Galen and Stoic Rhetoric

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The Sophists are at dinner, and among them Athenaeus places Galen as well as the less identifiable physicians ‘Daphnus of Ephesus’ and ‘Rufinus of Nicaea’. The connection between rhetoric and medicine is in fact an old one, going back to the beginnings of both in the first sophistic period. We might expect, however, that the connection would be especially well marked in the second century A.D. No one can think of Fronto and Aelius Aristides without remarking the obsession with health, healing, and medicine that dominates their works; for E. R. Dodds, in fact, the hypochondria of Fronto and Aristides was one symptom of an age of anxiety.

On the other hand, Galen, the greatest physician of the age, for all that he was a master of argument and persuasion, rejected rhetoric and expresses nothing but contempt for those who were deluded by it or devoted to it.

Perhaps it is Galen’s emphatic scorn for rhetoric or his failure to provide us with a systematic exposition of his ideas on it that accounts for the lack of scholarly attention to his views on the subject.

1 All three names may be corrupt or inventions of the Byzantine epitomator who gave us our present text of Book I of the Deipnosophistae; see John Scarborough, “The Galenic Question,” Sudithoffs Archiv 65 (1981) 1–31, esp. 18–21.


But even Galen’s scorn deserves study. His contemptuous attitude toward rhetoric was based on deep consideration of the philosophical issues raised by an anti-rhetorical stance. His ideas on rhetoric can be reconstructed from isolated passages in his medical and philosophical works. Finally, it is worth noting that Galen’s expressed contempt for rhetoric does not allow us to conclude that he was ignorant of it or reluctant to employ its methods. He tells us himself that he had read the rhetoricians’ handbooks (Doctr. 3.5 [V 326 K., I 204 De Lacy]), and his works reveal a practical, as well as theoretical, acquaintance with the rhetoricians’ art.6

The greatest influences on Galen’s idea of rhetoric were Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Part, at least, of this statement may seem obvious; for Galen, Plato and Hippocrates were the almost divine founders of true philosophical and medical knowledge (Exhort. 5 [I 8 K., 5 Kaibel]). As Philip De Lacy has shown, it is not wholly inaccurate to call Galen a Platonist.6 Even his eclecticism has an Academic cast. As for Aristotle, when Galen insists that clarity, σαφήνεια, is the greatest virtue of style (Nat.Fac. 1.1 [II 1 K., 1 Brock]) and that language, λέξις, has one virtue, signifying well (Fall. 2 [XIV 587 K., 94 Edlow]), he reveals his reading of Aristotle. At the beginning of his discussion of style in Book III of his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines the principal virtue of style (λέξις): it is clarity (τὸ σαφεῖ), since “speech, if it does not make the meaning clear, will not perform its proper function” (1404b1). Aristotle’s influence on Galen’s rhetoric extends, of course, beyond this example; it is pervasive.

The influence of Stoicism on Galen’s rhetoric may seem less certain. Although Galen wrote a treatise in three books on Stoic logic, a subject

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6 See especially On Prognosis with Nutton’s introduction (supra n.4) 59–63. I cite Galen’s works by title and section or book and section, followed by a reference for convenience’s sake only to volume and page in the edition of C. G. Kühn (Leipzig 1821–33), on which see V. Nutton, Karl-Gottlob Kühn and his Edition of the Works of Galen: A Bibliography (Oxford 1976). Kühn’s edition remains the most nearly complete Galen and must still be used for many of Galen’s works, but it is marred by numerous inaccuracies. For works mentioned in this paper I have used the following editions, cited by editor’s last name: Exhortation, G. Kaibel, Galeni Protreptici quae supersunt (Berlin 1894); On His Own Books, I. Müller, Claudii Galeni Persagmeni Scripta Minora II (Leipzig 1891); Doctrines, Ph. De Lacy, Galeni De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis: Galen On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates (CMG V.4.1–2 [1978–80]); Thrasybulus, G. Helmreich, Scripta Minora III (Leipzig 1893); Natural Faculties, A. J. Brock, Galen On the Natural Faculties (Cambridge [Mass.] 1916); On Prognosis, V. Nutton (supra n.4); On Fallacies, R. B. Edlow, Galen On Language and Ambiguity: An English Translation of Galen’s 'De Captionibus' (On Fallacies) (Leiden 1977); Introduction to Logic, K. Kalbfleisch, Galeni Institutio Logica (Leipzig 1896). See also H. Leitner, Bibliography to the Ancient Medical Authors (Bern 1973) 18–33.


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including rhetoric and dialectic (*Books* 16 [XIX 47 K., 123 Müller]), and is, as the index of von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* shows, one of our most important sources for Stoic doctrine, he cites the Stoics only to refute them. Like Plutarch in the first generation of the Second Sophistic, Galen has what C. P. Jones has called "the traditional mistrust of the Academy for rhetoric." Galen frequently insists that it does not matter what names one uses for things so long as one understands their nature, a position bound to bring him into conflict with the Stoics' belief that there was a natural correspondence between names and things. His attacks on the Stoic use of etymologies to discover truth stand out even among his cantankerous polemics.

Two further problems present themselves when we consider the phrase 'Stoic rhetoric'. First, our sources do not allow us to reconstruct with any confidence a rhetorical theory which can be labeled 'Stoic'. The Stoics divided logic into dialectic and rhetoric and considered rhetoric the art of speaking well about those true things which dialectic had discovered (Diog. Laer. 7.41). This definition is not of much help in reconstructing a coherent rhetorical theory, and when Diogenes Laertius, after outlining Stoic dialectic in some detail, comes to rhetoric, his description is brief, conventional, and uninformative (7.43). Zeno himself, asked to explain the difference between dialectic and rhetoric, resorted to metaphor: dialectic was the fist, rhetoric the open palm (*SVF* I 75). Although we can occasionally recover specific Stoics' doctrines on specific points about rhetoric, it is almost impossible to reconstruct a coherent and articulated doctrine of Stoic rhetoric from such evidence; even if we could, the disagreements of the Stoics with one another would probably keep us from discovering any uniform Stoic rhetoric.

The second problem is easier. If we wish to assess the influence of Stoic ideas about rhetoric on Galen's ideas about rhetoric, we need to remember that the boundaries of rhetoric, as well as what they contain, may be very different for the Stoics, for Galen, and for us. The Stoics included under dialectic style and diction, correctness of usage, tropes and figures, and other matters which both modern and ancient rhetoricians would consider part of rhetoric. When I speak of Ga-
Galen's ideas about rhetoric or the Stoics' ideas about rhetoric, I mean by 'rhetoric' those subjects included in the art of using language persuasively as understood in antiquity by such unphilosophical theorists as the Auctor ad Herennium and Quintilian—even if Galen or the Stoics would not have considered such subjects part of rhetoric as they understood it.

Given these necessary qualifications, it may seem that to attempt to discuss Stoic influence on Galen's ideas about rhetoric would be inconclusive at best. Hence it will be necessary to insist that Stoic ideas on language and rhetoric were, after Plato's and Aristotle's, the most important philosophical influence on Galen's rhetorical ideas. This is not to say that Galen's ideas on rhetoric are Stoic ideas. Galen is not a Stoic, and in his remarks on rhetoric the influence of Plato, Aristotle, and others can be seen and sometimes distinguished from that of the Stoics. Here I shall attempt only to show how Stoic ideas on rhetoric influenced Galen. No unexpected picture of Galen's relations with the Stoics will emerge from my examination of his ideas on rhetoric; rather, our image of Galen the anti-Stoic will be filled out, and it will become clear that his idea of rhetoric was in large part a response to the Stoics' treatment of the subject.

Galen speaks of rhetoric in at least three different ways. He can group ῥητορικὴ τέχνη with other technai in a conventional list; at Exhort. 14 (I 38–39 K., 22 Kaibel), for example, he groups rhetoric with medicine and μουσική in a tripartite list which includes geometry, arithmetic, and logic as well as astronomy, grammar, and law. A similar list at Thrasyb. 24 (V 851 K., 55 Helmreich) includes arithmetic, geometry, and music. Another at On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 8.1 (V 652 K., II 482 De Lacy) groups architecture, music, and the designing of sundials with logic, rhetoric, and grammar.¹⁰

Galen can also use rhetoric as the opposite of truth. Again in the Exhortation, we find him contrasting the man who is zealous for truth with the ῥητορικὸς ἀνήρ (Exhort. 10 [I 25 K., 13–15 Kaibel]). This second manner of speaking about rhetoric may seem to establish the counter-Stoic nature of Galen's idea of the subject. For the Stoics, rhetoric was one of the two fundamental parts of logic; thus their view that rhetoric was the knowledge of speaking well about those things which the other division of logic, dialectic, had discovered. But the contrast which Galen exploits between rhetoric and truth is no

¹⁰ Other lists: Doctr. 9.2 (V 733 K., II 550 De Lacy); Thrasyb. 24 (V 848 K., 63 Helmreich); Method 1.1 (X 17 K.).
more than a conventional antithesis. It can be found even in authors whose attitude toward rhetoric was sympathetic or enthusiastic: in Aristotle (Rh. 1359b, 1402a) and even Demosthenes (Exord. 46.2). Galen’s use of this antithesis says nothing one way or the other about his attitude toward Stoic ideas on rhetoric.

The third way in which Galen speaks about rhetoric does, however, show how closely he studied Stoic teachings on the subject. For the Stoics, logic, the part of philosophy dealing with language and its relation to reality, was the single instrument of inquiry into truth, and rhetoric was inseparably part of logic. But Galen is committed to the Platonic view that knowledge of what is true must come not from the study of words but from study of the thing itself. In his logic, also, Galen rejected the Stoic view that the verbal form of a proposition determined its necessity in favor of the Peripatetic view that the necessity of a logical proposition was determined by the relation among the facts of the proposition.\textsuperscript{11} Collision with the Stoic logos-centered epistemology was inevitable, but Galen could not reject the bipartite Stoic division of logic entirely. It was too well known, too widely accepted, and, Galen may have felt, too useful to be set aside.

The Stoic partition of logic could, however, be modified. Galen’s most detailed modification of it and most extended discussion of both rhetoric and the Stoics occur in the first five books of the \textit{Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato}, where he attacks, at greater length than an impartial observer might think necessary, Chrysippus’ view that the rational soul was located in the chest. In the \textit{Doctrines} Galen sets up a four-fold division of inquiry. All investigations can be placed into one of four classes according to the kind of premises on which the investigation is based: scientific (ἐπιστημονική), dialectical (διαλεκτική), rhetorical (ῥητορική), or sophistic (σοφιστική); he also refers to the dialectical mode as the mode of training (γνωστική).\textsuperscript{12} Galen’s four-fold division of inquiry in the \textit{Doctrines} represents an expansion of the Stoic division of logic under the influence of two of his ruling passions: Platonic epistemology and hatred of rhetoricians.

Galen accepted Plato’s argument (Cra. 435D–439B) that the knowledge which proceeds from the investigation of things themselves is more valid than the knowledge which proceeds from an investigation of names and language. After describing the importance of dissection

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Intr.} 3.1 (8 Kalbfleisch); see J. S. Kieffer, \textit{Galen’s Institutio Logica} (Baltimore 1964) 70.

for establishing the seat of the rational soul, he observes that “everything which falls outside this course is superfluous and irrelevant; and this is the way in which a scientific premise of a demonstration (ἐπιστημονικὸν ἀποδείξεως λήμμα) differs from one that is rhetorical, useful for training, or sophistical” (Doctr. 2.3.8 [V 220 K., I 110 De Lacy]). He goes on to define a rhetorical premise as one which proceeds “from men’s opinions (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δόξων), whether those of non-experts or poets or philosophers, or from some etymology, or from nods, whether of assent or dissent, or from anything else of that kind” (2.4.4 [227 K., 116 De Lacy]). His setting up of a category of scientific or genuine knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) above the knowledge, based on δόξα, that comes from dialectic and rhetoric is an attempt—to how successful I shall not attempt to say—to combine Stoic and Platonic notions about language, knowledge, and the world, and to assert the superiority of Platonic ἐπιστήμη over Stoic δόξα.\(^\text{13}\)

Galen’s ideas on language are in fact often marked by this combination of Platonism and Stoicism. At Doctrines 9.1 (V 734 K., II 544 De Lacy), in the course of an attack on those physicians who regard the name of something as more important than the thing itself, he gives his view of the purpose of language: “we use names and linguistic communication generally in order to express the thoughts in our mind that we have gained from examining the nature of things.” In this statement Galen interposes a mediating construct, the “thoughts in our mind” (τὰς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν δόξας), between language and reality. Plato had said that language should be based on the nature of things, but apart from a few hints in the Cratylius,\(^\text{14}\) he says nothing about any procession from thing to thought to name. Aristotle (Int. 16a) had argued that just as written words were the symbols of spoken words, so spoken words were the symbols of mental experience. But Aristotle’s scheme is static. Galen’s mention of gaining δόξα implies that he was thinking less of Aristotle’s scheme than of the Stoic doctrine of impressions, with its focus on

\(^{13}\) On Galen’s epistemology in general see Michael Frede, “Galen’s Epistemology,” in Galen: Problems and Prospects, (supra n.4) 65–88.

\(^{14}\) E.g. 386E–387D, where Socrates sets up an analogy between cutting and burning on the one hand and speaking on the other. When we cut something, we ought not to cut it however or with whatever we wish. Only if we wish to cut each thing in accordance with the nature of the operation and the instrument will we succeed. In the same way we cannot burn something according to every opinion, but only according to the right one. Speaking and naming similarly proceed from a right opinion about the nature of things. Later Socrates focuses on the making of names and shows that just as knowledge is necessary for making tools, so knowledge is necessary in making names (389C–D).
the dynamics of perception. According to this doctrine, perception was the result of an impression made on the psyche by external objects. These impressions might or might not be assented to by the person perceiving, and the entire perception (impression plus assent) might or might not be true. Galen’s talk of gaining δοξα may reflect the influence of the Stoic attention to the psychology of perception and language.

Aristotle also had anticipated the Stoics in associating rhetoric with dialectic; both, he said, were universally applicable, not tied to any particular subject matter, and both were means of providing arguments (Rh. 1356a30). The Stoics took this association of rhetoric with dialectic from Aristotle and made it the cornerstone of their epistemology. Galen’s approach to rhetoric, however, owes as much to the Stoic development as to Aristotle’s original assertion of the association. For Galen as for the Stoics rhetoric is a means of inquiry into the truth and an epistemological tool; he has little interest in analyzing rhetoric as what Aristotle repeatedly insists that it is, a practical art (e.g. Rh. 1359b), or in laying down rules and methods for using it.

At the other end of Galen’s four-fold hierarchy, his addition of a category of sophistical reasoning reflects his acceptance of the utility of the common antithesis between truth and rhetoric. It may also stem from his own adaptation of the Platonic distinction between eristic and antilologic and the Aristotelian distinction between rhetoric and sophistry. But Galen’s addition of a category of argumentation below rhetoric is also an indication of Stoic influence on his idea of rhetoric. It demonstrates his realization that the Stoic elevation of rhetoric to a place beside dialectic in the discipline of logic meant that an argument could not be refuted merely by calling it ‘rhetorical’.

Not that Galen did not try. In refuting Erasistratus’ views on ‘attraction’ (ἀλκή) he imagines what he might say to Erasistratus (Nat. Fac. 1.61 [II 61 K.]): “My good sir, do not run us down in this rhetorical fashion without some proof (χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως); state some definite objection to our view, in order that either you may convince us by a brilliant refutation of the ancient doctrine, or that, on the other hand, we may convert you from your ignorance” (tr. Brock). Rhetoric, then, is distinct from proof by demonstration (ἀποδείξεις). But he realizes that rhetoric cannot be used in this way without explanation, and he continues:

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Yet why do I say ‘rhetorical’? For we too are not to suppose that when certain rhetoricians pour ridicule upon that which they are quite incapable of refuting, without any attempt at argument, their words are really thereby constituted rhetoric. For rhetoric proceeds by persuasive reasoning (διὰ λόγου πιθανοῦ); words without reasoning are buffoonery (τὸ δὲ ἄνευ λόγου βωμολογικὸν) rather than rhetoric. Therefore, the reply of Erasistratus in his treatise “On Deglutition” was neither rhetoric nor logic (οὔτε ῥητορικὸς οὔτε διαλεκτικὸς).

The buffoonery which Galen here contrasts with rhetoric is the same as the sophistry at the bottom of his hierarchy of logic in the Doctrines. Erasistratus’ arguments are neither rhetorical nor dialectical; that is, they are outside the realm of argument by discourse, which in Galen’s view was all the bipartite Stoic logic included, as well as outside the higher realm of ἐπιστήμη or knowledge from demonstration (ἀπόδειξις, cf. Doctr. 2.3.8).

For Galen, in fact, the rhetorical tends to merge with the sophistical. At Doctrines 2.4 (V 228 K., I 116 De Lacy), for example, he distinguishes rhetorical premises from sophistical: the rhetorical are “twice removed from the scientific and differ by no great amount from sophistical premises, which consist for the most part of certain homonyms and forms of expression” (τοῖς τής λέξεως σχήμασι). The fact that Galen felt the need of a category of sub-rhetorical argumentation so little different from the rhetorical shows how thoroughly the Stoic concept of rhetoric as the art of saying true things well had shaped his idea of rhetoric. After the Stoics, it was simply not possible for someone careful with language to use ‘rhetoric’ as equivalent to ‘specious argumentation’. Galen, one feels, would have if he could, but he is always careful to keep rhetoric, which is based on δόξα and may or may not express the truth, distinct from scientific knowledge on the one hand and sophistry on the other.

Galen’s manipulation of the Stoic partition of logic is one aspect of his systematic downgrading of rhetoric. Another is his insistence that rhetoric is a craft of limited application, and that the single word was in fact rhetoric’s sole province. In this matter as in his repartition of logic, the greatest influence on Galen’s rhetoric was Stoic rhetoric. At Crisis Days 1.4 (IX 789 K.) Galen attacks doctors who quibble over what language means while they are ignorant of the very thing being talked about. They know as little about medicine, he says, as they do about dialectic, rhetoric, and grammar. The dialectician’s art will tell them about the rightness of a term; as for the grammarian and rhetorician, they can do no more than determine whether a term is good.
GREEK (ἐἰ συννθῆς τοῖς Ἑλληστὶ). These remarks represent a deliberate downgrading of the Stoic partition of logic. Dialectic, far from being the instrument for distinguishing truth from falsehood, is in Galen’s view merely a means for determining whether or not a given term is the correct one to use, and that question, as he makes clear on a number of occasions (supra n.8), was to him far less important than the question what is the nature of the thing under discussion. Rhetoric he downgrades still further; the rhetorician belongs with the humble grammaticus, and his function in a genuine scientific inquiry is only to judge the propriety of individual words and expressions. (Here, as often, one senses something more than philosophical ardor behind Galen’s attitude toward rhetoricians; his hatred—the word is not too strong—for them makes one suspect that his youthful rejection of their teaching was prompted by some personal injury.)

In limiting the rhetorician’s function to the determination of whether or not a term is good Greek, Galen does two things: first, he confines the province of rhetoric to single words, and second, he confines it to a single virtue of style, Hellenism. In both cases he is drawing on, modifying, and refuting Stoic ideas. The Stoics were not, of course, the first to catalogue the virtues of style or to give Hellenism a place among them. Theophrastus held that speech should have four qualities (Cic. Orat. 79): it should be pure and in proper Greek (purus et Latinus, says Cicero), lucid and clear, fitting, and ornate. Theophrastus’ list was an expansion of Aristotle’s declaration (Rh. 1404b) that clarity was the prime virtue of style. The Theophrastan list was in turn taken over by the Stoics and expanded to include a fifth term, conciseness (Diog. Laer. 7.59). Hellenism, however, held the prime place for them as it had for Theophrastus and indeed for Aristotle (Rh. 1407a).16

Michael Frede has demonstrated that the science of grammar developed out of an attempt to discover whether or not there was a τέχνη by which the Hellenism of a particular usage could be judged.17 He points out that in Diogenes’ report of the Stoic doctrine of the virtues of style, Hellenism is defined as an accurate way of speaking (φράσεις ἀδιάπωτος) in accordance with the technical, and not some random usage (ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συννθείᾳ). Frede goes on to show that “in [this] definition of Hellenism, ‘technical’ is chosen to mark the Stoic attitude” (41); proper usage is acquired

neither through practice and observation nor through scientific ἐπιστήμη, but through knowledge of a τέχνη.

Galen supports this Stoic attitude, although he traces it to his master Plato. At Doctrines 9.5 (V 760 K., II 568 De Lacy), after quoting Plato’s remarks on rhetoric at Phaedrus 271c–272b, Galen comments, “this is what [Plato] said about rhetoric here, as he instructed us how best to construct the art by the use of a method (μεθόδῳ χρώμενος), not by experience and familiarity (δι’ ἐμπειρίας τε καί τριβής), as most men do.” Rhetoric for Galen, as his remarks at Crisis Days 1.4 show, dealt with the virtue of style called Hellenism, and Hellenism in the Stoic view was not to be acquired through practice and observation. Nor were rhetoric and Hellenism a matter of ἐπιστήμη; Galen would have endorsed that Stoic view as well.

Galen’s assessment of the proper functions of the dialectician, grammarian, and rhetorician at Crisis Days 1.4 is part of his systematic campaign to reduce the entire heuristic apparatus of the Stoics to a minor part of scientific inquiry, one concerned only with the names of things. Galen implies that dialectic was concerned only with judging whether or not a name was consistent with the thing it described, and that grammar and rhetoric were both concerned only with whether or not a name was consistent with the canons of Hellenic usage. And these questions, he has repeatedly said, are trivial; they should not be made a substitute for questions about the nature of the thing itself, for knowledge of the nature of the thing itself is the only knowledge that matters (supra n.8). These trivial questions, he rather unfairly implies, are the only ones with which the Stoic system of inquiry is concerned.

Galen does not in fact do justice to Stoic logic or to Stoic theories of language. He concentrates on the Stoic emphasis on names (ὄνοματα) and etymologies, and he ignores their complex doctrine of predications (λέκτα). It is of course impossible to say why someone does not discuss a particular matter, but I think it likely that Galen neglected this part of Stoic linguistics in part at least because it was not relevant to his purposes. His business with the Stoics was essentially polemic, and their etymologizing of reality provided a convenient target. Chrysippus’ use of etymologies to answer physiological and anatomical questions was in fact foolish, and Galen missed no opportunity to point out the folly. The more complex doctrine of predication provided a less convenient target and one less obviously related to the medical questions that were Galen’s main concern.

If I am right, Crisis Days 1.4 is one of many passages in which Galen’s treatment of rhetoric reveals that he had made a deep study
of Stoic ideas on the subject, even though he did not accept them.
But is it not possible that the Stoics are not only in the background at
*Crisis Days* 1.4, but not there at all? The Stoics, after all, divided
logic into dialectic and rhetoric, not into dialectic, grammar, and
rhetoric. The grouping of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic in Galen
may be only the conventional *trivium* so familiar from the division of
the seven liberal arts into *trivium* and *quadrivium*; alternately, the
inclusion of grammar with rhetoric may reflect only the conventional
partition of education in letters between the *grammaticus* and *rhetor*.

It is unlikely, however, that Galen knew of the *trivium/quadrivium*
division. Although the canon of seven liberal arts had come into
being by the middle of the first century B.C., the division into the
*trivium* of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic and the *quadrivium* of
mathematics, music, astronomy, and geometry cannot be found ear­
erlier than Boethius. Occasional earlier groupings accidentally antici­
pate one or another of the later divisions—the arts of the *quadrivium*,
for example, appear together in Archytas of Tarentum (DK 47B1)—
but in Galen’s time there was no standard grouping or order for the
liberal arts. They could appear in any order, as Galen’s list of them at
*Exhort.* 14 shows. It is also unlikely that Galen’s grouping of dialectic,
grammar, and rhetoric reflects the conventional *grammaticus/rhetor*
division. The presence of dialectic in the list shows that Galen has a
philosophical, not an educational, partition in mind.

Galen’s placing of grammar in a three-fold grouping with dialectic
and rhetoric at *Crisis Days* 1.4, far from suggesting that he did not
have the Stoic division of logic in mind, confirms that he did. The
inclusion of grammar as a separate item was made necessary by the
position of grammar in Stoic logic. Galen is listing all the ways in
which the Stoics consider language: not only dialectic and rhetoric,
but also the grammar which could be seen as belonging to both.
Michael Frede has argued that the Stoics had a discipline of grammar
as a separate part of their logic. Stoic grammar was conventionally
part of dialectic, which (*cf.* Diog. Laert. 7.44) included phonology,
the parts of speech, and other essentially grammatical topics as well
as consideration of solecism and barbarism, the two vices opposed to
the virtue of Hellenism. At the same time, because grammar had
grown out of the science of diction, it naturally had a connection with
rhetoric:

So the material covered by the original rhetorical theory of diction
will be divided into two parts, one part that deals in a general way

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with any (educated) use of language, and which will become the part of dialectic with which we are concerned as, so to speak, a general theory of diction; and another part that deals with the specifically rhetorical use of language, and which will remain a part of rhetoric. Grammar, in fact, has an ambiguous status in the Stoic partition of logic between dialectic and rhetoric. Galen’s inclusion of it with the two major divisions at Crisis Days 1.4 reflects that status.

We may now ask where these traces of Stoicism in Galen’s ideas about rhetoric have come from and what they tell us about Galen’s position in the philosophical milieu of the second century. Our answers to both questions will necessarily be less than dogmatic. By Galen’s time philosophy had become a subject in which the questions asked and the vocabulary in which the answers were expressed differed little from school to school. This cross-fertilization of approach and terminology is especially apparent in the connections between Stoicism and Middle Platonism. From its beginnings under Antiochus of Ascalon in the first century B.C., Middle Platonism assimilated Stoic ideas and terminology; in fact, much of the debate within Middle Platonism turns on the question whether Platonic doctrine should be interpreted with the aid of Peripateticism, as Plutarch and Calvénus Taurus tended to believe, or with the aid of Stoicism, as Galen’s teacher Albinus and Taurus’ follower Atticus held.

It is thus not necessarily true that an expression or argument in Galen which can be paralleled in Stoic sources came to Galen directly from the Stoics. No proof of Stoic influence on Galen can be based on such facts as his use of the Stoic order Logic, Physics, Ethics as opposed to the standard Platonist order of Ethics, Physics, Logic. In his summary of Platonic doctrine, Albinus, the Middle Platonist teacher of Galen, follows the Stoic order. Nor can one argue the contrary, that Stoic expressions and arguments in Galen must have come to him through Middle Platonic sources. Although he does not specifically mention their rhetoric, Galen frequently summarizes the writings of Chrysippus, Posidonius, and other Stoics, refutes their arguments, and employs their terminology. He knew their works first-hand and

19 Frede (supra n.17) 49.
21 For Galen’s use of the Stoic order, see for example Doctr. 9.7 (V 781 K., II 588 De Lacy). Albinus gives the Platonic order Physics, Ethics, Logic at Epitome 3 but follows the Stoic order in his treatment of the subjects. The Epitome is most conveniently found in vol. 6 of Hermann’s Teubner text of Plato, under the traditional but erroneous authorship of ‘Alcinous’.
PEARCY, LEE T., Galen and Stoic Rhetoric, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 24:3 (1983: Autumn) p. 259

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cannot have overlooked what they had to say about rhetoric. But even when all due allowance is made for the concepts and vocabulary held in common by Stoicism and Platonism in Galen’s day, it is clear that Galen’s ideas on rhetoric represent an original assessment, based in part on Stoic ideas, of the position of rhetoric in philosophy. Galen’s inclusion of the Stoic two-fold partition, dialectic and rhetoric, in his four-fold classification of arguments according to their premises cannot be paralleled in Middle Platonic sources.

Galen’s partition does, however, bear a superficial resemblance to one set forth by Albinus at Epitome 3. There Albinus presents what he understands to be the Platonic division of philosophy. Philosophy is theoretical, practical, or dialectical. Dialectic in turn has four divisions, of which the last, syllogistic, has three divisions, demonstrative (ἀποδεικτικόν), attempted (ἐπιχειρηματικόν), and rhetorical (ῥητορικόν). Rhetorical syllogistic, Albinus says, is concerned with the enthymeme, which is called the “incomplete syllogism” and also “sophisms” (ὄ καλείται ἀτελής συλλογισμός, καὶ προστρεπτι σοφίσματα).

Galen’s classification of arguments as scientific (based on ἀποδεικτικόν), dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistic, a category which does not differ greatly from the rhetorical (Doctr. 2.4 [V 228 K., I 116 De Lacy]), may owe something to Albinus’ three-fold classification in which sophism was another name for enthymeme, the subject of rhetorical syllogistic. But Galen’s classification differs significantly from Albinus’ in at least two ways: first, Galen employs Stoic terminology for his middle two terms rather than the Peripatetic terminology chosen by Albinus, which can be traced to Aristotle Topics 162a16ff. Second, Galen makes sophistic a category entirely separate from rhetorical argumentation, although he was aware that they resembled each other very closely. His need to separate them, as I have argued, grew out of his desire to accommodate the Stoic system in which rhetoric was one of the principal instruments of inquiry into truth.

It is by no means clear, however, that Galen used Albinus at all, since his treatment of logic in the Introduction to Logic bears no specific resemblance to Albinus’ handling of the subject. Galen “does not employ any of the distinctive terms used by Albinus, such as ‘mixed’ syllogisms, nor does he give the same illustrative examples.” The superficial resemblance between Albinus Epitome 3 and Galen’s classification of arguments in Doctrines is best explained as due to the community of concepts and vocabulary among the schools which influenced Galen.

22 Dillon (supra n.20) 339.
Anyone considering the position of Stoicism in later antiquity must take account of the fact that its influence was felt almost as much by those who rejected its tenets as by those who accepted them. As F. H. Sandbach, speaking of the Christians, put it, “They might absorb [Stoicism], alter it, or refute it; but in any case they were in part moulded by it.” So it is with Galen. In his remarks on rhetoric and in his refusal to treat it as a subject worthy of the most serious consideration, he displays the attitude one might expect of a follower of Platonism. But Galen’s contemptuous slighting of rhetoric is in part a pose. He had thought deeply about words, things, and the relations between them, and in his thinking he was guided, but not convinced, by what the Stoics had said on these matters. Although he wrote no Rhetoric, he developed a coherent idea of the art. Rhetoric was based on opinion, and thus a belief founded on or conveyed through rhetoric was inferior to knowledge gained from sense perception or intellectual intuition on the one hand or from demonstration on the other; further, rhetoric as a techne dealt only with the virtue of style called Hellenism and with the corresponding vices, barbarism and solecism, and the rhetorician’s craft was therefore a humble one. The Stoics, as usual when they thought about the relation between language and reality, had got it wrong.

The University of Texas, Austin
June, 1983

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23 The Stoics (London) 1975) 18.
24 This article grew out of a paper presented at the American Philological Association meeting of 1981. I am grateful to Professor John Scarborough for reading an early draft and making suggestions which greatly improved it, and to this journal’s anonymous referee for similar help. What errors remain are of course my own. The Thesaurus Linguae Graecae in Irvine, California, provided a copyrighted machine-readable text of Galen and Pseudo-Galen which greatly aided my work.