonetheless deprives θυμὸς of its status as an independent form of motivation, grouping it together with the other ὀρέξεις in the ἄλογον.45 Attempting to reconcile tripartition to the framework of Aristotelian bipartition, the Peripatetics rejected the special status of the θυμοειδὲς by assimilating θυμὸς to the other ὀρέξεις (cf. Mag.Mor. 1187b36–37, 1188a23–26) and equated the resulting bipartite dichotomy with Aristotle’s division into ἄλογον and λόγον ἔχον.

Thus Plato’s tripartite psychology differs fundamentally from the division into ἄλογον and λόγον ἔχον attributed to him by the Peripatetics.46 In order to represent tripartition as a bipartite dichotomy, they had to reject the independent status of the θυμοειδὲς together


44 Cf. 440ε4–6, 441δ8–e1, 442α4–c3, 442δ8–443β2, 443c9–444α2, 444δ8–11, 586ε4–587α5, 589α6–β6; Leg. 644δ7–645c1; Tim. 70α2–7, 70δ2–6; Phdr. 246α6–b4, 253c7–255a1, 255ε4–256a6. When Socrates groups the three soul-parts into a dichotomy, he opposes the upper two parts to the ἐπιθυμητικῶν (cf. 440β2, 44–6, 442α4–6); only in the case of συναφοῦσα does he reverse the grouping (442c10–b1), but the agreement by the other two parts that the λογιστικῶν should rule in no way alters the natural function of the θυμοειδὲς to enforce the βουλευόμενα (442β9) of the λογιστικῶν (cf. e.g. Leg. 645α5–b1).


46 Cf. supra n.9 and the passages cited supra n.44 (add Resp. 602c–605c, Tim. 41c–44c).
with the distribution of desiderative elements among the three soul-parts, and to interpret tripartition in the terms of Aristotle's analysis of ἀρετής. Aristotle himself never represents tripartition as a bipartite dichotomy, and in the criticism of soul-division at De Anima 432a24–b7 he clearly distinguishes the two divisions. It was not until a generation later, when the problems that had motivated the Academic debate on soul-division were no longer alive, that the early Peripatetics attempted to reconcile Platonic and Aristotelian psychology. By interpreting tripartition in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition they fundamentally misrepresented Plato's psychology; yet, through a complex history of transmission, this Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition dominated the doxography and philosophical speculation of later antiquity. Virtually all subsequent discussion of soul-division represents tripartition in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition. The brief doxographical notice at Magna Moralia 1182a24–25 is only the first record of a Peripatetic doctrine that shaped the interpretation of Plato's psychology for many centuries thereafter.

**APPENDIX: PLATO IN THE MAGNA MORALIA**

Did the author of the Magna Moralia derive his knowledge of Plato from earlier doxography? We have seen (supra nn.36–37) that some of the details of 1182a24–30 are well explained by this hypothesis. If the author considered his attribution of bipartition to Plato original, he would surely have explained his interpretation of tripartition (as e.g. Aëtius, Dox.Graec. 389.10–390.4); instead, as Dirlmeier (supra n.1) 165 recognizes, he presents it as a commonplace, requiring no further elaboration. Moreover, if the author based his criticism of Socrates and Plato directly on the Republic, why should he ascribe bipartition to the latter and argue that the former did not recognize the ἀλογον? (What source other than Plato's dialogues would the author have for Socrates' psychological doctrine?) This inconsistency suggests that the author is simply reproducing stock Peripatetic criticism, and indeed his manner of presentation suggests that his own usage of doctrine was characteristic of contemporary discussions of soul-division.

If the doxography of 1182a10–30 does not reproduce a written source verbatim, it certainly reflects the understanding of pre-Aristotelian moral philosophy current in the Peripatos. It is possible, moreover, that the author's attribution of bipartition to Plato derived from the Peripatetic work that recorded Platonic doctrine and was the source for his catalogue of ἀρεται at 1185b4–13 (supra n.32). In introducing bipartition, the author says ὡς ἀμερ (1185b4), which can only refer to his earlier attribution of bipartition to Plato at 1182a24f. The source of the author's catalogue of ἀρεται at 1185b4–13 must also have referred to the division into ἀλογον and λογον ἔχον (it is the basis for the classification of the ἀρεται). Since 1182a10–30 probably derives
from earlier doxography, and since the Peripatetic catalogue recorded Platonic doctrine, the author’s source for 1185b4–13, might also have contained a doxography of soul-division that attributed bipartition to Plato. This evidence is suggestive, but hardly conclusive.

In his only other reference to Plato, the author explicitly cites the Republic (1194a6) for an example of his doctrine of proportionate justice, but his discussion (1194a6–29) leaves it uncertain whether he knows the work at first hand. Although the author’s enumeration of the γεωργός, οίκοδόμος, ύφαντης, and σκυτότημος does reproduce the membership of the self-sufficient ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις of Resp. 369c–370D, the ἀναλογία as an example of which the author cites this passage is not mentioned there at all, and his citation is marked as an interpretation by the analysis that begins ἦσσεν δ’ ἡ ἀναλογία αὐτή (1194a12). As Professor Cherniss has suggested to me, the author or his source appears to have taken as implicit in this passage of the Republic Aristotle’s doctrine of proportionate justice (Eth.Nic. 1132b31–1133b28). In fact, Aristotle himself uses the same examples as Plato (οἰκοδόμος and σκυτότημος, 1133a7–10; γεωργός, 1133b1; οἶνον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτότῳμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποθήματων ἀμοιβῇ γίνεται κατ’ ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ύφαντητὶ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς, 1163b33–1164a1), and he explicitly criticizes 369c–370D at Pol. 1291a10–22. Hence a Peripatetic might easily read this doctrine back into the Republic. (The report of οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι [1194a30] may be explained by the account of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός at Eth.Nic. 1132b20–22, which the author follows with modifications.) It must remain uncertain whether the author himself or some earlier Peripatetic introduced the illustration from the Republic. But it may well have been a stock Peripatetic example that the author took over from an earlier doxography, and certainly 1194a6–29 may not be used as evidence that the author was directly acquainted with the Republic.

In both cases where the author mentions Plato, therefore, he may well be drawing upon earlier doxography. Not only is 1182a24f best explained by supposing that the author was reporting a Peripatetic commonplace, but the criticism of Platonic moral psychology that follows bears all the marks of stock Peripatetic doctrine.47

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